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This thesis presents a security measure that is closely coupled to applica-
tions. This distinguishes it from conventional security measures which tend 
to operate at the infrastructure level (network, operating system or virtual 
machine). Such lower level mechanisms exhibit a number of limitations-
amongst others they are poorly suited to the monitoring of applications which 
operate on encrypted data or the enforcement of security policies involving 
abstractions introduced by applications. 
In order to address these problems, the thesis proposes externalising the 
security related analysis functions performed by applications. These other-
wise remain hidden in applications and so are likely to be underdeveloped, 
inflexible or insular. It is argued that these deficiencies have resulted in an 
over-reliance on infrastructure security components. 
The thesis introduces a design to externalise this functionality, realised as 
an interface between applications and an external security component which 
acts both as intrusion detection system and voluntary reference monitor. The 
interface can be seen to offer applications a means to solicit a second opinion 
when performing security related tasks. Compared to conventional intrusion 
detection systems, this direct coupling makes the analysis less vulnerable to 
desynchronisation, furnishes it with higher quality information and makes 
fine-grained, preventive measures feasible. 
A nontrivial system based on this design has been implemented, released 
and deployed. Selected results describing its effectiveness, performance im-
pact and the effort required to operate the system are reported. These con-
firm that the proposed approach is viable in operational systems and suggest 
that closely coupled intrusion detection and response can be achieved by 
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Despite considerable research [114, 31, 18, 124, 30, 64, 21]) it remains remark-
ably difficult and expensive to construct secure software. This has particu-
larly pronounced implications for applications, as these tend to be developed 
under significant resource constraints. Consequently a large number of flaws 
are discovered in applications only after they have been deployed, making 
it necessary to limit and otherwise manage the impact of security flaws at 
runtime. 
Usually the first line of defense against the exploitation of such flaws are 
infrastructure access controls, whether provided by the host operating sys-
tem, virtual machine or network firewall. While these are important barriers, 
this thesis contends that they are not sufficient to protect trusted applications 
that are required to interact with potential attackers. This restriction has 
contributed to the introduction of other security mechanisms such as audit 
modules and intrusion detection systems. In particular) intrusion detection 
systems provide substantial analysis facilities which can be used to monitor 
applications for undesired activity. 
Although attractive, conventional intrusion detection systems are also 
not without limitations-they are, as noted by Ptacek and Newsham [104], 
vulnerable to desynchronisation. Desynchronisation occurs when an intrusion 
detection system fails to track the state of the monitored system and its 
environment accurately. Such failures may result in attacks going unnoticed 
or legitimate activity being interpreted as threatening. The latter makes it 
difficult to deploy automated countermeasures as attackers may be able to 
trigger the intrusion response to disrupt legitimate activity.l 











2 Chapter 1 Introduction 
This thesis argues that desynchronisation opportunities arise when the 
guarding systems function at a significant distance from the guarded ones. In 
this context the distance is not only spatial or temporal2 but also conceptual: 
Intrusion detection systems tend to operate at lower levels of abstraction and 
thus are required to perform an expensive translation process. Effectively this 
demands the duplication of significant application (and occasionally even 
infrastructure) functionality to a high degree of fidelity. 
This thesis proposes a stronger integration between detection system and 
guarded application, as the reduced separation presents fewer possibilities for 
attackers to decouple the security mechanisms and so evade detection. To 
explore this approach a nontrivial system has been designed, implemented 
and published. The implementation provides a bi-directional and dedicated 
interface which allows application developers to transfer security analysis 
tasks to an external system, permitting not only more accurate monitoring 
but also fine-grained responses which block undesired activity. 
This instrumentation has been added to several existing and new trusted 
applications and results indicate that this approach can be useful to enhance 
application security with moderate costs. 
biological systems. 










1.2 Thesis Structure 3 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
The thesis can be divided into two logical parts-an analysis (Chapters 2 -
5) and a synthesis (Chapter 6 and following). The analysis consists of the 













Chapter 2 defines the topic of application security 
and motivates why it is worth investigating. 
Chapter 3 introduces a general model that de-
scribes the security components protecting 
applications and maps several common ap-
proaches to it. 
Chapter 4 uses the model as the basis for a tax-
onomy which identifies five major attributes 
describing the security components. 
Chapter 5 reviews the security component design 
classes and examines the tradeoffs that char-
acterise the classification space induced by the 
taxonomy. 
The analysis provides the context for the introduc-
tion of the security component described in the sec-
ond part. It contains the following chapters: 
Chapter 6 describes the proposed security com-
ponent and orientates it in the classification 
space of the analysis. 
Chapter 7 introduces a concrete and released im-
plementation of the design. 
Chapter 8 reports results which relate to the im-
plementation effort needed to instrument ap-
plications, the performance impact and the se-
curity gains. 
Chapter 9 discusses the limitations of the ap-
























This chapter argues that an investigation of application security is both rele-
vant and challenging. It notes that application security failures are numerous 
and expensive, while resource constraints make it difficult to construct per-
fectly secure applications. This makes it necessary to manage the flaws of 
deployed applications. 
2.2 Definitions 
As there exist several interpretations of the terms application and security, 
this chapter defines both. 
2.2.1 Applications 
This thesis defines the term application as I'a process or program executing 
outside the context of its host runtime". 
A runtime can take various forms but usually includes a component which 
manages the execution (operating system, virtual machine or script inter-
preter) and a collection of predefined supporting functions (libraries). 
In other words, an application is considered to be any execution context 
on the calling side of the application programmer interfaces (APIs). This 
definition is a broad interpretation-unlike the narrow one which is restricted 
to end user programs such as word processors or mail clients, this definition 
also includes server processes and system utilities such as database managers 











6 Chapter 2 Motivation 
The computer systems in common use tend to provide reasonably well-
defined boundaries between host infrastructure and application in the form 
of published APIs, typically implemented as system calls, library interfaces 
or object invocations. 
This does not imply that the boundary between application and infras-
tructure is fixed--it shifts when additional components offering new APIs are 
made available. In such cases a component previously part of an application 
may become sufficiently useful and a prerequisite for other applications to 
be considered part of the host infrastructure. In other words, the bound-
ary between application and host infrastructure is not necessarily static but 
changes as the capabilities of the infrastructure are expanded. In some cases 
this may result in nested applications-for example, a web browser may si-
multaneously be considered an application at one level (a process hosted by 
an operating system) and runtime at another (an interpreter for a scripted 
mortgage calculator). 
The distinction between application and host runtime, whether static 
or not, is useful as the interface between the two represents the boundary 
between general and specialised systems in a form which is used to build the 
majority of computer systems. 
From a security perspective it is interesting to understand the degree 
to which general purpose infrastructure can be used to secure applications 
and the circumstances under which it is necessary to rely on applications to 
operate securely. 
Such an investigation could be considered topical as current attempts of 
large information producers to exert greater control over the use of informa-
tion appear to generate a renewed interest in trusted operating systems and 
infrastructure in generaL 
2.2.2 Computer Security 
There exist two common interpretations of the term security-a broad one 
that includes most failures or undesirable conditions and a restricted one that 
requires the presence of an attacker either to exploit a failure or otherwise 
extract an advantage. 
Examples of the former, broad interpretation include the one given by 
Olovsson [97] which states that (fA secure system is a system on which 
enough trust can be put to use it together with sensitive information", or 
another found in the NSA glossary maintained by Stocksdale [129] which de-
fines computer security as Iitechnological and managerial procedures applied 
to computer systems to ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality 










2.3 Relevance 7 
An example of the latter 1 narrow interpretation is the informal definition 
as given by Cheswick [32] which states that " ... security is keeping anyone 
from doing things you do not want them to do to, with or from your comput-
ers or any peripherals". A more formal version is provided by Howard [62]: 
"Computer security is preventing attackers from achieving objectives through 
unauthorised access or unauthorised use of computers and network..9." A 
similar approach is taken by Meadows [91] who defines security as including 
Ii • •• any means for ensuring that a computer-based system performs a func-
tion in the face of an intruder or intruders who are actively trying to prevent 
it from doing so". 
Although the broad definition of security may be more pervasive, this 
thesis will use the second, narrow definition which requires the participation 
of an adversary and will use the terms reliability or safety to refer to the 
broad interpretation l . In other words, insecure systems are considered a 
subset of unreliable systems. 
2.3 Relevance 
This thesis asserts that the topic of application security is worthy of inves-
tigation, as application security failures account for a significant fraction of 
all published and exploited vulnerabilities. 
For example, of the 748 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 
dictionary entries assigned for the year 2000 (CVE-2000-000l to CVE-2000-
1189, as listed in [35]), application failures outnumber other failures by a 
factor of five. 2 
In addition to being numerous, application failures have the potential to 
be expensive. Data supporting this claim can be found in a publication of 
Computer Economics [41] which contains an estimate of the cost of major 
computer security incidents. The three most expensive incidents are repro-
duced in Table 2.l. 
All three incidents involve applications: Both the Love Bug and Sircam 
take advantage of design flaws in Microsoft Outlook (a mail client), while 
Code Red propagates by exploiting a vulnerability (CVE-200l-0500) in a 
lConsider the spontaneous mechanical failure of a harddisk. Under a strict interpreta-
tion of the broad definition this would have to be considered a security problem as it it 
impacts negatively on integrity or availability. 
2The analysis conducted as part of this thesis classifies 40 entries as kernel failures, 
while 73 relate to embedded systems or other difficult to classify systems (eg a flaw in 
VMware, a virtual machine, can be interpreted both as an application failure as well as 
a hardware flaw). As there exist a number of cases where the classification is ambiguous, 










8 Chapter 2 Motivation 
I Incident I Year I Economic Impact (USD) I 
i Love Bug 2000 8.75 Billion 
Code Red 2001 2.62 Billion 
Sircam 2001 1.15 Billion 
Table 2.1: Cost Estimate of Major Security Incidents [41] 
component of Microsoft IIS (a web server). The thesis notes that quantifying 
the cost of a computer security incident is difficult, and that the above figures 
may overstate the impact. However, the relative ranking is more certain-
there seems little reason to doubt that the above incidents are among the 
most expensive ones reported thus far. 
The large number of application failures as well as their potential sever-
ity makes efforts that aim to secure applications relevant. Given the scale of 
the problem and lack of progress in improving security (as noted by Blak-
ley [23] and others), alternative and even marginal approaches are worthy of 
investigation. 
2.4 Challenges 
Even when substantial resources are allocated to security it remains difficult 
to build nontrivial, yet secure computer systems. This problem is well-known, 
having been noted some time ago by Saltzer and Schroeder [114J who stated 
that "even in systems designed and implemented with security as an impor-
tant objective, design and implementation flaws provide paths that circumvent 
the intended access constraints". Recent examples confirming this observa-
tion include failures in OpenSSH and OpenBSD [38J (see CVE--2002-0083, 
CVE-2002-0639 and CVE--2002-0640), systems which have previously been 
subjected to extensive security analysis. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that in many cases security is 
only a secondary goal as current economic and legislative conditions do not 
sufficiently reward those who attempt to build secure software. Security 
competes with other requirements (such as time to market, feature set, ease 
of use) for scarce resources. Usually the most efficient tradeoff from the 
perspective of those producing software is to allocate only limited resources 
to security. 
Anderson [6] notes that this behaviour is rational: Reaching the market 
before a competitor or having more features are both likely to improve rev-










2.4 Challenges 9 
as vendors of computer related products are currently able to disclaim all 
responsibility for failures of their systems. This is in contrast to providers 
of other products and services where those harmed by failures tend to have 
legal recourse. Similarly, individuals involved in the production of software 
are not required to be licensed as is the case in other engineering fields. 
This thesis does not take a position on the desirability of changing these 
conditions by, for example, requiring that software engineers be profession-
ally registered or regulating markets to force vendors to absorb the costs of 
computer failures. It merely observes that currently there exist only limited 
incentives to produce secure software and that security competes with other 
requirements for limited resources--consequently expensive techniques (for-
mal proofs, comprehensive testing) are unlikely to be deployed in the near 
term. 3 
The effect of this lack of resources is particularly pronounced in the case 
of applications as, relative to the likes of operating systems or network pro-
tocols, applications tend to: 
• have shorter life-cycles, 
• be more numerous, 
• be more varied and 
• be developed by less qualified or experienced developers. 
Under these conditions several techniques known to reduce the number 
of security flaws are either less likely to be applied or become less effective. 
Amongst others: 
• A shorter development cycle leaves less time for testing, while a shorter 
deployment period reduces the chance that flaws found during opera-
tional use will be repaired. 
• Costly and time-consuming formal verification methods are even less 
likely to be applied to applications than to operating systems or net-
work protocols. 
• As applications are more diverse it is more difficult to establish a set of 
well-known and proven designs and an associated body of knowledge. 
3However, there exists the possibility that the greater security needs of vendor lock-in 










10 Chapter 2 Motivation 
Compared to infrastructure components, applications experience less pres-
sure to remain static. Infrastructure components are depended on by other 
systems and are expected to retain the same interfaces across revisions-this 
limits the rate at which changes can be introduced. Applications tend to be 
less constrained in this regard, hence application development is more dy-
namic, proceeding at a greater pace and yielding more numerous and diverse 
systems. 
A greater rate of change increases the potential for the introduction of 
flaws. Thus even under the assumption that the producers of applications are 
not malicious and may even make some attempts to secure applications, it is 
reasonable to assert that applications containing security flaws will continue 
to be shipped for some time to come.4 This makes defences that guard 
against the exploitation of such flaws particularly relevant. 
2.5 Approach 
The previous sections established that is is difficult to build secure systems, 
that in general few resources are allocated to security objectives and that 
these problems are particularly pronounced in the case of applications. 
Under such conditions it becomes important to deploy the few resources 
that are available in a way that maximises their effectiveness. A well-
established strategy used to pursue this goal calls for system designs that 
concentrate security functions at particular modules or components. One of 
the earlier suggestions to this effect can be found in a report by Anderson [4]; 
the report recommended that a security kernel be built, where lithe objective 
of a security kernel design is to integrate in one part of an operating system 
all security related functions." If effective, such designs make it possible to 
focus resources allocated to security on a subset of the system. Flaws in the 
remainder of the system, while still being a reliability concern, have reduced 
or even no security implications. 
In order to achieve this objective, means have to be found to modularise 
the security responsibilities of a given system to such a degree that they can 
be transferred to dedicated and conceptually distinct security components. 
This thesis uses the term security component in preference to security kernel 
to indicate that this strategy has led to the development of several systems, 
not all of which are strongly integrated with operating systems. Virus scan-
4 Although some progress has been made in limiting the impact of applications flaws 
with the deployment of Java Virtual Machines [80], Managed Code Infrastructures and 
related sandbox environments, Chapter 3 will argue that a class of applications can not 
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ners, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, audit components and operating 
system reference monitors are all examples of such security components-
either compensating for security deficiencies in, or assuming security respon-
sibilities of, other systems including applications. 
Despite the existence of such security components, application failures 
remain numerous and expensive. Thus there may be some merit in inves-
tigating the extent to which it is feasible to transfer the security responsi-
bilities of applications to these systems. An improved understanding of the 
circumstances under which application security responsibilities can (or, per-
haps more importantly, cannot) be transferred to other systems should be of 
practical value to both producers and users of applications. Such knowledge 
could also be applied in the design and implementation of alternative security 
components. 
This thesis conducts such an analysis by using a simple security compo-
nent model to establish a framework within which several common security 
system designs can be classified and their characteristics described. The 
framework also provides the context for the analysis of security component 
























This chapter presents a model which describes systems that are designed to 
replace or reinforce the security functions of other entities. These systems are 
referred to as security components. Although the model can be applied more 
generally, this thesis focuses specifically on the security components that are 
used to protect applications containing accidentally introduced flaws. 
3.2 Model Description 
The operation of a security component guarding another system can be re-
duced to three functions: 
1. Collecting information relating to the guarded system 
2. Analysing the information gathered to establish whether the guarded 
system satisfies given security requirements 
3. Mounting a response dependent on whether the requirements are being 
met 
A diagram of the security component model is provided in Figure 3.1: 
Data about the guarded system is acquired and mapped by the decoding 
module to a set of security events. These serve as input for the analysis mod-
ule which establishes whether a security event constitutes a security failure 
by referencing a security policy or equivalent (encoded as an access control 
list, set of firewall rules or database of IDS signatures). This decision is 











14 Chapter 3 Model 
Analysis 
Figure 3.1: A Simple Security Component Model 
Similar models have been applied previously in several security related 
contexts: 
• The Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) project devel-
oped an architecture described in Porras et al [101] as part of an effort 
to define an interoperability mechanism among different intrusion de-
tection systems [128]. This architecture defines four component types: 
Event generators ( (IE-boxes" in the terminology of the CIDF project), 
event analysers ( "A-boxes"), event databases ( "D-boxes") and response 
units ("R-boxes"). The E, A and R-boxes ofthe CIDF architecture cor-
respond, to a degree, to the respective decoding, analysis and response 
subcomponents of the model used in this thesis . 
• An analysis of logging and auditing by Bishop [19] describes the pro-
cess of monitoring a system as consisting of a logging and an audit 
step, where the audit step is further divided into reduction, analysis 
and notification steps. The logging, analysis and notification steps of 
the security logging model can be thought of as being analogous to 
the respective decoding, analysis and response subcomponents of the 
model introduced here, while the function of the reduction step could 
be distributed over the decoding and analysis subcomponents. 
The model proposed in this chapter differs from that of the CIDF project 
in that it is used as an abstract analytical framework, thus the model entities 
are not necessarily interchangeable or even distinct at the implementation 
level, as would be the case with CIDF elements. 
3.3 Mapping 
This section maps several well-known security component designs used in 
the protection applications to the above model. It also examines some of the 
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Reference i 
Monitor 
Figure 3.2: Conventional Host Reference Monitor mapped to the Security 
Component Model 
3.3.1 Host Reference Monitors 
The access control subsystems provided/by the infrastructure of an applica-
tion are the primary security barrier of most computer systems. These sub-
systems, also known as reference monitors, regulate access to the resources 
provided by the infrastructure. For example, most operating systems invoke 
a reference monitor component to establish if an application may read a par-
ticular file, while at the network level a firewall may be used to regulate the 
traffic reaching a networked application. 
With respect to the protection of flawed applications, infrastructure ref-
erence monitors can be used to restrict the access of potential attackers to 
applications, as well as to limit the damage which can be caused when at-
tackers do subvert applications. 
In terms of the model, host reference monitors are security components 
tightly integrated with the infrastructure. A request by an application for a 
resource is received by the infrastructure, decoded to a security event (usually 
in the form of a subject-object-access triple) and submitted to the analysis 
module. In most cases the analyser performs no more than a table lookup or 
equivalent to establish whether the request should be granted. This decision 
is relayed to the response module which either makes the resource available 
to the application or reports an error. A diagram illustrating how a refer-
ence monitor can be mapped to the security component model is given in 
Figure 3.2. 
Host reference monitors are well-established security components-their 
utility has been described by Anderson [4]1 and most computer systems in 
current use include reference monitors that implement access controls based 
IThe report uses the term Reference Validation Mechanism when referring to imple-
mentations of the reference monitor concept. This thesis will use the term Reference 









16 Chapter 3 Model 
on designs set out by Lampson [76]. However, although these are generally 
valuable and widely deployed, there do exist certain conditions under which 
these security components are of limited utility. 
Consider the example of a flawed mail transfer agent. Amongst other 
privileges, this application is permitted by the host infrastructure to read 
incoming mail messages from the mail port. An attacker, interested in sub-
verting the mail transfer agent, writes a corrupting mail message to the mail 
port. The message triggers a flaw in the mail transfer agent-a consequence 
of insufficient length checking, a quoting deficiency or another oversight. This 
allows the attacker to gain control of the application and, by proxy, to acquire 
the remaining capabilities of the mail transfer agent, such as the ability to 
manipulate mailboxes. The noteworthy aspect of this type of attack is that 
it may occur even when lower level access controls are in force. 
It is possible to examine the limitations of conventional infrastructure 
reference monitors in terms of the access matrix model described by Lamp-
son [76]. An access control matrix is used to map a subject-object pair to a 
set of access rights. Subjects are active entities seeking access to resources, 
objects are the resources protected by the reference monitor, and access rights 
are the operations that the reference monitor will perform on objects at the 
request of subjects. 
The subjects of interest in this thesis are attackers and applications. At-
tackers are subjects aiming to increase their capabilities beyond those explic-
itly granted in the access matrix, while applications are subjects containing 
flaws which, when exercised, allow an attacker to gain control of the appli-
cation. 
This problem is independent of the issue of access control safety (ad-
dressed by the likes of Sandhu [116]), which seeks to understand when an 
attacker can gain additional access rights through legitimate updates of the 
access control matrix. Instead this investigation focuses on how a static ac-
cess matrix might be used to prevent an attacker from subverting another 
subject. 
The application flaws considered here are introduced accidentally, not 
maliciously, making it improbable that they can be triggered via a covert 
channel. Given this assumption, an attacker has to interact with an applica-
tion using a communication channel that can be regulated by a host reference 
monitor. In other words, an attacker has to be in possession of capabilities 
which permit some interaction with a flawed application before it can be ex-
ploited, where applications of interest are those that possess capabilities not 
already available to the attacker. 2 
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The above properties can be described in terms of the capability sets of 
attacker and application, where the term capability set3 refers to the set of 
access rights and object pairs that are available to a given subject. 
The notation developed as part of this thesis defines the capability set 
of a subject (Cs ) as a set of ordered pairs, each pair consisting of an object 
(0) and an access right set (a), where a is the set of operations that s may 
perform on o. Given a Lampson [76] access matrix (A), it is possible to derive 
the capability set for a given subject as follows: 
Cs = {(o, a) I a = as,o} (3.1) 
Where as,o is the set of access rights at row s and column 0 of matrix A, 
each row referring to a subject and each column to an object. 
For an attacker to be interested in subverting a given application the 
application should possess capabilities not already available to the attacker. 
This can be expressed as follows: 
(3.2) 
Here Ct and Cv are the capability sets of the attacker and the vulnerable 
application respectively. 
In order for an attacker to exploit a vulnerable application, there has to 
exist some means of communicating with the application. Such a mechanism 
can be modelled using a set of objects which can transmit and receive in-
formation, acting as message containers. The transmissions are subject to 
access control, inducing two access right subsets: aW , the set of rights en-
abling a subject to write information to an object and aT, the set of rights 
allowing a subject to read information from an object. Thus for an attacker 
to send a message to an application, there has to exist an object to which 
the attacker can write and from which the application can read. This can be 
expressed as follows: 
Similarly, a message can be sent in the opposite direction, from applica-
tion to an attacker, if the following is true: 
capability to suspend or terminate an application. 
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Application 
Figure 3.3: Interaction between Attacker and Vulnerable Application 
Usually access controls are used to block this communication entirely, 
while multilevel security systems are designed to restrict this flow of informa-
tion to one direction only. The classical MLS approach focuses on confiden-
tiality and blocks writes to lower levels (excluding 3.4) j while integrity-centric 
designs prohibit reads from lower levels (disallowing 3.3). 
This thesis contends that blocking such exchanges is often too restrictive. 
In particular, a large number of real world applications, ranging from elec-
tronic commerce suites to multi-user gaming environments, are intended to 
communicate with other systems-this is the appeal of a networked environ-
ment. Thus these applications satisfy one, and usually both,4 of the above 
statements. 
However, if subjects communicate but have different capabilities, a failure 
in one subject may allow another to gain access to the capabilities of the failed 
subject, even if the capabilities are guarded by infrastructure access controls. 
A diagram illustrating this is given in Figure 3.3, where objects x, y and z 
can be bound to 0 in expressions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. 
This thesis will refer to applications that satisfy expression 3.2 and (ei-
ther 3.3 or 3.4) as being trusted and to the remainder as being trusting, 
noting that the security responsibilities of a trusted application cannot be 
transferred completely to conventional infrastructure reference monitors. In 
contrast, a trusting application can to a reasonable degree rely on the infras-
tructure to either isolate it from hostile subjects or restrict it to capabilities 
that are already in possession of the subjects interacting with it. Either mea-
sure diminishes the security implications of a flaw in a trusting application 
significantly, reducing the security concerns to ensuring that such trusting 
applications do not contain malicious flaws and are not deployed in roles 
where only trusted application would suffice. 
Consider the example of a trusting desktop calculator application: Host 
access controls are sufficient to restrict this application to the same privileges 
4Most widely-used protocols are bidirectional because duplex communication is desir-
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as the user invoking it and to ensure that only one user has access to a given 
calculator instance. There may well exist flaws in the calculator, however, its 
user has no incentive to exercise them, as this would yield no new capabilities 
and would only adversely influence the user's own computations. In other 
words, the flaws of this application are largely an issue of reliability rather 
than security, as it is possible for a reference monitor to assume most security 
functions of the calculator. This changes as soon as the calculator is used in 
a hostile environment where an unreliable system becomes a direct security 
hazard. For example, if the parts of the calculator are reused in an electronic 
commerce system (a trusted application), a flaw might allow an attacker to 
purchase an item at an unauthorised discount. 
This thesis notes that increased efforts aimed at partitioning or isolating 
subsystems are likely to reduce the possibilities that a trusting application 
may accidentally be exposed to hostile subjects, while finer-grained infras-
tructure access controls are an effective means of limiting the capabilities 
which an attacker may gain by compromising a trusted application. How-
ever, the thesis conjectures that neither fine-grained host access controls nor 
isolation mechanisms are sufficient to eliminate trusted applications entirely. 5 
An example supporting this notion is a trusted medical database appli-
cation which permits a certain user to retrieve a particular disease incidence 
rate for a population but not the disease status of an individuaL The disease 
incidence rate is a domain-specific abstraction introduced by the application 
and has its own security requirements. 
Controlling access to such domain abstractions at the infrastructure level 
is nontrivial, as the mapping from infrastructure resources (disk blocks) to 
abstractions (disease averages) can be arbitrarily complex, requiring either 
the duplication or inclusion of substantial application functionality in the in-
frastructure reference monitor. Consider the above database example where 
the calculation of the population average may generate the same disk block 
reads as a listing of all individuals-distinguishing between the two requires 
access to the database logic.6 
Conventional operating system reference monitors are generally not used 
to perform this task, as it is at odds with the principles of Anderson [4]. 
These state that reference monitors should be tamper-proof, always invoked 
and small enough to be well tested. In particular, the provision of facilities 
to encode and apply the domain knowledge necessary to follow higher level 
exchanges between attacker and application may conflict with the simplicity 
5This position can be rephrased using the terminology of Clarke and 'Wilson to state 
that it does not appear feasible to transfer all application resident transformation proce-
dures to conventional infrastructure. 
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and tamper-resistance requirements. 
In terms of the security component model, the decoding module of a 
conventional operating system reference monitor generates security events 
which relate to the access of infrastructure resources. In order to maximise 
reliability, the analysis of these security events is relatively simple, usually 
consisting of stateless lookups to determine if an access request should be 
granted. 
Reference monitors of this type are sufficient to isolate flawed but nonma-
licious7 applications from other subjects, but provide insufficient protection 
for trusted applications that are required to interact with potential attackers. 
This limitation has led to the introduction of other security component de-
signs such as intrusion detection and audit systems which are used to discover 
failures not prevented by conventional reference monitors. 
3.3.2 Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
Ketwork intrusion detection systems (NIDS), of which NSM [60] is an early 
representative, are entities that monitor network traffic for signs of unde-
sirable activity. Ketwork intrusion detection systems can be thought of as 
standalone security components which, amongst others, guard networked 
applications such as chat clients, P2P systems or mail servers. Along with 
infrastructure access controls and virus scanners, NIDS are among the most 
frequently deployed security components. 
A conventional NIDS can be mapped to the security component model 
as follows: The data source of a KIDS is network traffic which is collected 
using a promiscuous network interface or network tap. Each network packet 
is considered a security event which is submitted for analysis. NIDS analysis 
modules occur in two major forms: 
Misuse detectors apply a set of rules or signatures which describe known 
illegal activity 
Anomaly detectors employ statistical or machine learning techniques to 
flag deviations from normal activity 
Both NIDS analysis forms tend to be more sophisticated than the equiv-
alent infrastructure reference monitor subsystems, as the latter generally 
perform no more than simple table lookups. The same is not true of NIDS 
response modules, which are usually less developed and not as effective as 
7The confinement of applications intent on violating such constraints is substantially 
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Figure 3.4: Conventional Network Misuse Detection System mapped to the 
Security Component Model 
the host reference monitor equivalents, as the possibility exists that a NIDS 
may intervene in error-consequently most NIDS installations are config-
ured to alert human operators rather than to intervene directly, even when 
automated response facilities are available. 
The mapping of a typical NIDS to the security component model as il-
lustrated in Figure 3.4 is natural and without significant distortion. Several 
NIDS implementations use a model of this form as the basis for their ar-
chitecture: For example, Roesch [112] states that "there are three primary 
subsystems that make up Snort: the packet decoder, the detection engine, and 
the logging and alerting subsystem." A similar architecture is also given by 
Paxson [98, Figure 1]. 
The defining characteristic of NIDS, namely the use of raw network data 
as input, makes these security components reasonably independent of other 
systems. Consequently NIDS are easily deployed and unobtrusive, usually 
requiring no modification to existing systems other than finding a suitable 
point at which network traffic can be intercepted. 
The disadvantage of using raw network traffic to monitor applications is 
that the NIDS analysis has to duplicate the functionality of all intermediate 
network layers as well as application level abstractions. Such duplication has 
to be of high fidelity-if not it offers attackers the possibility to desynchronise 
the NIDS from the applications being monitored. 
Viewed informally and anthropomorphically, desynchronisation attacks 
are attempts to sneak past security components: An attacker, aware of the 
possibility that the target application may be monitored, attempts to avoid 
triggering the security component by obscuring the attack. An attacker can 
achieve this by taking advantage of differences between application and se-
curity component to formulate the attack in a way that causes it to be inter-
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Desynchronisation attacks have gained prominence in the field of network 
intrusion detection with the publication of a substantial list of desynchronisa-
tion possibilities relating to TCP lIP networks by Ptacek and Newsham [104] 
and the introduction of desynchronisation tools such as fragrouter [127] and 
whisker [107]. 
A class of systems that can be used to illustrate the problem of desynchro-
nisation are web-enabled applications, including Common Gateway Interface 
(CG I) programs and their successors. 
A substantial number of applications of this type are known to contain 
vulnerabilities,8 often input validation flaws. To exploit such a flaw an at-
tacker issues an HTTP [16] request which invokes the application with pa-
rameters designed to trigger the execution of attacker specified commands, 
usually by overflowing a buffer in the case of a compiled language such as C, 
or by taking advantages of insufficient quoting in interpreted languages such 
as PERL. 
The CGI specification [84] described how parameters may be passed to a 
web application as part of the URL (parameters are encoded as part of the 
query string in CGI terminology), an approach which has been adopted by 
successive systems and formalised in RFC 2396 [17]. 
This allows an attacker to probe for or compromise a vulnerable appli-
cation using a single HTTP GET request. Such an approach was used by 
the Code Red family of worms to propagate, taking advantage of the input 
validation failure identified in CVE-2001-0500. 
If the security components which guard web applications possess infor-
mation describing known vulnerabilities (for example, that a particular web 
application fails on receiving a query string exceeding a certain size), then 
it should be possible to detect attacks by decoding the client requests and 
matching them against entries in the vulnerability database. 
This task is commonly performed by network misuse detection systems. 
Although this appears simple, it may be vulnerable to desynchronisation at 
several points: 
• Ketwork stack differences or omissions can be used to desynchronise 
security components. For example, an attacker may interleave addi-
tional packets having an invalid checksum or sequence number and 
carrying a payload which masks the attack. Such packets may erro-
neously be processed by the NIDS but discarded by the target system. 
Some attacks of this form can be defended against by implementing a 
more accurate networking subsystem in the NIDS. However, this may 
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be difficult if parts of a protocol are underspecified---an example of 
this can be found in the handling of overlapping TCP segments~the 
specifications do not state which segment of an overlapping pair takes 
precedence. In such cases a ::".rIDS may have to support all permu-
tations, whereas the guarded system need only implement one. This 
increases NIDS complexity substantially. 
• Environmental differences between security component and guarded 
system may be exploited by an attacker. For example, a ::".rIDS located 
several hops in front of the guarded system could be sent a packet hav-
ing a time-to-live counter low enough to prevent it reaching the guarded 
system. Such a packet can be used to request the termination of an 
established session~on receiving it the NIDS may ignore subsequent 
packets even though they are still accepted by the guarded system. 
• Aliases and escapes may allow for the extensive reformatting of at-
tacks. In the case of HTTP requests, examples include % escapes which 
can be used to replace arbitrary characters (eg replace the character ; 
with %3b) and file system aliases (eg change / to /. I). Matters may 
be further complicated by Postel's Principle of Robustness [102] which 
advises developers to "be liberal in what you accept, and conservative 
in what you send." This advice yields systems that will attempt to cor-
rect nonstandard or malformed input in an implementation-dependent 
fashion-a behaviour that may have to be replicated by the NIDS. 
• Flooding and other denial of service attacks may overwhelm the se-
curity component. For example, a NIDS located at the gateway of a 
large, high-bandwidth network may be required to monitor a substan-
tial number of web servers. If the computational resources available 
to the web server farm exceed those of the NIDS, then an attacker 
may generate (or wait for the occurrence of) large volumes of traffic to 
swamp an attack. 
• Some systems provide cryptographically secured channels. These may 
be used by an attacker to evade detection. For example, a web server 
supporting HTTPS (the cryptographically secured version of HTTP) 
may provide substantial privacy to an attacker compromising a web 
application, effectively reducing the function of a conventional NIDS 
to traffic analysis. 
The above de synchronisation possibilities can be described slightly more 
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as parameters the current application state s~ and some input if, and com-
putes some output of and the next state s~+1' where t is a discrete measure 
of time, starting at t 0 and sg is the initial application state: 
r(i~, s~) = (o~, s~+1) (3.5) 
Using the observation of Ilgun [63], one can partition the set of appli-
cation states sa into two nonoverlap ping subsets, those states in which the 
application is in a safe state s E S:, and those states which denote a com-
promise s E sg, where S: n sg = 0. The characteristic function ca of subset 
sg can then be used to test if an application has been compromised. 
ca(sa) {
true if sa E Sea 
false if sa ¢: sg (3.6) 
A NIDS can be thought of as a function fn which decides whether an 
application has entered a compromised state by monitoring application in-
put and output, without having direct access to the internal state of the 
application. 
f n( ·n n n) a, ~t ,Ot, St (3.7) 
Here a is a description of the application, i~ and o~ are the current ob-
served application input and output, s~ the current NIDS state, and d~ the 
NIDS assessment, where dn E {true, false}. Under the conditions that 
1. the application description a is sufficiently detailed to derive fa and 
the initial application state sg, 
2. the inputs observed by the NIDS are the same as received by the ap-
plication: Vt : i~ =if 
3. and the NIDS can encode sufficient state: Isnl ~ ISal, 
it is possible for the NIDS to construct a shadow copy of an arbitrary 
application-the state of this copy can then be inspected to determine if 
the monitored application has been compromised. In the terminology of 
Bishop [19], a NIDS meeting these requirements can be thought of as a real-
time change logging system with access to the initial state of the monitored 
system. 
Desynchronisation becomes a concern when the above constraints are vio-
lated. For example, attempts to overload a NIDS can be thought of as violat-
ing either constraint 2 (forcing the NIDS to discard some traffic still received 
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state). Similarly, a NIDS monitoring a cryptographically secured application 
may fail on constraint 1 (not being party to an initial secret contained in sg) 
or 2 (lacking access to a copy of the random input used in the generation of 
cryptographic keys). 
It should be noted that for some application classes it is possible for a 
NIDS to violate the above constraints yet remain synchronised. In partic-
ular, an application that contains redundancies can be monitored using a 
smaller, yet equivalent, shadowed copy by applying compression techniques 
from the field of information theory. Simplifications are also possible if the 
the mapping from input and current state to output is amenable to inversion. 
In such cases the output can be used to detect failures after they have oc-
curred. However, while such simplifications are possible in some cases, they 
are not necessarily cheap, as both compression and inversion may require a 
significant domain dependent analysis effort. 
For the general case, meeting the above constraints is difficult and unlikely 
to become easier, given the trends of increased deployment of cryptograph-
ically secured channels and the ever greater nesting of protocols. The most 
substantial example of this is the construction of multiple protocol layers 
above HTTP, previously considered to be a top-level protocol. 
Under such circumstances it remains likely that a typical NIDS analysis 
module will only receive an approximate description of the higher level inter-
actions between attacker and application. \Vhile such approximations may 
provide analysis modules with sufficient information to detect naive attempts 
to subvert applications, capable attackers may have enough opportunities to 
escape detection. 
3.3.3 Log and Audit Systems 
Subsection 3.3.1 examined infrastructure reference monitors and noted that 
the infrastructure level security policies enforced by conventional systems are 
insufficient to protect against the exploitation of flaws in a class of applica-
tions termed trusted. 
This limitation of not being able to absorb the security implications of all 
application flaws is largely a consequence of keeping the analysis module of a 
conventional reference monitor simple and making the overall system tamper-
proof. Such an approach is justified, as it reduces the possibilities that the 
reference monitor itself may contain flaws or be subverted. Unfortunately 
low complexity and tamper-proof often also imply difficult to extend, mak-
ing it necessary to deploy secondary security components to guard trusted 
applications. 
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Figure 3.5: Conventional Host Anomaly Detection System mapped to the 
Security Component Model 
are among the more widely used secondary security component types. Al-
though also used to guard against the exploitation of flaws in systems other 
than applications (eg flawed protocol stacks)) network intrusion detection 
systems tend to include substantial analysis functions capable of discovering 
attempts to exploit flawed applications across a network. The weakness of 
these security components is that they have to duplicate substantial logic and 
state to remain synchronised with applications. As this duplication is expen-
sive, most NIDS only provide approximations which makes them vulnerable 
to desynchronisation and thus of limited effectiveness against non-naive at-
tackers or in cryptographically secured environments. 
A strategy used to reduce desynchronisation opportunities involves the 
closer integration of security components with the systems to be guarded. In 
terms of the security component model this consists of the partial or complete 
sharing of data acquisition and decoding functions between guarded system 
and security component as shown in Figure 3.5. At the implementation 
level this is usually achieved by instrumenting the systems to report security 
related information. These security events, in this context known as audit 
records, are stored for both human and automated analysis. Indeed, most 
of the early work in the field of intrusion detection [5, 40, 88] involved the 
analysis of audit data as opposed to network traffic. 
A limitation of security components which process audit records is that 
activity is only reported once it has occurred and that audit interfaces are 
generally unidirectionaL This makes it difficult to take action to prevent at-
tacks, while posthoc responses may lack the facilities to influence the guarded 
system at the desired level of detaiL In other words, responses may be de-
layed and coarse. 
Deciding what information should be logged, and capturing the meaning 
of this information, presents further challenges. In general it is not feasible 
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ing an audited system to disregard some information,9 while the meaning 
of information which is chosen to be recorded has to be made available to 
those performing the analysis. When examining this issue, it is useful to 
differentiate between infrastructure and application level information: 
• Infrastructure level instrumentations record security events in terms of 
the abstractions of the host runtime, logging events such as the sys-
tem calls made by applications. The Solaris Basic Security Module 
(BSM) [131] provides a well-known example of such a host audit inter-
face and is used as data source by a number of host based intrusion 
detection systems including the ones described in [63, 72, 95, 49]. 
• Application level instrumentations report events relating to the domain 
in which the application operates. A subsystem often used by applica-
tions to report such information is the syslog interface [85], although 
it is not uncommon for applications to implement their own logging 
subsystems. 
The advantage of using an infrastructure instead of an application audit 
trail is that the information can be acquired without the co-operation of the 
application provider and without relying on the integrity of the monitored 
application. In addition, host audit records have the same structure across 
different applications, a property which simplifies their manipulation. 
The disadvantage of processing infrastructure audit records is that it re-
mains necessary to map this data to higher level abstractions when monitor-
ing trusted applications. Consider the example of a mail client, inherently a 
trusted application,lO monitored by a security component which receives a log 
of the system calls issued by the mail client: Distinguishing reliably between 
a mailborne worm and a legitimate autoforward function using a system call 
trace is challenging. Merely examining the sequence of system call names 
(and ignoring parameters) may not be sufficient, as the propagation of a 
worm or the autoforwarding of harmless mail may be indistinguishable at 
that level of detaiL Correcting for this by recording more detail, such as the 
buffer content of 10 related system calls, can increase (already nontrivial) 
9 Arguably this problem is more pronounced in host audit systems than in network 
intrusion detection systems, as exchanges among hosts (and particular those crossing net-
work boundaries) tend to be more expensive and thus represented in a more compact form 
than the ones occurring within a host. 
10 A mail client satisfies expression 3.2 as it possesses privileges such as the right to 
manipulate mail folders or the ability to print mail, privileges which should not be available 
to arbitrary correspondents of its owner, while expressions 3.3 or 3.4 are met whenever 
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storage and processor demands substantially.11 Thus few conventional audit 
subsystems are configured or even designed to do so. 
This problem is related to NIDS desynchronisation described in the pre-
vious section, in particular the violation of constraint 2-the requirement 
that the inputs received by guarded application and security component be 
the same. Security components processing infrastructure audit records may 
also fail on the remaining constraints, as reconstructing the security status of 
an application from an audit trail may (in the worst case) impose the same 
processing demands as running the application. It is worth noting that the 
use of techniques such as application space threading, scripted extensions, 
end-to-end encryption and the caching or preloading of resources can con-
tribute to the complication of this task. In other words, systems analysing 
infrastructure audit data are also vulnerable to desynchronisation, although 
not to the same extent as network intrusion detection systems: Whereas 
NIDS share little more with guarded applications than access to the same 
network, host audit systems provide substantial decoding functions, provid-
ing analysts with security events defined in of the abstractions that 
are used to construct or service the guarded applications. 
By instrumenting applications it becomes possible to reduce desynchro-
nisation opportunities further: In terms of the security component model, 
this approach yields access to security events defined in terms of application 
abstractions. Such a close coupling is difficult to desynchronise, as the se-
curity component does not need to duplicate application functionality and 
has direct access to the application state. However, the use of application 
level instrumentations also has disadvantages: It requires the co-operation 
of the application provider and relies on the integrity of the instrumented 
application. The latter property compels security components operating on 
application logs to detect attacks before the application is compromised, as 
subsequent application audit data may no longer be accurate. 
A further disadvantage of analysing application-specific abstractions is 
that it is difficult to construct a substantial analysis framework which spans 
different application domains. Consequently the systems processing appli-
cation logs tend to be either specialised systems operating on the logs of a 
particular application (such as web proxy logs in the case of Calamaris [14]) 
or are designed to operate on unstructured data (a common approach involves 
the use of regular expressions to match text log entries, as implemented by 
systems such as Swatch [57]). 
11 For example, starting the mozilla suite involves approximately 10,000 system calls but 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a security component model and mapped three 
of the most widely used security mechanisms to it. The limitations of the 
mechanisms, when used in the protection of applications, were identified as 
the following: 
• Conventional infrastructure access controls lack the facilities to track 
the interaction between trusted applications and attackers. 
• Low-level intrusion detection systems are vulnerable to desynchroni-
sation because they are required to duplicate substantial application 
functionality. 
• Logging mechanisms tend to be unidirectional and operate after the 
fact, making it difficult to launch a response. Infrastructure logging 
systems may also be vulnerable to desynchronisation (albeit in a milder 
form), while application logs may be unreliable and tend to require 
substantial domain knowledge during their analysis. 
These limitations motivate the investigation into alternative security com-
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Figure 4.1: Security Components Mapped to the Time Dimension 
ponent can be assigned to one or more of these periods, yielding several 
design permutations. Representative examples are described below and the 
description is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
• A vulnerability scanner such as NetKuang [144] can be invoked before a 
system is exposed to attack. Mapped to the security component model 
all the phases (collection, analysis and response) are active before an 
attack is attempted. 
• A reference monitor, and access control systems in general, are deployed 
during an attack to ensure that the action initiated by an attacker does 
not progress far enough to damage the guarded system. All the phases 
of this design are thus active during the attack. 
• A conventional network intrusion detection system such as snort [112] 
collects and analyses information relating to an attack as it occurs. Al-
though facilities exist to initiate automated responses, the more usual 
approach consists of alerting a human operator. This design differs 
from an access control system in that it is not possible to guarantee 
that any of the phases will complete before the attack succeeds. Con-
sider the example of a buffer overflow exploit sufficiently compact to be 
contained in a single packet-conceivably such an attack may succeed 
even before it has been completely decoded by the NIDS. Thus, unlike 
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Figure 4.3: A Security Setting of the Mozilla Web Browser 
well-integrated with the application gateway, although there do exist 
designs that only use application gateways to collect information and 
leave analysis and response to other parties . 
• Security components that are designed to protect the applications with 
which they are integrated occur in a number of forms. Application level 
logging is an approach which integrates data collection with the appli-
cation but leaves analysis and response to other systems. Examples of 
measures that also integrate analysis and response with the applica-
tion are configuration options which disable application functionality 
deemed to be dangerous-a screenshot showing a configuration option 
that disables a web browser function associated with threats to con-
fidentiality, in particular privacy, is given in Figure 4.3. Other exam-
ples include consistency checks (a simple example being the use of the 
assert macro to test if security relevant assumptions hold) and appli-
cation level access controls (such as those implicit in the buddy lists of 
a chat client which may allow selected individuals greater access to its 
user). 
4.4 Degree of Automation 
This attribute describes the extent to which a security component can func-
tion autonomously. Informally this attribute describes who is needed to 
provide assistance during the deployment and operation of the system. 
Human intervention may however be necessary during all three phases of 
the model. For each phase the degree of this involvement can be categorised 
as follows: 
• An entirely manual phase relies on a human to perform the given task. 
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behaviour. However, current anomaly detection systems remain depen-
dent on some form of human supervision. 3 
As in the previous example, network intrusion detection systems typi-
cally alert human operators instead of mounting automated responses. 
Exceptions are inlined network intrusion detection systems which are 
able to discard undesired traffic-in the case of snort this functionality 
is provided by the hogwash extension. 
• Infrastructure reference monitors in the form of operating system access 
controls or network firewalls are security components that are designed 
to operate autonomously-collecting, analysing and responding to at-
tempted transgressions without human intervention. The deployment 
of such systems does require supervision, as inserting a firewall into 
an existing network gateway or a reference monitor into an operating 
system previously lacking access controls can involve extensive design 
changes. However, as access control mechanisms are usually integrated 
with modern network elements and operating systems, this task does 
not have to be undertaken on a per-installation basis. The effort that 
remains dependent on a particular environment is the management of 
the analysis module, ie the specification of an access control policy.4 
• A system such as stackguard [37] is an example of a security com-
ponent which can function with almost no supervision. Except for 
the initial deployment effort of recompiling the guarded executable (a 
task which requires little analysis effort and can be performed by an 
application provider), little human involvement is required-once in-
strumented, this security mechanism will monitor a process for failures 
that result in stack corruptions and will abort execution if any are 
detected. 
4.5 Analysis Abstraction 
This section provides an initial categorisation of the events submitted for 
analysis. Put simply, this section describes what the analysis subcomponent 
operates on. 
3Human involvement is often needed to supply annotated training data, tune learning 
parameters and, most significantly, disambiguate between true and false positives [9]. 
4In this context a role-based access control approach provides a level of indirection 
which isolates core security policy statements from some environmental dependencies and 
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As in the previous sections, the intention is not to establish a detailed 
framework capable of defining every possible abstraction uniquely-arguably 
such an effort requires further advances in the representation of ontological 
information. Instead the objective is to identify a general quality of the 
entities in terms of which the security events are defined. Three classification 
categories are proposed for this purpose: 
• Infrastructure abstractions describe events in terms of entities which 
are used to construct or service the application. Examples include host 
operating system processes identifiers, files and system calls. 
• Application abstractions are introduced by the designer of a particular 
application to describe the domain in which the system operates. For 
example, a word processor might generate security events defined in 
terms of paragraphs and chapters. 
• Security abstractions are independent of a particular application or 
infrastructure but are introduced to capture a generic security property. 
For example, a security class of a multi-level access control system 
labelled confidential is a construct which could be used to describe 
both a word processor paragraph or an operating system file. 
The abstraction dimension differs from the placement or location at-
tribute described earlier-for example, designs exist which place a security 
component inside an application, yet report security events in terms of in-
frastructure abstractions; a simple case is a modification that causes an ap-
plication to log the system calls it issues. 
Of interest is that the application and infrastructure categories are easily 
accessible to those providing the respective systems, as the same conceptual 
frameworks used to construct the systems can also be used to perform the 
security analysis. Consider the example of a network router which operates 
on an abstraction involving packets and networks. Constructing an analy-
sis subcomponent that processes security events in the form of packets sent 
to networks does not require the introduction of an alternative conceptual 
framework. Similarly, an application-specific abstraction permits the appli-
cation programmer to generate security events without a translation effort. 
In contrast, the security abstraction category requires a mapping of the 
reported security events from the native abstraction to an alternative form 
prior to analysis. A number of these mappings are described below: 
• The conventional access control model (subjects having a set of access 
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security-related activity of a particular system to a set of subject-object-
access triples. Usually the meaning of these values remains dependent 
on a particular domain (an operating system may operate on files, 
a database on tables, etc); however, when a security labelling scheme 
(either in the form of security compartments or levels) is used, an access 
control abstraction can be separated from the application domain. 
• Analysis components employing machine learning techniques to dis-
cover anomalies (an approach sufficiently general to be applied to both 
applications and infrastructure activity) tend to require particularly 
information-dense representations of security relevant information for 
optimal operation. Mapping system activity to such a representation 
usually involves feature selection (see [79] for an examination of this 
task in a security context) and encoding efforts (an example of a map-
ping from a TCP connection attempt to a compact 49 bit string is 
described in [61]). 
• The syslog interface is primarily used to report unstructured infras-
tructure or application-specific events. However, it also includes an 
eight-valued severity field (ranging from routine debug and informa-
tional messages to high-priority alerts and emergencies) which makes 
it possible to filter events without knowledge of the domain in which 
the reporting system operates. 
• The Distributed Auditing Standard (XDAS) [133] defines 9 default 
event classes, which in total contain 45 generic events to which the 
activity of a given system can be mapped. Event classes relate to tasks 
such as the administration and use of accounts, communications chan-
nels, services and applications. Within each of the event classes, activ-
ity is generally reported in terms of the creation, access, modification 
or destruction of an entity. 
• Although the Message Exchange Format of the Intrusion Detection 
\Norking Group (IDWG) [43] as well as the Logging Data Map (LDM) 
of Ranum and Robertson [108] operate on domain abstractions, pri-
marily network related, it is possible to identify a security abstraction 
(not unrelated to the subject-object-access model) which defines ac-
tivity in terms of a source (possible attacker) and a target (potential 
victim). In the case of the LDM, 10 of the 23 tags are used to describe 
source and target entities (example tags are SRCPID, SRCPATH, SRCDEV 
and SRCUSER), while others are used to label information such as event 
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proposed IETF Intrusion Detection l1essage Exchange Format consist 
primarily of source and target elements, which may be nodes, users, 
processes or services. 
4.6 Analysis Complexity 
This attribute categorises the computational requirements of the analysis 
phase. The thesis of Kumar [75] describes the complexity of encoding misuse 
signatures in terms of four major categories, in ascending order of complexity: 
ExistenceTests C Sequence Matches C 
ExtendedRegular Expressions C Other Patterns 
An alternative approach would be to describe the time and space re-
quirements of a security component directly. However, given that the above 
categories are established, representative of mechanisms used operationally, 
and can be mapped to the time and space requirements, the four categories 
are also used in this taxonomy. Members of these categories are given below: 
• The reference monitors of commonly used operating systems are designs 
that belong to the first category: In order to test if an access request 
should be granted, a lookup is performed to establish if the requested 
access right is available for the given subject/object pair-in other 
words, the reference monitor tests if a given privilege exists. Both 
the time and space requirements of this approach are low: Usually no 
state needs to be maintained across events and the test can often be 
performed in constant time.5 
• The approach of matching short sequences of system calls, as described 
in [61], is representative of the second category, provided that the gen-
eration of sequences during the training phase is regarded as a variant 
of policy formulation, rather than part of the immediate analysis. 
• Regular expressions have been used for a number of analysis 
although usually associated with the processing of unstructured secu-
rity event streams, regular expressions have also been applied in the 
specification of behaviour restrictions on applications [121] or gener-
ated automatically as anomaly detectors [92]. 
5Consider the request by a unix process to open a file: Comparing the process owner 
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• Analysis components belonging to the fourth category include those 
that provide extension interfaces or policy interpreters for computa-
tionally complete languages. DEEDS [3J is an example of the latter, as 
policy is stated in the form of a Java program. Such an analysis can 
have unbounded time and storage requirements. 
The above categories were not intended to describe the complexity of 
anomaly detection systems. If anomaly detectors are thought of as systems 
that automate the specification of policy, then this function (and its complex-
ity) is distinct from the matching of the learnt patterns against the security 
event stream. Otherwise the control logic and state size of anomaly detection 
systems is usually sufficiently large to assign them to the latter categories. 
Similarly human analysis is regarded as belonging to the most complex cat-
egory. 
4.7 Related Taxonomies 
This section relates the security component taxonomy introduced in this 
chapter (and abbreviated to SCT in this section) to other classification work 
in the area of computer security. The largest effort in this area has been 
directed at categorising security flaws and the attempts to exploit them-
taxonomies of this type have been described in [78, 81, 74, 62, 48], amongst 
others. Despite being criticised by a number of authors for being somewhat 
ambiguous [62J or nonspecific [74], the taxonomy of Landwehr [78] remains 
an appealing framework. It proposes three security flaw dimensions: 
• The genesis attribute describes how flaws are introduced, defining two 
major categories that differentiate between flaws that have been intro-
duced inadvertently and those inserted deliberately. 
• The time of introduction positions the point at which the flaw is in-
serted relative to the lifecycle of the system-this attribute defines the 
major categories of development, maintenance and operation. 
• The location describes which systems contain the flaw. Here the major 
categories are hardware and software, with the latter being further 
divided into operating system, support and application subcategories. 
This flaw taxonomy can be used to position the work of this thesis-as 
motivated in a previous chapter, the focus is on applications which contain 
flaws introduced accidentally. In terms of the Landwehr taxonomy, SCT is 
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• Genesis: Inadvertent or nonmalicious 
• Time of introduction: All categories, from development to operation 
• Location: Applications 
Although useful in positioning and evaluating security components, flaw 
and attack taxonomies provide only limited information about the mecha-
nisms used to defend computer systems-such information is better conveyed 
by direct descriptions of security components. The following subsections ex-
amine such taxonomies and relate them to the framework proposed in this 
chapter. 
The comparison is qualified by the observation that the various tax-
onomies do not have identical subject domains, for example some taxonomies 
focus more on collection mechanisms, while others seek to classify responses. 
4.7.1 Conventional IDS Classification 
A simple taxonomy, which is frequently used to introduce intrusion detec-
tion systems, consists of two classification attributes-one dimension distin-
guishes between anomaly and misuse detectors, the other between network 
and host-based systems. 
Mapped to SCT, the distinction between misuse and anomaly detection 
systems can be described using the degree of a1J,tomation attribute (see Sec-
tion 4.4) applied to the analysis phase: A misuse detection system can be 
considered an example of a security component which contains a partially 
automated analysis subcomponent: A security administrator is no longer re-
quired to analyse security events directly, instead a security expert compiles 
a set of signatures that describe undesired activity and drive the analysis. 
Anomaly detection systems are examples of security components that aim to 
automate the analysis phase further: Instead of specifying policy manually, 
a corpus of past activity is submitted to a machine learning system which 
uses this data to derive the equivalent of a security policy. 
The distinction between network and host-based systems can be thought 
of as an alternative categorisation of the location attribute (see Section 4.3) 
of the security component model. Whereas the conventional approach groups 
applications and operating systems (as well as related support systems such 
as virtual machines and language interpreters) into the single host category, 
SCT groups networks and operating systems into the infrastructure category. 














Figure 4.4: Conventional and SCT Partitions of the Location Dimension 
4.7.2 Zamboni Data Collection Classification 
Zamboni [142, chapter 2] examines a number of intrusion detection architec-
tures and classifies these, primarily in terms of their data collection phase. 
Two classification dimensions (termed conceptual classifications by their au-
thor) are identified: 
• The collection structure is used to distinguish between distributed and 
centralised data acquisition. A collection structure is defined as distri-
buted if the number of collection locations is "directly proportional to 
the number of monitored components". The same division is also used 
to describe the subsequent analysis. 
• The collection mechanism distinguishes between indirect and direct 
monitoring, with the former category being defined as "the observation 
of the monitored component through a separate mechanism or tool" and 
the latter as "the observation of the monitored component by obtaining 
data directly from it". Observation mechanisms of the direct category 
are further divided into external and internal sensors. An external 
sensor is defined as "a piece of software that observes a component in 
a host and reports data usable by an intrusion detection system, and 
that is implemented by code separate from that component"[142, pg 16], 
whereas an internal sensor is "a piece of software that observes a compo-
nent in a host and reports data usable by an intrusion detection system, 
and that is implemented by code incorporated into that component"[142, 
pg 17]. 
The collection mechanism dimension of this taxonomy can be mapped to 
the SCT location dimension (described in Section 4.3) as follows: 
• A sensor internal to an application can be regarded as a security com-
ponent which locates its collection, and possibly analysis and response, 
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• distinction between an IDS using an indirect collection mechanism 
and one using an external sensor as defined above seems slight: Mon-
itoring a component using a "separate mechanism or tool" appears to 
be little different from receiving data from something which is "imple-
mented by code separate from that component". For this reason both 
these categories will be considered to be equivalent to security compo-
nent designs whose collection subcomponent is placed adjacent to or 
below the monitored component/guarded application (points Y or Z in 
Figure 4.2). 
The SCT location dimension can also be used, in part, to describe the 
collection structure, by noting that any design which locates the collection 
subcomponent within the guarded application has a distributed collection 
structure as the number of collection subcomponents is, of necessity, propor-
tional to the number of monitored components/guarded applications. 
4.7.3 AINT: The Anti-Intrusion Taxonomy 
AINT, introduced by Halme [55], informally describes a number of mecha-
nisms used to defend computer systems. The taxonomy does not identify 
distinct classification attributes or dimensions, instead it lists the following 
six categories: 
1. Prevention " ... seek[s} to preclude or at least severely handicap the like-
lihood of success of a particular intrusion." 
2. Preemption " ... techniques strike offensively prior to an intrusion at-
tempt . .. " 
3. Deterrence "seeks to make any likely reward from an intrusion attempt 
more troublesome than it is worth. " 
4. Deflection "dupes an intruder into believing that he has succeeded in 
accessing system resources, whereas instead he has been attracted or 
shunted to a specially prepared environment for observation". 
5. Detection "encompasses those techniques that seek to discriminate in-
trusion attempts from normal system usage and alert the SSO". 
6. Counteraction 'iempower[s} a system with the ability to take autonomous 
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Time of Operation (of Response Phase) 
Figure 4.5: AINT Categories mapped to the SCT Time and Automation 
Attribute of the Response Subcomponent 
Halme notes that the deflection category (of which honeypots and light-
ning rod accounts are given as members) can often be regarded as a special 
type of intrusion countermeasure. 
Given this overlap, it is possible to describe the AINT model categories in 
terms of SCT time of operation and (to a lesser extent) degree of automation 
attributes as applied to the response phase in the following way: 
Preemptive measures (Halme lists the infiltration of attacker organisa-
tions as an example) tend to involve manual intervention before an attack 
is attempted. Preventive measures aim to intercede before damage has been 
caused and are thus active before and during an attack. Deflection can 
be seen as a specialised countermeasure which either prevents or mitigates 
attacker damage, while the more general detection and countermeasures are 
generally active during and after an attack. The distinction between counter-
measure and detection is that the response of the former is at least partially 
automated, while the latter response is manuaL Lastly, a deterring response 
is initiated not to block or undo the damage of the current attack but to head 
off further ones. An approximate illustration of these mappings is given in 
Figure 4.5. 
4.7.4 Fisch and Carver Response Taxonomies 
A paper by Carver [28] describes two taxonomies which aim to classify possi-
ble intrusion responses. The first, developed by Fisch at the same institution 
as Carver, is described as consisting of two primary features: 
• The time when a compromise is detected. This attribute is divided 
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Time of Operation (of Response Phase) 
Figure 4.6: Features identified by Fisch mapped to the SCT Time and 
A utomation Attribute of the Response Subcomponent 
• The goal of the response. Relative to the time attribute two categories 
are identified: Control mechanisms are active during an attack, while 
assessments are undertaken afterwards. The former category is sub-
divided into active and passive control mechanisms, while the latter 
distinguishes between assessment and recovery. 
The main characteristics of the Fisch Damage Control and Assessment 
Taxonomy can be mapped to two attributes of the Security Component Tax-
onomy proposed in this document, namely time and degree of automation 
particularly if related to the response phase. This mapping is shown in 
Figure 4.6. Here passive or assessing systems perform data acquisition and 
analysis tasks, but do not provide an automated response component. 
The second taxonomy (Carver's Intrusion Response Taxonomy), identifies 
six classification dimensions and associated categories: 
1. Timing of the Attack: Preemptive, During and After 
2. Type of Attack: Availability, Confidentiality and Integrity 
3. Type of Attacker: Cyber Gangs, Economic Rivals, Military Organisa-
tions, ... 
4. Degree of Suspicion: Low to High 
5. Attack Implications: Low to Critical 
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With the exception of the time dimension, which has an equivalent in 
the first attribute of the taxonomy proposed in this chapter, the dimensions 
tend to enumerate factors which modulate responses, rather than describe 
the response mechanisms directly and are thus not examined further in this 
thesis. 
4.7.5 Axelsson's IDS Taxonomy 
In introducing a survey of intrusion detection systems, Axelsson [10] presents 
an IDS taxonomy. In addition to the distinction between anomaly and misuse 
detection systems, the following eight attributes are identified: 
1. Time of detection: This dimension distinguishes between systems that 
are real-time and those that are not. 
2. Granularity of data-processing: This attribute describes whether a sys-
tem operates on batches of data or a continuous data stream. 
3. Source of audit data: As in the case of the conventional IDS taxon-
omy, the primary distinction is between network and host-based data 
collection. 
4. Response to detected intrusions: This dimension distinguishes between 
systems that are active (respond autonomously) and those that are 
passive (notify an authority). 
5. Locus of data-processing: This divides systems into designs that pro-
cess data centrally or distribute the task over multiple locations. 
6. Locus of data-collection: Like the previous dimension, this attribute 
distinguishes between centralised and distributed designs. 
7. Security: The ability of the IDS itself to withstand attack. 
8. Degree of Interoperability: The extent to which the system under con-
sideration can interoperate with other intrusion detection systems. 
The first two classification attributes relate to the time over which an IDS 
is active. Given a definition of real-time which requires that an attack be 
detected within a certain time period, and a batch size metric describing the 
interval over which events are collected, these two classification attributes 
can be related to the SeT time of operation dimension as follows: 
The first dimension (time of detection) can be mapped to the interval be-
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Figure 4.7: Time of Operation of Analysis Phase 
The second dimension (granularity) provides an indication of the delay be-
tween the time at which an attack occurs and the point at which analysis 
commences. intervals are illustrated in Figure 4.7 by X and Y re-
spectively, with the dashed line segments indicating the period during which 
events of interest occur. 
This interpretation may also help to clarify the assertion by Axelsson 
which states that the first two attributes "do not overlap since a system 
could process data continuously with (perhaps) considerable delay, or process 
data in (small) batches in 'real-time '." The two attributes do indeed measure 
different timing aspects but are not completely unrelated, as the batch length 
is bounded by the interval during which analysis has to be completed. Put 
simply, a system required to discover a given event within N seconds of its 
occurrence should be supplied with data at intervals smaller than N seconds. 
The third classification dimension of the Axelsson taxonomy describes the 
audit data source. It corresponds to the second attribute of the conventional 
IDS taxonomy described in Subsection 4.7.1 which, in turn, can be mapped 
to the SeT location attribute as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
The response attribute, dimension four, can be related to the SeT degree 
of automation attribute (described in Section 4.4) of the response component, 
with a passive response being equivalent to a manual response phase, and an 
active one being partially or completely automated. 
Dimensions five and six are used to distinguish between distributed and 
centralised designs and have been incorporated into the Zamboni taxon-
omy described in Subsection 4.7.2. Although the taxonomy proposed in 
this chapter does not consider the issue of distribution directly, the SeT 
location dimension identifies designs (collection, analysis or response mecha-
nisms resident in the guarded application) which are of necessity distributed. 
In addition, the SeT analysis abstraction can be used to identify classes 
of systems (those operating on domain independent abstractions) that are 
amenable to centralised analysis even if collection and response subcompo-
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taxonomy summarised in this section, the degree of interoperability. 
Dimensions four, five and six can be used to illustrate how the approaches 
taken to derive the Axelsson taxonomy and the one introduced in this chap-
ter differ: Of interest is that the former taxonomy distinguishes between 
distributed and centralised collection and analysis (attributes six and five) 
but does not include a similar attribute for the response phase. Conversely 
Axelsson differentiates between systems that provide an automated response 
and those that defer to a human (attribute four) but does not do the same 
for the collection and analysis phases. 
These asymmetries of the Axelsson taxonomy are induced by contempo-
rary intrusion detection designs. The systems surveyed by Axelsson auto-
mate the operational aspects of the collection and analysis phases but only 
a few respond autonomously. This makes it it is possible to ignore distri-
buted response or manual collection categories when classifying conventional 
intrusion detection systems. However, for the purpose of exploring the set 
of possible security component designs, a taxonomy derived from a set of 
existing intrusion detection systems may be limiting, hence the approach of 
deriving the security component taxonomy from an abstract modeL 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has used the security component model to derive a taxonomy 
of systems which protect applications. The taxonomy uses the attributes 
time, location, automation, abstraction and complexity to generate a five-
dimensional classification space. In the next chapter, this classification space 
will be used as framework to describe the tradeoffs which underlie various 
security component designs. 
In order to examine the coverage of the framework, it was related to a 
number of existing taxonomies. These included an informal categorisation 
(Halme), several narrower approaches (Zamboni focused on the data collec-
tion phase, while both Fisch and Carver considered possible responses) and 
a more extensive one (Axelsson). In each of the cases it was shown how most 
of the features identified by their respective authors could be described in 























The previous chapter introduced a taxonomy of security components in the 
form of a five-dimensional classification space. This chapter assigns different 
security component designs to regions in this space. In conjunction with the 
category examples provided earlier, this can be seen as an augmented review 
of related work-whereas a conventional review would simply enumerate sys-
tems, this chapter attempts to arrange and group the various approaches in 
order to explore the tradeoffs which underlie the designs and identify alter-
native approaches. 
The comparison is divided into two parts: A section which examines 
infrastructure security mechanisms and a section which considers measures 
operating at the application level. Viewed in terms of the taxonomy, the two 
sections can be thought to divide the classification space using a plane or-
thogonal to the location dimension (refer back to Section 4.3 for a description 
of this dimension). 
5.2 Infrastructure Security Components 
This section examines those security components which are part of the gen-
eral purpose infrastructure below the level of the application. Most classical 
security mechanisms belong to this group. 
5.2.1 Infrastructure Reference Monitors 
Arguably the oldest and most established security component design is the 
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representatives of this design. However, as the taxonomy regards both net-
working and operating systems as being part of the infrastructure, simpler 
network firewalls also belong to this category. 
The subspace occupied by these security components is given below: 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
During the attack 
Infrastructure 
Automatic operation, 
manual policy specification 
Infrastruct ure 
Low (existence tests) 
Anderson's seminal description [4, page 22] of this security component 
design outlines the requirements of a security kernel implementing a reference 
monitor as follows: 
1. "The reference validation mechanism must be tamper proof" 
2. "The reference validation mechanism must always be invoked" 
3. "The reference validation mechanism must be small enough to be tested 
(exhaustively if necessary)" 
These requirements influence the position of reference monitors in the 
classification space. A security kernel implies an infrastructure component, 
the minimality requirement suggests an analysis subsystem which is of low 
complexity, and the tamper-proof requirement calls for a system resistant to 
extension and thus limited to infrastructure abstractions. 
Essentially this design trades expressive power for robustness. As noted 
previously, this tradeoff allows infrastructure reference monitors to provide 
substantial and reliable protection to trusting applications but makes them 
ill-suited to follow higher level exchanges between trusted applications and 
potential attackers. 
It can be argued that this limitation, as well as the cost of manually 
specifying a sound access policy, has motivated the introduction of additional 
security component designs such as audit and intrusion detection systems. 
5.2.2 Manual Infrastructure Audits 
Given the limitations of reference monitors, a class of components has been 
developed which allows security specialists to analyse computer systems for 
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type include audit systems that collect data from the operating system for 
review (the Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM) [131] is a well-known rep-
resentative) as well as firewall logs or a system such as the Packet Vault [7] 
which perform a similar function at the network level. 
Because humans operate at lower speeds and have shorter concentration 
spans than computers, such analysis is generally performed after the fact 
and intermittently. This security component design can be mapped to the 
taxonomy as follows: 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
Collection during and after the attack, analy-
sis and response after the attack 
Collection at infrastructure 
Automated collection, manual analysis and re-
sponse 
Infrastructure 
High (performed by humans) 
These systems can be thought of as security components which perform a 
much more sophisticated analysis than conventional reference monitors but, 
because of the operational involvement of human security analysts, trade this 
for a greater delay and higher cost. 
5.2.3 Conventional Intrusion Detection Systems 
Conventional intrusion detection systems examine either operating system 
audit data or network traffic in place of expensive and slow human analysts. 
If a machine learning system is employed, both the operational aspects as 
well as the policy specification are automated, otherwise policy in the form 
of a set of misuse signatures is specified by hand. 
Oriented in the security component classification space, a conventional 
intrusion detection system can be regarded as an intermediate between an 
operating system reference monitor and a manual audit analysis with respect 
to the time of operation and analysis complexity dimensions: An IDS is 
faster than a human, but slower than an access control system because it is 
unable to delay an attacker while the analysis is conducted. Similarly, an 
IDS analysis subsystem tends to be more complex than the simple lookup 
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Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
Collection during the attack, analysis and re-
sponse during or after the attack 
Collection at infrastructure 
Automated collection and analysis, automa-
ted policy specification in the case of anomaly 
detection, manual response 
Infrastructure 
Intermediate to high (usually matching se-
quences or better) 
5.2.4 Extended Infrastructure Reference Monitors 
In the last decade a number of intrusion detection projects have developed 
systems which can be considered augmented reference monitors. At the op-
erating system level, such projects include Janus [51], the Wrapper Sup-
port System CWSS) [47], the Auditing Specification Language (ASL) [121], 
pH [126] and Medusa DS9 [143], with recent efforts such as the Linux Se-
curity Module (LSM) Interface [140J aiming to standardise and popularise 
these extensions. 
The network equivalents of these systems are more sophisticated firewalls. 
These are often advertised as stateful or inspecting, of which the ftp protocol 
parser of the Linux netfilter is a well-known example. Also belonging 
to this class are inlined network intrusion detection systems which are able 
to discard undesirable traffic, an example being the hogwash extension to 
snort. 
In terms of the security component taxonomy, these systems can be seen 
to increase the complexity (and thus the analytical power) of conventional 
reference monitors without delaying the response until after an attack has 
succeeded, as is the case in conventional intrusion detection systems. 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
During the attack 
Infrastructure 
Automated collection and analysis, automa-
ted policy specification in the case of anomaly 
detection 
Infrastructure (possibly applications) 
Intermediate to high (usually matching se-













Time of Operation 
Figure 5.1: Complexity versus Timeliness: Comparison for Infrastructure 
Reference Monitors (RM), Manual Audits (MA), Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDS) and Extended Reference Monitors (ERM) 
5.2.5 Analysis 
Although somewhat of a simplification, the four infrastructure security com-
ponent designs summarised in the above classification can be thought to form 
a trajectory (illustrated in Figure 5.1). Here human analysts compensate for 
limitations of classical access control systems, intrusion detection systems 
replace the manual effort, and extended reference monitors intervene sooner 
when prevention is possible. 
This progression is particularly pronounced in the case of operating sys-
tem security components, where the initial IDS model of Denning [40] pro-
poses using the reference monitor subject-object-access triple! as analysis 
data. This can be viewed as the interface between access control and intru-
sion detection. A similar transition can be noted in IDS designs. Earlier 
implementations (see [88] for a survey) mimic human analysis by being in-
voked periodically, later systems operate on a near-realtime basis, and recent 
systems act as preventive reference monitor extensions. 
With regard to the equivalent network security components, this pro-
gression is not as pronounced. Nevertheless, a trend towards the extended 
reference monitor design remains apparent2 , involving either a direct pro-
gression from simple to complex firewall or an indirect one involving the use 
of inlined network intrusion detection systems to perform what amounts to 
1 Augmented with a timestamp, resource usage and an error status. 
2Note that this observation is restricted to infrastructure components. Application 
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an access control function. 
Incorporating intrusion detection functions into reference monitors allows 
for a more effective response, because blocking damaging activity is usually 
more easily accomplished and automated than damage recovery. This benefit 
is traded against: 
• An increased sensitivity to false positives, because mistakenly blocking 
access may be costly, 
• Stricter time constraints, given that a reference monitor usually lies on 
the critical path of a system and thus has an impact on overall system 
latency,3 
The increased deployment of more sophisticated firewalls and other ex-
tended reference monitors suggests that components which act before an 
attack succeeds are attractive. This implies that the above disadvantages 
are acceptable in the protection of real-world systems. However, the fact 
that many of these extended reference monitors (particularly those requiring 
changes to operating systems) have evolved from intrusion detection efforts 
rather than being direct reference monitor advances, can be interpreted as a 
reluctance to violate the simplicity requirement of classical reference moni-
tor designs. Similarly the tamper-proof requirement can be seen as having 
delayed the widespread introduction of such systems until the adoption of 
open-source and modular kernels made arbitrary third-party operating sys-
tem extensions feasible. 
As motivated previously, a significant reason for the introduction of more 
complex infrastructure security components is the need to regulate higher 
level exchanges. In such cases a substantial part of the infrastructure secu-
rity component may be dedicated to the re-implementation of application 
functions. Examples include duplicated application protocol parsers and file 
format handlers, as built into inspecting firewalls (for example to track in-
coming ftp data connections and open the appropriate port) or mail transfer 
agents (to scan documents, which are normally considered opaque at that 
level, for viruses and worms). This thesis considers the trend toward such 
re-implementation suboptimal, since it is: 
• Inelegant: It blurs the layered design of computer systems. 
3Throughput remains unaffected when compared to an intrusion detection system of 
equivalent complexity, if an overloaded IDS that discards data is considered equivalent to 
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• Dangerous: A failure of an infrastructure security component may 
have greater security implications than one affecting the application 
it guards, particularly as a number of protection mechanisms may not 
be available at lower levels.4 
• Demanding: The duplication has to be performed with a high degree 
of fidelity. It may require the tracking of substantial state, differences 
among versions or deviations from documented behaviour. Failure to do 
so may allow attackers to evade detection or (in the case of automated 
responses, as encountered in shunning firewalls or traffic normalisation 
systems) stage denial of service attacks. 
• Not always possible: End-to-end or application level cryptographic 
measures are explicitly designed to prevent the acquisition of infor-
mation by lower level components. 
These limitations motivate the investigation into application security com-
ponents undertaken in the next sections. 
5.3 Application Security Components 
The alternative to increasing infrastructure security component complexity is 
to shift security components into applications where domain knowledge does 
not have to be duplicated. In terms of the security component taxonomy, 
these two different approaches develop the simple reference monitor design 
along different dimensions: The former requires a more complex analysis, 
while the latter depends on the integrity and support of a larger system by 
being located within applications. The two different strategies can oriented 
in the classification space as shown in Figure 5.2. 
This section reviews and categories application level security component 
types and identifies several possible reasons which have made them a less 
popular choice than infrastructure systems. 
4Consider the example of the ftp protocol parser part of a network firewall: A failure 
in the parser, often a kernel resident system (where application resource limits, address 
space restrictions and a lowered user id do not apply), may allow an attacker complete 
access to and control over the traffic reaching a network. In contrast, a compromise of 
the ftp server may have only yielded access to a sandbox containing public data, given 
that a number of anonymous ftp server implementations for unix systems chroot into a 
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Figure 5.2: Expansion of Conventional Infrastructure Reference Monitors 
(RM) toward Greater Complexity (ERM) or the Application Level (ARM). 
5.3.1 Vendor-Supplied Security Components 
Security components of this type are constructed as part of the application 
development effort. Examples include internal consistency checks, configura-
tion options which disable high-risk operations, as well as application resident 
access control systems (refer back to Figure 4.3 for an example). Application 
providers usually possess a good understanding of the domain abstractions 
but are likely to allocate only limited resources to the security effort, for 
reasons examined in Chapter 2. 
Such constraints yield security components which are usually less well de-
veloped than their infrastructure counterparts. Most affected is the analysis 
phase which tends to be of low complexity and static, with policy changes 
often requiring an application restart or even a recompilation. 
These characteristics can be mapped to the classification space as follows: 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
Variable, often before or during the attack 
Application 
Manual insertion and management 
Application specific 
Variable, often simple 
5.3.2 Application Logging 
Although application logging subsystems can be viewed as a special case of 
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is because these systems transfer the analysis and response effort from the 
application provider to an administrator or security specialist. Application 
logging systems differ further from other vendor security components (such 
as internal consistency checks) in that they tend to be active after the fact, 
reporting events that have occurred recently. This is a limitation, since a 
successful attack may disable logging or even generate false entries. 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
Collection during the attack, analysis and re-
sponse only after the attack (unreliable) 
Collection in the application 




5.3.3 Application Proxies 
Application proxies, both classical (eg the TIS's firewall toolkit [109] or 
fk [71]) and alternative (eg privacy enhancing proxies such as junkbuster), 
operate adjacent to the guarded application. However, while application 
proxies are widely used to cache data, pure security proxies have in a number 
of cases been displaced by infrastructure systems (eg network level firewalls 
which tracking ftp transactions) or application resident security components 
(eg the mozilla and galeon web browsers acquiring privacy enhancing fea-
tures). Performance concerns may account for this or (in the latter case) a 
desire to reduce the amount of duplicated effort. 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
During the attack 
Adjacent to the application 
Manual construction, otherwise automated 
Application specific 
Variable 
5.3.4 Automated Security Tools and Components 
For reasons provided earlier it is not always possible to rely on application 
provides to include sophisticated security components in their products, while 
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These issues have motivated the introduction of utilities which insert secu-
rity components into applications automatically. Well-known representatives 
of this approach are stackguard [37] and RAD [33] that block a particularly 
common type of input validation failure. Although not operational at run-
time, static analysis tools such as Flawfinder [139] and RATS [123] also are 
intended to prevent attacks by flagging risky constructs (such as the use of 
strcpy in place of strncpy). 
The limitation of completely automated security components is that they 
are intended to be used on a wide range of applications. They thus need to 
operate on common abstractions, typically the entities used in the construc-
tion of the applications (functions, objects) or generic runtime measurements 
(execution time, memory use). As these are generic, it is difficult to capture 
the domain knowledge and other features specific to a particular application. 
Thus while these components may be located inside (or operate on) ap-
plications, it is possible to view the the analysis abstractions as being located 
close to or even within the infrastructure. These characteristics place auto-
matically added application security components in the following region of 
the classification space: 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
Before (static analysis) or during (runtime 
component) the attack 
Application 
Automatic insertion and operation 
N ear infrastructure 
Variable, possibly complex 
5.3.5 Expanded Security Infrastructure 
The fact that the fully automated security components described in the pre-
vious sections operate on abstractions common across applications makes it 
possible to absorb these measures into the infrastructure. In other words, 
the infrastructure can be expanded toward applications with the discovery 
of heuristics or metrics common to a sufficiently large set of applications. 
Several examples illustrating this trend are listed below: 
• Systems [70, 125] have been introduced that perform the functions of 
stackguard at the operating system level without requiring that ap-
plications be changed . 
• Jones [65] describes an IDS which extends the short sequence anomaly 
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invocations in place of system calls. Elbaum [42] presents a related 
system5 which collects information pertaining to the path taken by a 
program through its function call graph in order to detect anomalous 
activity. 
• Rooker [113] proposes that conventional operating system protection 
mechanisms (which operate on files or processes) be expanded to in-
clude the elements of graphical user interfaces (objects, widgets). Al-
though Rooker identifies the NeXT system as a possible platform, 
no actual implementation or experience with this approach has been 
recorded. Although brief and lacking an implementation, Rooker's pro-
posal is noteworthy as it is one of the earlier works arguing for the 
expansion of security functions toward the application level. 
It can be argued that most features of language-based security mecha-
nisms (119], implemented by systems such as the JVM [80] or CLR, can be 
seen to extend the infrastructure security functions in this fashion. Measures 
ranging from the enforcement of type safety to garbage collection, which 
previously were the responsibility of application programmers, have been 
absorbed into the infrastructure provided by higher level languages. 
Time of operation: 
Location: 




Usually before or during the attack 
Infrastructure 
Automatic operation 
Infrastructure moved closer to application 
Variable, possibly complex 
Security components that are located within applications occur in a num-
ber of forms and may mirror infrastructure designs. Application level ref-
erence monitors, application logging systems and even application intrusion 
detection systems all borrow design features originally developed as part of 
infrastructure components. 
However, vendor provided security mechanisms tend to be less well de-
veloped than their infrastructure equivalents. This is because application 
providers operate under significant resource constraints as well as a con-
sequence of the inherent specialisation of applications which removes the 
5The work describes an instrumented operating system kernel. However, the technique 










62 Chapter 5 Comparison 
economies of scale. Unlike a number of infrastructure security component 
designs, the costs associated with the construction of substantial application-
specific security measures cannot be amortised over a large number of sys-
tems. 
It is this issue of cost which makes sophisticated application-resident se-
curity components rare (although some have been constructed, by parties 
other than the application provider, an example being DEMIDS [341-an 
IDS analysing the logs of a relational database). In order to reduce these 
costs, a number of automated systems (including both standalone tools or 
infrastructure enhancements) have been developed which can operate with-
out the direct involvement of the application developer. 
Useful as these automatic or generated mechanisms may be, a central 
argument of this thesis is that the construction and management of security 
components is unlikely to be automated completely for as as long as applica-
tions themselves are built by humans: An application can be thought to be 
the instantiation of an abstract process defined in terms of a domain-specific 
model. Flaws may be introduced if the process or domain model, as un-
derstood by the application designers, is inaccurate or if the mapping from 
process to instantiation is incorrect. 
For most conventional applications neither the model nor process are de-
fined formally and may not even have been articulated at all. Thus this 
information is inaccessible to the automated tools that inspect or augment 
applications.6 This leaves only the flawed implementation as source of in-
formation. It is generally insufficient to establish if the domain model is 
sound7 . Thus automated tools are largely limited to inspecting applications 
for inconsistencies or implementation constructs known to provide attack-
ers with opportunities to assume control over the application. For example 
stackguard may block the exploitation of an unchecked strcpy, flawfinder 
will recommend replacing strcpy with strcpy, while java disables direct 
pointer manipulation entirely. 
However, where domain knowledge is required to identify flaws or failures, 
completely automated systems are insufficient. Arguments supporting this 
view can be found in the work of Sielken [122], primarily a case study of the 
security requirements of two application domains-an electronic toll collec-
tion system and a health record management system. The domain constraints 
identified by Sielken show that it is difficult to transfer application-specific 
security concerns to infrastructure components, and are used to argue for 
6Even if such information were available, humans would have to provide reference data 
to establish whether a domain model is accurate. 










5.4 Summary 63 
the construction of application specific intrusion detection systems, although 
Sielken's dissertation does not present an actual implementation of such a 
system. 
The need for domain knowledge to perform effective intrusion detection 
can also be considered an elaboration of Pu et al's [105] observation which 
distinguishes between hardwired and contextual flaws, where the "first kind 
of attack is machine code dependent, for example, a virus or worm taking ad-
vantage of raw binary representation of programs and data ... [while] ... the 
second kind of attack is a more subtle one, from programs that execute legal 
kernel calls but somehow performing functions outside the original inten-
tions. For example, the worm program written by R. T. Morris, Jr. uses the 
debugging feature of sendmail." 
It is the difficulty of equipping entirely automated and general purpose 
security components with sufficient domain knowledge (or context, using the 
terminology of Pu) which suggests that human involvement is likely to remain 
necessary for the protection of trusted applications. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has placed a number of security components in the classifica-
tion space. For infrastructure security components it noted a trend towards 
more complex systems which aim to track trusted applications. Usually this 
approach involves security specialists constructing systems that duplicate 
significant application abstractions at lower levels. These shadowed applica-
tion functions (protocol parsers, file format handlers, application logic) are 
then used to regulate the application level exchanges without relying on the 
guarded system. 
As noted in Section 5.2, such an approach is awkward and vulnerable 
to desynchronisation but is deemed necessary, given that many deployed 
applications contain significant security flaws because application providers 
are only able to allocate limited resources toward security. 
Automatically adding additional security components to such flawed ap-
plications is an incomplete solution. While the components may detect in-
consistencies or undesirable implementation constructs, they lack the context 
to detect flaws which relate to inaccuracies in the application domain modeL 
This suggests that until machine learning systems are perfected (an AI-
hard problem) human involvement will be needed in the protection of trusted 
applications. This makes the problem of efficiently distributing the human 
























The analysis undertaken in the previous chapters argues that security com-
ponents operating at the infrastructure level are vulnerable to desynchroni-
sation when used to protect trusted applications, while security components 
inserted automatically into applications lack the domain knowledge to be a 
complete defence against contextual flaws. 
These weaknesses motivate the introduction of an alternative approach 
which aims to involve the application provider in the task of defending against 
security problems that are only discovered once the application has been 
deployed. This chapter describes the design of this component and orientates 
it in the classification space. 
6.2 Approach 
The approach used to design the security component can be contextualised 
by considering the degree of human involvement (the subject of the third 
classification dimension, see Section 4.4) in the protection of a trusted appli-
cation. 
The conventional strategy is to relieve the application provider of as many 
security responsibilities as possible and transfer these to infrastructure com-
ponents. This approach is appropriate when guarding trusting applications 
and the only reasonable choice when applications are assumed to be mali-
cious. Mechanisms to contain the latter have received considerable attention 
as part of Java and related mobile code security efforts. Examples include 
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Figure 6.1: The Proposed Design mapped to the Security Component 
:Model 
However, as argued in previous chapters, this approach presents difficul-
ties when applied to the protection of trusted applications. In particular, it 
results in security experts re-implementing substantial application functions 
at lower infrastructure levels-an expensive and, arguably, wasteful under-
taking. 
This chapter describes an alternative security component design requiring 
some co-operation from those involved in the construction of applications for 
the purpose of defending against contextual flaws which are only discovered 
after the application has been deployed. Such a component would be an 
intermediate, as far as the demands made of the application provider are 
concerned, between designs which assume application programmers to be 
malicious and those which demand flawless implementations. 
It can be argued that this approach has not yet been explored fully, 
under the assumption that application providers, having failed to prevent 
the introduction of these flaws in the first place, are either insufficiently 
interested or too untrustworthy to be included in efforts to mitigate their 
impact. 
This thesis claims that this assumption is too strong. Instead it argues 
that the construction of nontrivial trusted applications is simply very difficult 
and that applications are likely to contain flaws even if efforts were made to 
exclude them. A similar position is held by Cowan et al [36] who note that 
"commercial software chronically has bugs, many with security vulnerability 
implications. Tempting as it may be to hypothesize that this is because the 
vendors are lazy or stupid, this is not the case. Commercial software chron-
ically has bugs for the dual-reason that correctness is hard, and correctness 
does not sell software. " 
In terms of the security component model, the alternative security com-
ponent described in this chapter requires that application programmers in-
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analysis to a system constructed by a security specialist, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.1. This introduces an interface between application providers on the 
one hand and security specialists and system administrators on the other. 
The purpose of this interface is to allow the former to provide the latter with 
the means to block the exploitation of flaws not known when the application 
is built, using a mechanism less disruptive and expensive than the rushed 
application of untested patches or hotfixes. 
In this context the definitions of Elbaum and Munson [42] are helpful: 
"It is a most unfortunate accident of most software design efforts that there 
are really two distinct set of operations. On the one hand, there is a set of 
explicit operations OE. These are the intended operations that appear in the 
Software Requirements Specification documents. On the other hand, there 
is also a set of implicit operations, 0 1, that represent unadvertised features 
of the software that have been implemented through designer carelessness or 
ignorance. These are not documented, nor well known except by a group of 
knowledgeable and/or patient system specialists, called hackers. " 
Restated, it is the problem that it is almost impossible to construct a 
nontrivial application whose 0 1 set is empty that motivates the introduction 
of a security interface designed to allow system administrators, security spe-
cialists or even machine learning systems to monitor and adjust applications. 
A security reconfiguration can be initiated for a number of reasons: 
• At time of installation it is considered good practice to disable un-
needed application functionality. As noted by Lindqvist [82], this is 
particularly important in the case of COTS systems which are often 
marketed on the basis of the size of their feature sets. This process can 
be seen to reduce OE in the hope of proportionally reducing 0 1 . 
• The publication of a vulnerability alert (describing an element 0i E 0 1) 
marks the start of the largest phase of the window of vulnerability [120] 
which is only reduced once a fix or workaround becomes available. A 
number of reasons may delay this: Embedded applications may be 
difficult to service, while commercial applications depend on a single 
vendor (who may no longer exist or be unwilling to support the vul-
nerable system) to provide a remedy. Even open-source systems may 
not be repaired immediately, as a fix may only be available for the 
most recent revision (fix in CVS), with both the fix and revision being 
poorly tested, whereas a particular organisation may have installed a 
more reliable, older and possibly customised version. In these situa-
tions it is beneficial to disable the flawed application subcomponents 
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included in advisories, but these are often coarse or require significant 
administrative effort. Using the outlined interface, a security expert 
(possibly even the author of the advisory) could specify the equivalent 
of a signature that would disable the flawed functions with only lim-
ited impact on the overall application (ie disallow 0i while retaining a 
reasonable subset of DE)' This would be a finer-grained intervention 
than the one proposed in Riordan et al [111] which terminates flawed 
applications completely . 
• As part of an integrated intrusion response it may be desirable to limit 
application functionality in response to suspicious or unusual activity. 
At the infrastructure level such an automated response may be rel-
atively coarse or easily misdirected by the attacker to damage other 
systems. This problem is related to the issue of desynchronisation. A 
strongly integrated application level response is less vulnerable to such 
an attack, since the path from collection to response is shorter, while a 
fine-grained response may reduce the costs associated with responding 
in error. The latter is a particularly significant concern in situations 
where anomaly detection systems are used in the analysis, since their 
false positive rates tend to be substantial [9]. Consider the case of an 
anomaly detection system flagging a telnet option as unusual. Blocking 
this option at the infrastructure level by discarding packets is likely to 
suspend a session indefinitely; in contrast at the application level it is 
possible to decline to process this option but otherwise continue. l 
In effect, the design outlined here is an extension of the concept of defen-
sive programming. The application programmer can use the API to request 
the equivalent of a second opinion whenever an action is to be taken which 
has security implications. 
6.3 Analysis Abstractions 
The previous section proposed a security component design intended to al-
low application providers to report security related information. This section 
examines the abstractions which can be used describe the reported security 
events. This relates the the design to dimension 4 (Section 4.5) of the clas-
sification space, which has been divided into the infrastructure, application 
and security abstraction categories. The tradeoffs associated with these cat-
egories are described below. 
ISimilar considerations apply to cryptographic systems where cypher types and 
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6.3.1 Thadeoffs 
The three approaches can be seen to distribute the effort between application 
provider and security analyst in different ways. 
• Reporting security events in terms of infrastructure abstractions (for 
example, by recording the system calls issued) requires little effort on 
the part of the application provider. Indeed, it is usually possible to 
perform this task automatically by extending compilers, rewriting ex-
ecutables or instrumenting the infrastructure. As noted in previous 
chapters, the tradeoff of this approach is that the runtime analysis is 
complex-it requires the duplication of application logic and is vulner-
able to desynchronisation. 
• Emitting events in terms of application abstractions requires the co-
operation of the application provider. Whereas this approach neces-
sitates the judicious insertion of instrumentation hooks, it does not 
demand that the application provider perform a translation from the 
native domain (for example, queries or transactions in the case of a 
database) to an alternative form. The corresponding analysis requires 
application domain knowledge and relies on the application to supply 
accurate information. 
• Security abstractions require that the application provider map domain 
abstractions to ones defined in terms of a security model. Such efforts 
include the labelling of data, the identification of security subjects and 
objects or the assessment of risks. These tasks are relatively expensive 
but simplify the runtime security effort. 
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The basis for the introduction 
of the security component design is the conjecture that an isosecurity curve 
is the product of both development and runtime efforts, making the most 
efficient tradeoff one which involves both equally. This is supported by the 
observation that the extremes of this curve tend to infinity. In particular, 
it seems almost impossible to construct perfectly secure trusted applications 
(which require no security updates and thus zero runtime effort), while this 
thesis has argued that it is equally difficult to construct an infrastructure 
which eliminates the need for trusted applications entirely. 
6.3.2 Approach 
In order to explore this tradeoff, particularly the region spanning the ap-
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of Human Effort for Abstraction Categories 
designed to allow activity to be reported in terms of multiple abstractions. 
This can be achieved by using a nonprescriptive or semi-structured [2] 
interface at lower levels, which can accommodate several more structured 
frameworks at higher levels, while at the same time allowing application 
providers to describe activity in terms of their native abstractions with com-
paratively little effort. 
A range of abstractions is considered. This range is depicted in Figure 6.3, 
which provides an approximate position of selected frameworks in terms of 
this tradeoff. 
Most of the approaches considered are summarised briefly in this section 
(related frameworks have been reviewed in Section 4.5, while Appendix AA 
documents the implemented naming schemes). The exception is the func-
tionality labelling model which is described in more detail, as it deemed 
to represent a particularly interesting tradeoff between implementation and 
deployment effort. 
Native Application Domain Abstractions 
This approach leaves it to an application provider to define the meaning 
and structure of security events. Thus subsequent runtime analysis requires 
application-specific knowledge. 
Standardised Domain Abstractions 
Events belonging to this type are defined using a domain standard. A 
commonly-used example is the Common Log Format (CLF) [89] which de-
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Figure 6.3: Approximate Ranges of Considered Abstractions 
models which underlie SNMP [29] MIBs can also be seen as belonging to this 
category, although these usually pertain to infrastructure abstractions.2 
Such an approach can be thought of as introducing a reference model 
for a particular domain which allows the applications operating within it to 
generate security events with a common structure and meaning. Often such 
an approach is based on an existing application protocol or similar standard 
(in the case of CLF, this point of reference is HTTP). 
Compared to the previous category, the runtime analysis no longer re-
quires knowledge of a particular application. This reduces the effort and 
makes automated analysis tools viable if the application domain is sufficiently 
popular. 
Access Control Abstractions 
In its simplest form an access control abstraction requires the application 
provider to describe activity in terms of subjects requesting various types 
of access to objects. This may be augmented by also supplying information 
such as group, role, domain or clearance. This abstraction is central to most 
operating system security components (access control, as well as intrusion 
detection [40]) and has similar uses within applications which introduce new 
subjects and objects (eg transactions and tables in database applications, 
script fragments and frames in web browsers). Recent work towards articu-
lating and standardising this abstraction for federated web environments can 
be found in the SAML [54] and WS-Policy [39] specifications. 
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Figure 6.4: Possible FTP Server Functionality Hierarchy 
Resource Use Abstractions 
Events of this type describe the resources held or released by an application. 
Although conventionally used for accounting purposes, where known entities 
(often the same subjects in the above access control abstraction) are expected 
to pay for resources consumed, it is also useful to detect or defend against 
denial of service attacks, even when the resource consumers are difficult to 
identify. Contemporary work in this field is described by Qie et al [106]. 
Operational Abstractions 
The security events of this category are related to system or network man-
agement abstractions. Central to these approaches is the notion of an overall 
system state, with security events generated on state changes. Examples of 
such transitions include an application start, suspension, reconfiguration or 
termination. 
Functionality Labels 
Security events belonging to this category describe the importance of appli-
cation functions or tasks, and their associated dependencies, as opposed to 
labelling subjects or objects, as would be the case in a conventional multilevel 
or domain/type access control system. 
Consider an ftp server which implements a number of application protocol 
commands: Some of these commands are essential if the ftp server is to per-
form its basic function of making files available to remote users, while others 
are only used infrequently. If the provider labels each of these commands 
accordingly, administrators or automated response subcomponents are able 
to initiate an orderly reduction of application functionality without requiring 
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This is illustrated in Figure 6.4. The commands of the smallest set al-
low for the blind retrieval of files,3 while the next largest set is sufficient to 
browse and download material-enough functionality to implement a read-
only anonymous ftp site. The larger function sets permit modifications and 
access to site-specific extensions. 
Such a label (which in its simplest form can expressed as a set of levels, 
although lattice representations are also feasible) encodes application domain 
knowledge, making it accessible to generic analysis. Consider, for instance, 
a conventional anomaly detection system that monitors the stream of ftp 
commands for unusual activity whose recent history includes neither PASV 
nor SITE commands: On encountering either, the system is likely to trigger 
an alert and, in the case of an inlined system, block the command. Blocking 
the SITE command may be a reasonable response, but disabling the PAS V 
command is likely to be disruptive-this denies all access to clients behind 
restrictive firewalls. In such a situation a label indicating that the latter 
command provides core functionality may modulate the response. 
Functionality labelling has a development cost, but it may be attractive 
to application providers who on the one hand wish to provide a large feature 
set, but also want to make it easy for administrators or automated systems 
to secure a system without requiring the latter to understand and adjust 
a large set of configuration options. A number of existing applications im-
plement what could be considered adhoc labelling in the form of interactive 
configuration dialogs. These dialogs summarise or aggregate security related 
settings, but it can be argued that this could developed further. Such exten-
sions would make it possible to perform more sophisticated security analysis 
on a per event basis, instead of fixing settings at deployment (or occasional 
reconfiguration) and can be used to realise the automated restrictions that 
have been proposed in Welz et al [137]. 
Risk Assessments 
This approach involves the application provider describing pending actions in 
terms of the risk that they pose. Risk is described in terms of the probability 
of a failure occurring. The failure can be quantified as an overall cost, or as 
a compromise of a security objective, such as availability, confidentiality or 
integrity. 
A risk assessment requires a substantial analysis effort by the applica-
tion provider and is often a subjective exercise as past data may be scarce 
and of limited relevance. Thus an optimistic application provider may assign 
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a lower risk rating to a particular event than a conservative one. Despite 
these disadvantages, such an approach is appealing because a policy defined 
in terms of risk thresholds can often be made sufficiently simple to be con-
densed to a single statement. This reduces the management demands made 
of application owners and administrators. 
6.4 Position 
This chapter has described a closely coupled security component designed to 
protect trusted applications and considered a number of abstractions which 
may be used by application providers to report security related activity to 
the external component. 
With the time of operation and location determined by the requirements 
that the component intercede before it can be disabled and that desynchro-
nisation opportunities be limited, it is possible to map the design to the 
security component taxonomy as given below: 
Time of operation: 
Location: 
Degree of automation: 
Analysis abstraction: 
Analysis complexity: 
During the attack 
Collection and response within application 
Automatic operation, 
manual insertion 
Application and security 
Variable 
The position in the classification space relates it to other security mecha-
nisms reviewed in Chapter 4. For example, compared to an application log-
ging system, the proposed component operates sooner and offers a response 
mechanism. 
Alternatively it can be viewed as a more general and developed form of 
libwrap. This library, an extension4 of TCP wrappers [135], also externalises 
security analysis, while at the same time requiring the co-operation of the 
application provider to supply it with information and enforce the response. 
However, compared to the component introduced in this chapter, libwrap is 
a simpler and more specific system, managing incoming network connections 
only. A further difference is that its analysis phase operates on infrastruc-
ture abstractions. As noted in the previous chapters, this makes it possible 
to transfer most of its functions to infrastructure components, particularly 
network firewalls. 
4In terms of the taxonomy, the transition from wrapper program to library shifts the 
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The outlined security component also differs from the recent5 Embedded 
Sensors Project (ESP) by Zamboni [142] where a security specialist, who 
possesses knowledge of existing flaws, instruments systems to log attempts 
to exploit these flaws, even if previously repaired. Such an approach may 
be useful as part of a larger intrusion detection system to discover naive 
attackers, particularly those who indiscriminately launch scripted exploits 
without prior reconnaissance. However, because it requires knowledge of 
attacks at time of implementation, it is expensive to update as new attack 
descriptions become available. In terms of the security component model, 
both the analysis and response phases of individual sensors are fixed at time 
of construction. In contrast, the system described here provides integrated 
response facilities and allows analysis to be adjusted at runtime, both in 
the form of policy changes, as well as the complete substitution of analysis 
components. 
The runtime compensation for design oversights is related to the topic 
of fault-tolerance or survivability [83], as these efforts also seek to reduce 
the impact of failures. The conventional approach involves system replica-
tion. For example, the design described by Wu et al [141] duplicates web 
servers in order to limit the impact of a server compromise. This approach 
requires the use of several different implementations. Consequently both 
development and runtime (management and resource) costs increase corre-
spondingly. An alternative survivability measure aims to provide facilities 
to adjust systems in response to changing security circumstances. An exam-
ple of such a system is the Security Agility Toolkit implemented by Petkac 
and Badger [99]. This toolkit operates by intercepting library calls made 
by applications and redirects them to replacements implementing additional 
functionality. For dynamically linked applications, the process requires nei-
ther source code modification nor recompilation. 
The closely coupled security component proposed in this chapter can be 
viewed as an elaboration of this approach. Instead of relying solely on the 
infrastructure, it deliberately includes application providers in the effort to 
make trusted applications (using the terminology of Petkac and Badger) agile 
or security aware. This reduces the need to duplicate domain logic at lower 
levels and thus decreases the potential for desynchronisation attacks. 
5Both the implementation described in the next chapter and the ESP were presented 






















IDS/A: An Application Level 
IDS Implementation 
7.1 Introduction 
The study of computer security is inherently an empirical endeavour-perhaps 
even an engineering discipline, rather than a science, according to Schae-
fer (117]. Ultimately the value of a particular security component is estab-
lished during its use in protection of real-world systems. In this regard an 
implementation is not only needed to demonstrate that a given design can 
be built, but also to show that this can be done without: 
L encountering unacceptable performance losses, 
2. requiring that its users incur excessive expenses or 
3. introducing security problems worse than the ones being remedied. 
N either a trivial prototype nor an unreleased system may be sufficient to 
examine these issues . 
• In the case of a prototype implementation it may not always be appar-
ent if a performance weakness is a consequence of a substantial design 
problem or lacking implementation effort. 
• A substantial and released implementation can be deployed. This in-
creases the likelihood that it will be examined for security problems, 
since both its users as well as their attackers have an immediate moti-
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• A published implementation is necessary to allow independent review 
of the results derived from its use. Failing to do so can be equated with 
the refusal to publish experimental methods or apparatus descriptions 
which is at odds with a scientific approach. 
These concerns motivate the construction of a nontrivial implementation. 
The implemented system is named IDS / A for Wntrusion [J2]etection [S]ystem 
III [AJpplications since the analysis component resembles an inlined IDS, al-
though it is also possible to view the system as an application level firewall 
or augmented logging system. This chapter describes the implementation, 
provides examples of its use and describes a number of applications which 
have been built or modified to make use of it. The implementation has been 
made available for anonymous download for over two years and has been 
included in a Linux distribution. 
7.2 Platform 
The security component design introduces an interface between applications 
and a security analysis component. The insertion of this interface requires 
source level changes. This makes a system where application sources are 
readily available attractive. 
The technical requirements of the underlying infrastructure also relate to 
this interface. In particular, trusted application and security analysis compo-
nent should be able to communicate (as well as execute) without interference 
from third parties. In terms of Loscocco et al [86], IDS/ A requires that the 
infrastructure provide process isolation and trusted path 1 facilities. 
The last substantial demand is that the platform is a conventional and 
widely used system. This ensures that both results and observations are 
relevant to the protection of real-world applications. 
Linux meets all these requirements and was thus chosen as platform. It 
is popular and representative of a unix-like operating system, and its appli-
cations are generally available in source form. Linux implements reasonable 
process isolation using hardware memory paging and provides a number of 
trusted path mechanisms. These involve file paths and permissions, shared 
memory areas and unix domain sockets. The implementation language of 
the IDS / A system is C because the largest number of Linux applications are 
written in this language, as are most system libraries and the kernel. 
lThe term trusted path is commonly used to describe the communication channels 
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Figure 7.1: IDS/ A Architecture 
7.3 System Architecture 
The position of the IDS/ A implementation related to existing components 
of the implementation platform is shown in Figure 7.1 The components in 
gray are introduced by the IDS/ A system, while the application is partially 
shaded to denote a modification. 
Referring back to the design Figure 6.1 on page 66, the shaded region 
of the application contain the collection and response subsystems, while the 
gray components external to the application are dedicated to the analysis. 
The primary interface between the application and analysis subsystem is 
implemented as a C API. The exchange internal to the analysis (between 
client IDS/ A library and daemon) takes the form of a simple protocol which 
uses an inter process communication mechanism provided by the kernel. 
7.4 IDS/ A API 
The IDS/ A API can be seen as the interface between development and run-
time security efforts. By instrumenting an application with calls to the API, 
sensors (collection subsystems) and actuators (response subsystems) are em-
bedded into the application. These can be used to modify application be-
haviour once deployed. 
Given that application providers are unable to allocate substantial re-
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plications should be as simple as possible, since this increases the probability 
of it being used (see also Requirement 2 on page 77). For this reason the 
API has been designed to resemble an enhanced and structured version of 
the relatively well-known syslog logging API. 
In its simplest form, three library calls are needed to report pending 
security-related activity for analysis: 
IDSA_CONNECTION *idsa_open (char *name, char *credential, 
int flags); 
int idsa_set (IDSA_CONNECTION *c, char *n, 
int 
char *s, int f, unsigned ar, 
unsigned cr, unsigned ir, ... ); 
idsa_close(IDSA_CONNECTION *c); 
Here idsa_open and idsa_close can be seen as mandatory equivalents of 
the respective syslog library calls openlog and closelog. The meanings of 
arguments to ids a_open and idsa_close are described in more detail in the 
respective manual pages (see Appendix A.3). A noteworthy difference be-
tween them and their syslog equivalents is that library state is made explicit 
to the user via a pointer to an opaque IDSA_CONNECTION structure. This 
makes it possible to use the API in threaded applications without requiring 
explicit locking or atomic library internals. This should not impose a sub-
stantial burden on the application provider, since IDSA~CONNECTION can be 
regarded as the equivalent of a FILE handle encountered in standard stream 
I/O and can be hidden using a trivial wrapper (similar to the printf wrapper 
of fprintf). 
The idsa_set forms the central part of the API. Its parameters provide 
the analysis component with information relating to pending security activ-
ity, while its return code guides the application response, indicating whether 
processing the pending action would lead to a security failure or not . This 
distinguishes it from a conventional logging function such as syslog which 
reports recently occurred activity. Thus from the perspective of the appli-
cation programmer, all runtime security analysis occurs within this library 
call. The parameters of idsa_set are described in greater detail below: 
c A pointer to the opaque connection handle returned by ids a_open. 
n, s These two strings are used to assign a name (n) and namespace or 
scheme (s) to the pending security event. By using a private naming 
scheme, an application provider can report events defined and named in 
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f : Some security events, in particular error conditions, are neither known 
in advance nor can be blocked. In such cases ids a_set can be used in 
a degraded form as a structured logging interface. To indicate that it 
is not possible to deny an event, the caller of idsa_set sets the flag f 
to zero. 
ar, cr, ir : These three parameters are used to describe the risk to availability 
(ar), confidentiality (cr) and integrity (ir) posed by an event. Each 
value encodes a cost and a confidence value-the structure of these 
fields will be described later. These parameters can be seen as an elab-
oration of the priority field of the syslog call. However, it is possible 
for an application provider to decline to provide this information by 
setting the confidence values of these risks to zero. 2 
ellipsis ( ... ) : Most information is transferred to the analysis component using the 
variable argument list indicated by the elipsis. Unlike most other C 
functions taking variable arguments (such as printf), idsa_set was 
not designed use a format string to organise arguments, since the re-
sultant string tends to discard structure information. Instead variable 
arguments are grouped in multiples of 3, each triple consisting of a 
label (or key) string, a type indicator and a pointer to the value. This 
provides a highly compact means of representing a set of named ele-
ments. Such label value approaches have previously been proposed by 
amongst others Bishop [20] and Abela et al [1] at the protocol level to 
structure logging information. The interface of ids a_set can be seen 
to make this available to the application programmer. 
For applications reporting security information in terms of their na-
tive domain abstractions, no structure of the variable argument set is 
prescribed. In contrast, applications describing activity in terms of a 
particular security model use a predefined set of named elements which 
have a standardised meaning. 
The return code of idsa_set is used to indicate whether the pending 
event would violate a security policy (indicated using IDSA_LDENY) or is 
permissible (IDSA_LALLOW). 
The following pages provide several code fragments which show how the 
API can be used. The first subsection provides a simple scenario which shows 
how the IDS / A API can be used to replace conventional security measures. 
This is followed by a short description of two alternative forms of the inter-
face. 
2 An improvement over the priorities of syslog where an unknown priority is arbitrarily 
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7.4.1 Conventional and IDS/ A Security Instrumenta-
tion 
Consider an application which provides facilities to print a document, such 
as a word processor, image viewer or web browser. Unix applications usually 
perform this task by piping the entity to be printed to the lpr utility. This 
utility is invoked using the popen library call. Used in a trusting environ-
ment this presents little difficulties, and at time of printing the user is often 
prompted to provide the parameters to lpr or even an arbitrary replacement. 




confirm("Print command", cmd, MAX); 
if (pf = popen(cmd, "W"»{ 
file_export(pf, document); 
pclose(pf); 
} else { 
display_errore); 
} 
However, deploying such an application in a hostile environment, such 
as a public terminal/kiosk, presents problems. In these environments it is 
usually necessary to limit the user to a particular application-a restric-
tion which can be bypassed in the above application if an attacker selects 
"xterm&cat>/dev/null" instead of "lpr" using a dialog of the confirm 
function. 
The conventional approach to counter such problems is to enforce stricter 
controls at the infrastructure level, by for example running the application 
as an unprivileged user in a chrooted environment. However, as noted pre-
viously, such controls may be coarse or duplicate application functions. 3 In 
such cases it is necessary to harden the application itself and do so with as 
little cost as possible to the application provider. Usually this is achieved by 
3For example, the application may be relied upon to emit well-formed printing instruc-
tions, but an attacker could reconfigure or reprogram the printer. In the above this could 
be done using "echo -e '%! PS ... ' Ilpr". This can be difficult to block at the operating 
system level, given that the echo command is a shell component of bash, while a shell 
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adding restrictive configuration settings and logging calls. For this purpose 
the above application might be rewritten as: 
FILE *pf; 
char cmd[MAX]; 
if (config->enable_printing) { 
strcpy(cmd, "lpr"); 
} 
if (config->change_print_command) { 
confirm ( II Print command II , cmd, MAX); 
} 
if(pf = popen(cmd, IIV")){ 
file_export(pf, document); 
pclose(pf); 
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "printed document \II%S\" usinglt 
IIcommand \II%S\", document->title, cmd); 
} else { 
display_errore); 
} 
Such an approach has several limitations. The use of static configuration 
options requires the application provider anticipate all desired restrictions: 
For example, an installation may wish to allow its users to select different 
printers (using the option"lpr -P printer"), yet prevent shell access. This 
is not provided for in the above case and requires that the application provider 
add a third option which, if implemented naively, may be coded as follows: 
strcpy(cmd, Itlprlt); 
if (config->change_print_command) { 
confirm(ItPrint command", cmd, MAX); 
} else if(config->change_printer){ 
char printer [MAX] ; 
printer[O]='\O'; 
} 
confirm (,'Printer" , printer, MAX); 
if (printer [0] !='\O'){ 
} 
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Unfortunately this can still be defeated if an attacker provides an escape 
sequence in the printer name, for example "colour-laser; xterm&". COlm-
tering this attack either requires substantial input sanitation (the stripping 
of special characters from supplied input) or the replacement of the popen 
call by lower level calls (pipe, fork, dup and execlp). The former requires 
a detailed knowledge of shell behaviour and is often incomplete, while the 
latter requires a greater implementation effort and, if used to replace popen 
completely, denies users in trusting environments useful functionality. 4 
The logging call syslog can also be defeated in at least two ways: 
• The application can be terminated (during printing) to prevent infor-
mation from being recorded . 
• The attacker may assign a particularly long title to the document which 
ends with the sequence "using command lpr"ll. As a logged message 
may be no longer than 1024 bytes, this may cause a malicious print 
command to be discarded. Even if the title is truncated, the insertion 
of "using command lpr"" into a short title may be sufficient to evade 
automated log analysis tools. 
The IDS / A API can be used to address some of these weaknesses. In the 
above example, both the code to handle the security configuration and the 




confirm(IIPrint command", cmd, MAX); 
if ((idsa_set (c, IIprint" , lIapplication ll , 1, IDSA_R_DECLINE, 
"title ll , !DSA_T_STRING, document->title, 
"cmd", !DSA_T_STRING, cmd, NULL) === IDSA_L_ALLOW) 
&& (pf = popen (command , "W"))){ 
file_export(pf, document); 
pclose(pf); 
} else { 
display_error() ; 
} 
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Here idsa_set is used to report a print event local to the application 
naming scheme. This event can be blocked (indicated by the flag being set 
to 1), while the provider has declined to specify risk values.5 Two optional 
arguments are reported, the title of the document and the command used in 
printing. 
In this example the IDS / A interface is used to transfer the security anal-
ysis effort encoded in the security settings to a more generic external compo-
nent, while at the same time performing a more structured logging function. 
7.4.2 Extended Interface Version 
The library function idsa_set has deliberately been kept compact to reduce 
the demands made of the application programmer. However, the IDS / A 
library does also provide a more complex interface which distributes event 
reporting over multiple functions calls. For example, in the above example 
the call 
idsa_set(c, "print!!, II application", 1, IDSA_R_DECLINE, 
IItitle ll , IDSA_T_STING, document->title, 
"cmd", IDSA_T_STRING, cmd, 
NULL); 
is equivalent to the following fragment 
IDSA_EVENT *evt; 






idsa_add_string(evt, "titlen, document->title); 
idsa_add_set(evt, ncmd", IDSA_T_STRING, cmd); 
idsa_Iog(c, evt); 
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Here idsa_add_string is a convenience wrapper for idsa_add_set which 
accepts several types (integers, strings). idsa...b.onour is used to set the 
flag indicating whether an application is able to honour a request to block 
the reported event. No call to idsa_risks has been made as the equiva-
lent idsa_set has declined to specify this information. Note that the value 
returned by idsa_log specifies if the action should be allowed or denied.6 
The primary advantage of the long form of the single idsa_set call is 
that it can be used to generate an event whose exact number of optional 
parameters is not known at time of implementation. 
7.4.3 Alternative Language Binding 
In addition to the C API, the IDS! A implementation also provides a command-
line utility idsalog. It can be used by applications written in languages such 
as PERL or for a shell interpreter in a similar manner to the C library call 
idsa_set. idsalog also receives a number of label value fields as command-
line arguments and returns the analysis result via its exit code. The above 
example can thus be translated into a shell script as follows. 
idsalog -n print -m application -f titIe=l!$titIe" cmd="$cmdl! 
The combination of C API and idsa_Iog make the IDS! A interface avail-
able to most Linux applications. 
7.5 Analysis Abstractions 
The example employed in the previous section uses a native application ab-
straction to describe a security event-the labels "title" and "cmd" are 
defined in the context of the particular document viewer or web browser. 
This section provides a number of examples showing how events can be re-
ported in terms of alternative abstractions. As in the design of the IDS! A 
function idsa_set, a significant objective is to make this process as easy as 
possible for the application provider. 
These abstractions are introduced by reserving a namespace or scheme. 
The labels (and possibly values) within this space are fixed in advance and 
assigned a meaning which maps them to entities of the particular model. 
These predefined elements are made available to the application provider as 
6 Also note that idsa_log deallocates evt, as documented in the manual page for 
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a set of C macros. Thus the task of the application provider who chooses 
to use a particular abstraction is to describe application activity in terms of 
these predefined elements. 
This task can be illustrated using the example of a web server which 
reports an HTTP request to the IDS! A analysis system. U sing a native 












This event reports the address of the client issuing the request, the request 
type (GET, POST, etc), the ud as well as the file system object to which the 
ud has been mapped. As indicated in Figure 6.3, this approach makes rela-
tively few demands of the application provider but requires that the runtime 
analysis possess application-specific knowledge. 
This requirement that the analysis phase have knowledge of a particu-
lar application implementation (though not the particular application do-
main) can be removed by using a standardised domain abstraction. For web 
servers there exists an established standard, the Common Logging Format 
(CLF) (89], which can be used for this purpose. The IDS! A implementa-
tion provides a set of macros that define the fields of this format and which 
can be used to label the reported event accordingly. For example the above 
"client" can be replaced with the macro IDSA_CLLREMOTEHOST. 
The effort involved in mapping security activity from a native abstraction 
to a well-designed domain standard is often modest, as such standards often 
codify best current practice-what most reasonable applications would have 
reported anyway. 
A greater translation effort is required if events are to be described in 
terms of specialised security abstractions-instead of a straightforward rela-
belling of native fields, different entities have to be identified and reported. 
Three examples of abstractions describing application level access control, 
resource use and state transitions are given in Table 7.l. 
It should be noted that the examples abstract domain detail to different 
degrees-the access control abstraction only defines a set of actions (read, 
write, create, etc) but retains domain-specific subjects and objects. In con-
trast, the state abstraction does not include any domain information, because 
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I I 
Entities to Events to Web Server Web Server idslLset Call I Identify Report Example 
. Access I I Subjects 
idsLset(c, "send-file", .. " 
Subjects 
InSA.AM.3USJECT, IDSA. T.HOST, client, 
Files re· IDSA.AM.OBJECT, IOSA.T..FILE, path. 
Control • and objects accessing quested by 
IDSA.AM..ACTION, IOSA.T -STRING, IOSA..AM-REAO, 
i objects remote host 
1IlJLL) ; 
Exhaustible I Acquisition 
ids a_set (c ~ "new-connection" ~ 
Resource Network 
IOSA.RQ..REQUEST, IDSA.I.INT, &;pending, 
IOSA.RQ.USED, !DSA.LINT, &Used, 
elements and release connections IDSA.l\Q.IDTAL, IOSA.T.INT, &maximum, 
of resources made and 
1IlJLL) ; 
destroyed 
State System Transition Termination idsd_set(c, tlshutdown·, ... , 
I phases between and restart 
IOSA.SSM, IOSA.T.3Tl\IJlG, IDSA.SSM-STOP. 
I II 
I phases I sign~ls 11IlJLL) ; 
received 
Table 7.1: Abstraction Examples 
The implementation defines a number of other abstractions (see Ap-
pendix AA), including ones describing risks, error behaviour and functional-
ity restrictions (the latter having been introduced in Chapter 6). With the 
exception of the risk abstractions, these also describe activity by appending 
predefined labels and values to the variable argument list of idsa_set or its 
equivalent. 
As noted previously, the risks associated with an event are described in 
three mandatory arguments, viz ar, cr and ir. Each value encodes a cost 
in the range 1,1] and a confidence value [0,1] which allows application 
providers to qualify their assessment. Here a negative cost indicates a risk 
reduction, while a confidence value close to one indicates a high degree of 
certainty. The implementation provides a number of predefined risk values, 
including IDSA_R_TOTAL which denotes an almost certain and high risk and 
IDSA_R_UNKNOWN which signifies a risk assessment of which the confidence 
value is zero. However, it is also possible for application providers to de-
fine their own risks using the function idsa_risk...lllake. Its prototype and 
selected predefined risks are given below: 
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reporting the deletion of a table. An application provider may choose to 
rate this as reducing availability, improving confidentiality and having an 
unknown impact on integrity. Using idsa_set this could be encoded as: 




"table", IDSA_T_STRING, table, 
"transaction", IDSA_T_INT, &tid, 
NULL); 
As indicated in Figure 6.3 on page 71, a risk assessment is a high level 
abstraction. It requires a substantial analysis effort on behalf of the appli-
cation provider and is generally a subjective undertaking. Both confidence 
and costs are difficult to measure accurately-although the extremes are well 
defined (eg cost 0.0 - no effect, 1.0 - total application failure), intermediates 
are less distinct and are thus used to order severities rather than to quantify 
them precisely. 
Lower level abstractions can be used as guides for such assessments. For 
example, a read from a unix file which is not group or world readable is likely 
to pose a greater risk to confidentiality than one which is. Confidentiality 
and integrity labels of multilevel systems could also be used for this purpose, 
as can the functionality labels introduced in the previous chapter. 
7.6 IDS / A Analysis Components 
This section describes the external analysis system of the IDS; A implementa-
tion. Its users are the parties involved in the runtime effort to secure a system 
and include security experts and system administrators. This contrasts with 
the IDS; A API whose users are the application providers. 
As indicated in Figure 7.1, the analysis function is distributed over two 
major subsystems: A client-side library (libidsa) and a server process 
(idsad) which also maps libidsa into its address space. 
The logical components of the analysis system are depicted in Figure 7.2 
(a more elaborate form can be found in [138, Figure 3]). In a typical scenario 
an event enters the systems via a call to the API (shown at the left edge of 
the figure). The library adds infrastructure information (a timestamp as well 
as user, group and process identifiers), serialises the event and transmits it to 
















I----I-h--======~-_ log files 
ids"pipe 
idsacxec 
idsadllibidsa analysis and response utilities 
Figure 7.2: Analysis Subsystems 
against a rule set whose syntax resembles an extended firewall language. 
Individual analysis and response functions are implemented as modules and 
can be extended via the module interface. The analysis result is returned 
to the application which processes or blocks the pending event, while the 
response modules initiate secondary actions, such as writing the event to 
permanent storage. The next sections describe these stages in greater detail, 
focusing on application-server communications, the rule processor and several 
of the modules. 
7.6.1 Communications 
Two characteristics define the communications between application and idsad: 
The interprocess communication mechanism and the message format or pro-
tocoL 
The IDS/ A implementation uses stream unix domain sockets as commu-
nication channels. Other systems using this IPC mechanism are the con-
ventional Linux syslog subsystem, X Windowing System components, name 
server caches and object request brokers. 
A server instance idsad binds one or more sockets, while applications con-
nect to these sockets as clients. The default socket is /var/run/idsa. Addi-
tional sockets may be bound to support applications executing in a sandbox 
generated by the chroot 0 system call. Controlled facilities exist to change 
the default socket which makes it possible for unprivileged users to run pri-
vate idsad instances which, for example, could bind /home/username/ . idsa. 
The format of the messages exchanged across the sockets resembles the 
Universal Logger Message Format [1] and an earlier one by Bishop [20]. How-
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typing information. The first example of ids a_set involving a print request 
by a document viewer could be encoded as the following two request and 
response messages:7 
?pid:pid="1410" uid:uid="504" gid:gid=1I504" 
time:time=1I1043334930 11 service:string="viewer" 
host:host="knoll" name:string=lIprint" 
Request scheme: string=lIapplication" honour: flag="O" 
arisk: risk=IIO. 000/0.000" crisk: risk="O. 000/0.000" 
irisk:risk="O.OOO/O.OOO" 
cmd:string="lpr -Plaser" 
Reply {! deny: flag="O" 
title:string="unnamed" 
Note that library call idsa_set inserts a number of common fields relating 
to the infrastructure (such as uid, pid and time). Consistent with the 
arguments in Section 5.3 this occurs automatically. Further fields (such as 
function name or the line number at which the idsa_set call is made) could 
also be included. 
An additional binary message format has also been developed. It has been 
used in a number of earlier revisions atop a unix domain transport, but it is 
more suited to an interprocess communications mechanism involving shared 
memory pages. 
7.6.2 Rule Processor 
The core of the analysis system is a processor operating on a list of rules. 
The rule language can be thought of as an extended form of those used by 
network firewalls. Each rule consists of a head and a body. The rule head 
consists of a number of tests (analysis functions) which can be combined by 
means of conjunction, disjunction and negation operators. The rule body, 
which consists of a list of actions (response functions), is executed if its head 
matches the current event. An event is matched to rules in sequence and 
evaluation terminates at the first successful rule match unless overridden in 
the rule body with the continue keyword. The core of the grammar for this 
rule language is given below using a BNF notation. Optional elements are 
enclosed in square parentheses and nonterminals are italicised. 
7Linebreaks have been inserted for presentation purposes. The actual protocol uses 
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[ % 1 action-module 
A simple example list of two rules is given below. The first rule, containing 
two tests and a single action, permits the print command "lpr" on weekdays, 
while the second rule, containing one test and two actions, denies all other 
events and logs them to file (note the that the first test is negated). 
(! %time wday sat,sun) & (cmd:string "lpr") :allow 










At the implementation level, the list of rules is compiled into a binary 
directed acyclic graph which resembles a decision tree, shown adjacent to 
the rules. The evaluation is performed by traversing the graph. Each node 
encodes a single test-if the test succeeds, the true arc (outlined arrow) 
is taken to the next node, and any actions associated with that node are 
performed, otherwise the evaluation follows the false arc (solid arrow). 
The rule evaluation framework is extensible and modular: Additional test 
and action modules can be implemented as shared objects and loaded into 
the system without modification to the server executable or library. 
Using the long syntax, each module is introduced by a percentage sign, its 
name and an optional list of arguments. In the above example, the modules 
time and true have been used in the long form. The module time has been 
given four arguments, true none and log three. 
7.6.3 IDS / A Modules 
The current revision of the IDS/ A implementation provides a total of 18 
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State Modules 
State modules are used to store information across events. Included in this 
category are the modules keep, timer and counter. These modules are used 
in both rule heads and bodies. State is set in a rule body and tested in a rule 
head. In the following example, the timer module is used to record more 
detailed information for the minute following a suspicious event: 
scheme:string syslog & service:string sshd & 
%regex message "breakin.*attempt ll : 
%timer ssh-warning 60 ; continue 
%timer ssh-warning : 
log file Ivar/log/ssh-warnings 
The modules can also be used to throttle activity or even shun subjects 
that are perceived to be hostile. However, the latter may allow attackers to 
initiate denial of service attacks-thus in many cases a direct response which 
disallows an undesired event is preferable to one which blocks subsequent 
activity. 
Anomaly Detection Modules 
The implementation provides an experimental anomaly detection module 
based on a class of designs described by Forrest et al [46]. The module can 
be set to examine a particular event field of successive events for unusual 
value sequences. Also implemented is a module to test for the occurrence of 
unusual characters within event fields 
External Analysis Interface Modules 
Two modules (pipe and interactive) provide interfaces to external analysis 
processes. The pipe module can be used to transfer selected analysis tasks to 
external programs, such as a shell (sh) or scheme interpreter (idsaguile). 
The second module forwards events to a user interface (CUI and console 
version implemented by idsaguardgtk and idsaguardtty respectively) for 
interactive analysis. While it is generally too expensive to request human 
analysis for every security event, it is useful to consult the operator when en-
countering unusual activity (in order to disambiguate between true and false 
positives) or events labelled as posing particularly high risks. For example, 
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Idsaguard lIerslon 0.94.2 
Connecting to Iroot/lest- cmds ... ok 
Request for unusual print command "Ipr .. Pinkjet" 
Request for urlUslJal print commam; "xteml & Ipr" 
allow deny stay exit 
Figure 7.3: Interactive Analysis 
name:string print & ! %keep cmd:string valid-cmds, size 64 & 
%interactive /root/test-cmds 5 failclosed: 
keep cmd:string valid-cmds 
name:string print & %keep cmd:string valid-cmds: 
allow 
name:string print: 
log file /var/log/denied-cmds; deny 
A screenshot of the idsaguardgtk utility which is used to facilitate human 
analysis is shown in Figure 7.3. The command line used to invoke it is given 
below: 
idsaguardgtk -F$'Request for unusual print command I/%{cmd}I/\n' 
/root/test-cmds 
Output Module 
Output to files or other processes is handled by the module log. Output can 
be generated in a number of predefined formats) including XML and syslog) 
as well as used-defined ones. The latter are specified using an extended 
format string syntax which provides different escape sequences. Log files can 
be rotated automatically as soon as a size threshold is exceeded. 
The implementation includes two helper utilities) idsaexec and idsapipe. 
idsaexec will spawn a command) optionally passing selected event values to 
the command as arguments) while idsapipe will pass the event stream to the 
process on standard input. The utilities allow for timeouts and size limits. 
For example they can be used to limit the number of log lines that are mailed 
to the administrator in one go) or close the pipe to (and so terminate) the 
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7.7 Implementation Considerations 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, a useful implementation should 
not introduce substantial development or performance costs, nor should it 
pose greater security risks than the ones it counteracts. 
The emphasis on simplicity in the design of the API has sought to reduce 
the first concern of minimising development or deployment costs. This section 
describes the measures taken to secure and optimise the implementation. 
7.7.1 Security Measures 
The IDS / A system is implemented entirely in user space-it does not require 
any changes to the hosting kernel. It is noted that a modern operating system 
does provide applications with numerous facilities useful in a security effort. 
Communications 
Applications and idsad communicate over unix domain sockets. It is the task 
of the operating system to guard against the interception or modification of 
messages in transit. To prevent unauthorised parties from masquerading as 
idsad, the listening socket is created in the directory /var/run which is 
only writable to the superuser. In order to prevent rogue applications from 
masquerading as others, idsad uses a trusted path feature (SO-PEERCRED)8 
of newer unix domain socket implementations to verify the user, group and 
process identifier of the clients connecting to it. The same mechanism is also 
used to discard excessive connections from an unprivileged client who at-
tempts to exhaust the pool of available connections. This approach provides 
a convenient alternative to constructing an implementation-specific authen-
tication subsystem. The choice of local unix sockets also reduces the risk 
that the IDS / A interface might accidentally be exposed to remote parties, 
as could be the case if a transport involving TCP sockets had been used. 
The choice of a specialised protocol and message format, as opposed to a 
generic system such as XML over HTTP, reduces the program code allocated 
to the communication subsystem by several orders of magnitude. In addi-
tion to improving performance, this reduction in complexity should benefit 
security. 
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Privilege Minimisation and Separation 
idsad is designed to enter a chrooted environment and relinquish superuser 
privileges. In addition idsad will always lower its resource limits to disallow 
the creation of child processes. Thus even a catastrophic compromise of 
idsad yields only limited capabilities to an attacker (a single, unprivileged 
process). In this regard the IDS/ A system holds an advantage over kernel 
resident security mechanisms where a failure may allow arbitrary operations. 
Before relinquishing its superuser privileges, idsad can start processes 
such as idsaexec or idsapipe. These processes can run under different user 
identities. Since the interface to these is unidirectional, this may prevent an 
attacker who may have compromised idsad from undoing previous actions, 
such as truncating log files opened by idsapipe or its subprocesses. 
Resource Management 
An attacker may be interested in causing idsad to consume excessive process-
ing time, memory or permanent storage. The following defenses are provided 
against these attacks: 
• To counter attempts to exhaust disk space, idsad can automatically 
rotate logs once they exceed a certain size. This can be done without 
having to restart idasd or otherwise losing messages during rotation. 
By enabling log rotation and writing messages from different users (or 
messages reporting different attack types) to separate files, it is possible 
to enforce log quotas. 
• To defend against deliberate memory exhaustion attempts as well as 
accidental memory leaks, idsad can be configured (using the -M option, 
see Appendix A.2) to preallocate all memory at initialisation. 
• To prevent an attacker from consuming all available file descriptors by 
establishing a large number of connections, idsad limits the number of 
connections that can be held by an unprivileged user. These limits are 
only enforced once the pool of file descriptors nears exhaustion. 
• The design of the protocol between application and idsad makes it 
difficult for an attacker to flood idsad with messages in the hope that 
some will be dropped, because the protocol uses a reliable stream trans-
port and requires that each message be acknowledged before the next 
is submitted. Messages have size limits, as do individual fields. The 
latter reduces the potential that a value supplied by the attacker of an 
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Conventional application ~ibidsa Q idsad 
Prefiltering I application ~ibidsa.) I :D idsad 
, -, 
, ' 
Autonomous application : idsad : , , 
1- _______ .!. 
Figure 7.4: Alternative Analysis Paths 
fairness, events sent by different applications are processed on a strict 
round-robin schedule. 
• Algorithms have been selected for good worst case performance. For 
example, the index used in the state and anomaly detection modules 
(keep and sad respectively) is implemented using an AVL-tree rather 
than a hash table. 
• The modular design makes it possible to select a particular degree of 
analysis complexity (see Section 4.6), ranging from the equivalent of 
a set of existence tests (using the default module only) to an analysis 
of arbitrary time and space complexity (using the guile interpreter). 
Particularly risk averse installations have the option of not installing 
high complexity analysis modules. 
7.7.2 Performance Enhancements 
The interprocess communications triggered by an IDS / A library call have 
a non-negligible impact on overall performance-~-the system calls used to 
manage the message exchange require a transfer into kernel space, while the 
involvement of more than one process necessitates context switches between 
applications. 
In order to reduce these costs, the IDS/ A implementation provides two 
facilities to perform part or all of the analysis in the client library: 
• Individual applications may load a set of rules from a private configu-
ration file entirely independently of the idsad process. 
• The server process may push rules into the application context. This is 
similar to the approach used by Goldszmidt [52] for distributed systems 
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prefilter activity, submitting only activity considered hostile for 
analysis by the server. 
- provide a fallback position, in case the server process becomes 
unavailable. 
transfer analysis completely into the application and disconnect 
from the server process. 
The server pushes a rule into the application context using the module 
send to return a string containing a rule set to applications. For example, 
the following action instructs applications to block activity posing a high risk 
to availability in case the server is inaccessible. 
rule head : 
send failrule:string "arisk:risk > 0.5 : deny" ; other action 
The rule is appended as a distinguished label value field to the protocol 
reply. The resulting message is shown below. 
!deny:flag=="O" failrule:string=="arisk:risk > 0.5 deny" 
It should be noted that the rules transferred into the application context 
have the same syntax and meaning as the ones used by the server, because 
the rule processor is implemented in the library libidsa shared between 
applications and idsad. Furthermore, the analysis transfer is transparent to 
the running application-the calls to idsa_set remain unchanged. 
However, this enhancement does change the security characteristics of 
system. In particular, a catastrophic failure of the client side analysis sub-
system will affect the application equally severely. This is traded against the 
advantage of applications being able to operate independently of a central 
server process. 
Given this change, the implementation requires that application providers 
explicitly enable this functionality. This is performed by setting the flag 
IDSA_F _UPLOAD in the call to ids a_open. 
7.8 Application Examples 
As part of the implementation effort a number of applications have been 
either constructed or modified to make use of the IDS / A API. A subset of 
these is listed below: 9 
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• ample [58]: a streaming audio server 
• mod_idsa: a module for the apache [8] HTTP [45] server 
• experimental FTP and HTTP servers as well as HTTP proxies (imple-
mented by undergraduate students) 
• ftp and pop proxies part of the application level firewall suite fk [71] 
• teapop [67]: a POP3 [96] server 
• pam_idsa: a module for the pluggable authentication module system 
(PAM) [115] used by programs such as login or xdm 
• linetd: an internet superserver 
• elfingerd: a finger server 
• idsatcpd: a tcp wrapper replacement 
• unix2tcp: a unix domain to TCP connection relay 
The above applications cover several permutations relating to the devel-
opment phase at which IDS/ A calls are inserted, as well as the position of 
security component relative to the guarded system. 
• Some applications were designed to use the IDS/ A API, others were 
instrumented only after they had been constructed. Of the latter some 
were instrumented by modifying the implementation source, while in 
other cases calls to the IDS / A system were added using existing exten-
sion APIs without rebuilding the application itself. 
• Referring back to the location dimension of the taxonomy (see Sec-
tion 4.3), the collection and response subcomponents of an application 
security mechanism can be positioned either inside the guarded appli-
cation or adjacent to it. The proxies and wrappers are examples of the 
latter. 
These characteristics of the different applications are listed in Table 7.2. 
The last column indicates whether the application or modification has been 
made available to the public. It should be noted that most application types 
occur as components both internal and adjacent to the guarded system-
for example linetd includes functionally which can also be provided by the 
external idsatcpd wrapper. 
In addition to the above applications, the IDS / A system has also been 
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System Instrumentation Location Published 
ample streamer modification internal no 
apache HTTP server extension internal yes 
student HTTP server design internal no 
student HTTP proxy design adjacent no 
student FTP server design internal no 
fk FTP proxy modification adjacent yes 
teapop POP server modification internal no 
fk POP proxy modification ~acent yes 
linetd superserver design internal yes 
elfingerd design internal yes 
idsatcpd wrapper design/ extension adjacent yes 
unix2tcp relay modification I internal no 
I I pam_idsa I extension I internal I yes 
Table 7.2: Selected Applications Using the IDS/ A System 
• log4cpp [12]: a hierarchical logging system. The IDS/ A implementa-
tion provides a log4cpp target . 
• syslog: the classical unix logging system. The IDS/ A implementa-
tion provides local and remote syslog replacements (idsasyslogd and 
idsarlogd), as well as a kernel logger (idsaklogd). 
When used as a part of a logging system, the callers of the IDS / A API 
only implement the collection subcomponent and defer both analysis and 
response to external systems. 
7.9 Summary 
This chapter has described a nontrivial implementation which allows the 
providers of trusted applications to transfer security related analysis to an 
external system without risk of desynchronisation. 
Applications are coupled to the analysis system via a compact API. The 
API has been designed to make the instrumentation process simple-a sensor 
actuator combination can be embedded into an application with a single 
library call. Security events can be reported in terms of multiple abstractions, 
ranging from application-specific ones to high-level risk assessments. 
The analysis system processing the events is modular and extensible. 
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cheap, stateless existence tests to the evaluation of computationally complete 
scripts. The analysis system can enforce conventional access control policies, 
perform both misuse and anomaly detection as well as request direct human 
supervision. 
A substantial effort has been devoted to making the system useful in real-
world environments---incl uded in this effort are several measures which ad-
dress security and performance concerns. In order to evaluate these measures 
and the overall implementation empirically, a number of trusted applications 























This chapter presents selected results and experiences gained during the op-
eration of the IDS/ A system. The chapter is divided into four sections which 
describe the instrumentation costs, performance impact, protection afforded 
and the runtime effort. 
8.2 Instrumentation Costs 
The effort needed to add IDS / A support to applications depends on a number 
of factors, including: 
• The inherent complexity of the application and its domain 
• The design quality, particularly the lucidity, of the modified applica-
tions 
• The ability and domain knowledge of those adding the instrumentation 
• The chosen instrumentation abstraction and the level of detail selected. 
These factors make it difficult to use individual results (for example, 
that the construction of the PAM component took a few hours or that the 
instrumentation of unix2t cp was performed within a day) as the basis for 
general predictions. Nevertheless, the results do convey an impression of the 
effort needed for representative cases. 
The next sections measure this effort by reporting changes to application 
size and complexity. This is followed by an informal description of the ef-
















STMs ! PPDs 
I ~~:: I 
Modified Applications (source changes) 
fkpop 491+ 39 (7.94%) 230+ 12 (5.22%) 35+ 15 0.80 
fkftp 955+ 20 (2.09%) 494+ 4 (0.81%) 40+ 11 0.36 
fklib 2482+ 88 (3.55%) 1125+ 25 (2.22%) 439+ 32 0.78 
unix2tcp 736+ 95 (12.91%) 436+ 13 (2.98%) 40+ 34 0.38 
ample 1421+ 94 (6.62%) 661+ 27 (4.08%) 177+ 42 0.64 
teapop 3445+391 (11.35%) 1610+ 92 (5.71%) 622+173 0.53 
Extended Applications (modules or plugins) 
apache +171 + 57 + 15 3.80 
pam +127 + 64 I + 12 5.33 
tcpd +183 +100 + 29 3.45 
Table 8.1: Increases in Code Size (for selected applications instrumented 
after construction) 
this approach reduces the influence of developer productivity, a factor which 
varies considerably. 1 
Results are given for selected applications written in the C programming 
language which have been modified or extended after their initial construc-
tion, because such posthoc changes make it clear what code has been added 
to support the instrumentation. The omission of results for applications de-
signed to use the instrumentation is not considered significant because these 
costs tend to be lower. 
8.2.1 Code Size 
The size of the instrumentation has been measured using Lott's csize util-
ity [87]. Both the number of non blank, noncomment lines (NBNCs) as well as 
the number of statements and declarations (STMs)2 are listed in Figure 8.1.3 
Where source level changes have been made to an application, both the 
Ipotok et al [103] report a difference of "nearly 50 times" between most and least 
productive teams. 
2Measured by counting the semicolons that are not part of literal strings. 
3 Although the wrapper tcpd can also be considered a new application designed to use 
the IDS! A interface, the fact that its sole purpose is to report connections to the IDS! A 
system allows it to be viewed as an extension of a network superserver such as inetd. 
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original size as well as the increase are given, while only the size of the 
plug in or module is reported for those instrumentations added by means of 
a runtime extension mechanism. The full application size has been omitted 
in the latter because it is difficult to define and measure: 
• Applications may increase in size across revisions, yet retain the same 
extension interface. 
• Applications of different sizes may implement the same extension in-
terface. For example, the PAM module may be loaded by su, login or 
xscreensaver. 
• Substantial application functions may themselves be implemented as 
optional modules. For example, most apache functionality is imple-
mented in modules-the base package alone includes 33 which account 
for approximately half the code size. 
In cases where source code has been modified, the changes are enclosed 
in preprocessor directives (#ifdef USE_IDSA and #endif). This makes it 
possible to activate the instrumentation using a compiler option. Since this 
inflates the NBNC count, the number of preprocessor directives (PPDs) are 
also listed separately. This inflation is apparent in the ratio of added state-
ments to added preprocessor directives (~~~~) when comparing source mod-
ifications to runtime extensions. 
8.2.2 Code Complexity 
McCabe's Cyclomatic Complexity [90] was chosen to measure the complexity 
of adding the IDS / A instrumentation to applications. This measure quan-
tifies the size of the application control graph. In this graph each node 
"corresponds to a block of code in the program where the flow is sequential 
and the arcs correspond to the branches taken in the program". The complex-
ity (v) can be expressed in terms of the arcs (e), nodes (n) and connected 
components (p--a term accounting for transfers to other modules): 
v = e - n+ 2p (8.1) 
For a structured4 module taken as a single component (p = 1), McCabe 
shows that the complexity (v) can be derived from the number of predicates 
(IT) contained in the module: 
4Several of the applications also make use of unstructured got os. However, since no 
jumps are added by the instrumentations, and existing applications use gotos sparingly 
(a single jump target for ample, teapop and fkpop; and four in the case of fkftp and 
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II n ~+~~ ~n %n 1T+~7r % 
Modified Applications (source changes) 
fkpop 26 5.04+0.19 105+ 5 (4.76%) 
fkftp 36 7.06+0.14 218+ 5 (2.29%) 
fklib 146 3.32 I 4 2.00 339+ 4 (1.18%) 
unix2tcp 27 6.82+0.11 1 2.00 157+ 4 (2.55%) 
ample 46 5.85+0.22 2 1.50 223+ 11 (4.93%) 
• teapop 65 8.40+0.25 3 3.67 481+ 24 (4.99%) 
Extended Applications (modules or plug ins) 
apache 9 3.33 + 21 
pam 2 11.50 + 21 
tcpd 1 32.00 + 31 
Table 8.2: Increases in Cyclomatic Complexity 
V=7r 1 (8.2) 
Here predicates are the language constructs that introduce branches in 
the control flow such as if, while or case. These have been counted using 
Cobb's mccabe utility and are given in Table 8.2. Separate complexities are 
given for modifications made to existing functions (vn and ~vn for an existing 
n functions) and new ones (v ~n for ~n new functions). 
For example, the unmodified teapop server consists of 65 functions with 
an average complexity of 8.4. The average increases by 0.25 after instrumen-
tation. The instrumentation also adds 3 new functions of average complexity 
3.67. Both increases are due to the addition of 24 new branching constructs 
to an existing 481. The distribution of the instrumentation over individual 
functions is shown in Figure 8.1. Each bar represents the complexity of an 
unmodified function, while a point indicates the complexity after modifica-
tion. Points to the far left denote new functions. 
8.2.3 Discussion 
The previous sections measured two properties that provide an indication of 
the effort needed to instrument particular applications. This section describes 
the process in general terms and relates several observations made during the 
instrumentation of the above (as well as other) applications. 
Referring back to Figure 6.1, the effort can be examined separately for 
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Figure 8.2: Expensive (left) and Cheap (right) Control Flow Changes 
that applications be modified to supply idsa_set or its equivalent with in-
formation. Under unfavourable conditions an application may have to be 
modified to collect information which would otherwise not have been ac-
quired, which would have been discarded or which would only have been 
retained in an inaccessible form. However, in most of the applications in-
strumented, existing data structures have contained sufficient information to 
populate the parameters of idsa_set with relative ease. This is supported 
(albeit indirectly) by the result that the ratio of statements to preproces-
sor directives in Table 8.1 indicate that the code fragments enclosed by an 
#ifdef/#endif pair is not much larger than a single statement.5 
The response phase consists of altering the execution flow, with a deny 
response reducing application functionality. In suboptimal cases this task 
requires the introduction of a completely new decision point in the control 
graph of the application. However, operational experience shows that such 
effort is needed only infrequently as it is often possible to extend an existing 
branching construct. Instead of introducing a new code block (or control arc, 
using McCabe's terminology) to handle the response, a deny result returned 
by idsa_set is used to direct control to an existing, but more conservative, 
code fragment-often an error handler. The difference between the two ap-
proaches is illustrated in Figure 8.2 (X denotes the new response component). 
As in an earlier figure, the components in gray denote a modification. 
Although these experiences support the claim that posthoc modification 
is not unreasonably expensive, it is worth repeating that this cost varies 
significantly. Using the above measurements to compute an average and 
variance would be of limited benefit (even if the number of samples were to 
be increased substantially), given that a large number of poorly quantifiable 
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factors6 influence the cost of instrumenting a particular application. Instead 
the next paragraphs describe some of the more interesting issues qualitatively. 
Threads and Signals: Asynchronous programming constructs tend to in-
crease instrumentation costs because these make it more difficult to 
comprehend the control flow of an application. \Vhile it is possible for 
the instrumentation to lock every added fragment (in case of thread-
ing) or defer/block all interruptions during its execution (in the case of 
signals), some subtleties tend to remain. The greater demands made by 
asynchronous designs can be viewed as an additional result which sup-
ports the claim by Boebert [24] that these constructs are more difficult 
to secure. 
Side Effects: Code fragments with poorly discernible or separable side ef-
fects raise modification costs. The two cases of interest are func-
tions used to supply idsa_set with data and functions used as test 
predicates in branching constructs altered by the instrumentation (la-
belled Y in Figure 8.2). A design making extensive use of accessor 
functions, commonly advocated as part of an object encapsulation 
(getmember(object) and the equivalent C++ object.getmemberO 
instead of the unambiguous7 object->member), increases these costs 
as an effort is needed to confirm that a read is really only a read. 
Error Handling: Applications which provide superior error handling are 
usually easier to modify, since an existing branching predicate testing 
for an abnormal condition provides a suitable point for the insertion of 
an ids a_set call, as shown in the right side of Figure 8.2. Where such 
an insertion is made, the IDS / A analysis phase may even be used as 
a "fault" injection system to aid the testing of the error management 
components. 
Instrumentation Style: A surprising factor contributing to the variation 
in cost is the style of the instrumentation-a "quick-and-dirly" change 
is noticeably less expensive than one which strives to follow the con-
ventions set by the application developer. Here the term style not 
only refers to the indentation or variable naming convention but also 
extends to some design issues. For example, a particular application 
design may avoid global variables and instead transfer state in function 
6 Arguably a problem affecting the field of software metrics in generaL 
7Note that this is not necessarily true for C++. In general, the unwise redefinition of 
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parameters-in such a case the use of a global IDS/ A handle is likely 
to be jarring even if functionally correct. 
Chosen Abstraction: Confirming the tradeoff depicted in Figure 6.2, events 
defined in terms of native abstractions tend to be visible directly in ap-
plication procedures and data structures, while higher level abstractions 
need to be translated. For example, the handlers servicing individual 
POP protocol requests have been implemented as separate functions 
which are easily identified. In contrast, an access control abstraction 
requires that native elements be mapped to a set of subjects, objects 
and access modes, while the functionality labelling approach requires 
that actions be categorised. However, although these higher level ab-
stractions impose a translation cost, they also guide the identification 
process. For example, functionality labels can be assigned on the ba-
sis of a set of questions such as "Mat are the tasks performed by the 
applications?", "Where in the application are tasks initiated?", "Mat 
are the task dependencies?" and "Mat tasks are essential?". 
8.3 Performance Impact 
The previous section examined the implementation costs of adding IDS / A 
support to applications. This section describes the runtime overhead, in 
particular the increase in execution time. Like the development cost, the 
performance impact is influenced by numerous factors: In addition to usual 
infrastructure properties (operating system, compiler and hardware char-
acteristics) affecting most performance evaluations, these results are also 
dependent on the particular application, its workload and instrumentation 
strategy. So while performance results for real applications are satisfying 
from the perspective of an experimentalist, they are difficult to generalise. 
For this reason three different approaches have been taken to measure the 
performance impact of adding the IDS/ A instrumentation to applications: 
• Detailed run times were measured for two applications 
• IDS/ A library calls were benchmarked on a range of platforms 
• System calls issued by IDS / A functions were enumerated 
The first set of measurements provides empirical results for real appli-
cations. The purpose of the second approach, the synthetic benchmark, is 
to remove application dependent factors and so estimate the cost of an 
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estimate the performance impact of inserting such a call at a particular lo-
cation under a given application workload. vVhile this not as convenient as 
a general result which claims that instrumenting applications with IDS/ A 
calls lengthens execution time by N%, it is likely to be more usefuL 
Listing the system calls triggered by an IDS / A library function serves a 
similar purpose-it places a lower bound on the cost of an IDS/ A API call 
in a form less dependent on a particular platform: The cost of making an 
IDS/ A library call as measured by the synthetic benchmark is reported in 
elapsed seconds and is dependent on the compiler, system libraries, kernel 
and hardware. For a platform which is similar to the one used in the syn-
thetic benchmark, the results should provide a reasonable indication of the 
expected performance impact. However, for substantially different systems, 
in particular newer processor architectures and alternative operating systems, 
such timings are of limited use. In such cases system call costs can provide 
an estimate, albeit coarse, of the cost of invoking IDS/ A library functions. 
All above measurements were made for both plain and performance op-
timised configurations in order to evaluate the effectiveness of shifting the 
computational load from a separate process into the application context as 
described in Subsection 7.7.2. 
8.3.1 Application Benchmarks 
This section provides performance figures for two applications which have 
been instrumented using the IDS / A API. The following five system configu-
rations were exercised. 
Configurations 
Original: The unmodified application. 
Simple Server: A configuration where calls to the IDS/ A API inside the 
application are forwarded to the IDS/ A server, idsad. The IDS/ A 
server matches requests to a trivial rule set. 
Simple Client: The same configuration as the Simple Server, except that 
the rule processing is performed in the application. 
Logging Server: The same configuration as the Simple Server with the 
addition of writing each reported event to disk. 
Logging Client: The same configuration as the Simple Client with the ad-
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Original Simple Server Simple Client Logging Server Logging Client 
Application Application Application Application 
Library Library Library 
Server J 
Figure 8.3: Exercised Configurations 
The two simple configurations were chosen to provide an indication of the 
overhead of using the IDS / A API. The Simple Client configuration removes 
the interprocess communications overhead encountered in the Simple Server 
configuration. 
The logging configurations have been chosen as representatives of rela-
tively expensive tasks. They provide an indication of the cost of using the 
API and performing a nontrivial operation. Like the Simple Client configura-
tion, the Logging Client configuration is intended to evaluate the performance 
gains of shifting tasks into the application context. 
Applications 
The two applications exercised are apache [8], a representative of an ap-
plication extended using a plugin API, and teapop [67], an example of an 
application which has been modified at the source level. The applications 
were subjected to the following loads: 
HTTP server : The web server test load consisted of 10 different web 
pages having an average size of approximately 60kb. Sullivan [130] 
found this size to be representative of documents encountered on the 
world wide web. For each test run 1,000 HTTP GET requests were 
made, distributed equally among the 10 pages. The web pages were 
retrieved with the httperf utility[93]. 
POP server : The mailbox server test load consisted of a 12,859,057 byte 
mailbox containing 968 messages with an average message size of 13,284 
bytes and a standard deviation of 76,815 (the largest message occupied 
1,490,421 bytes). No claim is made to the representativeness of the 
mailbox other than that is not synthetic. This mailbox was downloaded 
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Each configuration was exercised 25 times. In total 7,467,675,000 bytes 
of web pages and 1,607,382,125 bytes worth of mail were transferred. 
The tests were warm, with both data and executable images previously 
loaded into the host buffer cache to reduce the impact of variable disk laten-
cies. 
The server and client were run on the same machine. Using the loop-
back network interface magnified the performance penalty of making calls to 
the IDS/ A library~-in a real scenario the network latencies and bandwidth 
bounds would reduce the relative impact of this penalty. Further masking 
can occur when an interactive client is used-both the clients used (httperf 


















Hostname lookups disabled, logging enabled 
0.8 
--hog --wset=10,1 --num-conns=1000 
0.3.3 
Default, started from internet superserver 
5.3.3 
--bsmtp - -p pop3 > /dev/null 
Password read from. fetchmailrc 
IDS/ A 0.91.10 
Linux 2.2.19 
GNU 2.1.3 
Cyrix 6x86L 120MHz 
64M 
HTTP server results are given in Table 8.3 while the POP server results are 
presented in Table 8.4. 
Discussion 
For the unoptimised cases (executing tests inside a separate server process) 
the performance impact lies between 16 and 20% for the web server and 4.2 


















o 10 15 20 
Time in seconds 
I I Mean (s) I Deviation (s) I Cost (s) I Cost (%) I 
Original 12.54 0.135 -
Simple Server 14.50 0.138 1.96 15.62 . 
Simple Client 13.03 0.107 0.48 3.86 
Logging Server 15.09 0.126 2.55 20.32 
. Logging Client 13.59 0.161 1.04 8.30 
Table 8.3: The performance impact of the IDS/ A instrumentation on the 
Apache HTTP server. Error bars indicate two standard deviations. Increases 














j------..... ---------.. -------'-t_e__J 59.64 
Server 
o 10 20 30 50 60 70 
Time in seconds 
I I Mean (s) I Deviation (s) I Cost (s) I Cost (%) I 
I Original 57.22 0.347 -
Simple Server 59.57 0.844 2.35 4.10 
Simple Client 58.04 0.602 0.81 1.42 • 
Logging Server 59.64 0.797 2.42 4.23 
Logging Client 58.49 0.409 1.27 2.22 
Table 8.4: The performance impact of the IDS/ A instrumentation on the 
Teapop POP server. Error bars indicate two standard deviations. Increases 
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Table 8.5: Performance Gains of Client Side Operation 
In both cases the instrumentation reports application protocol level events: 
Each HTTP GET request results in a call to the IDS/ A library, as does each 
POP RETR request. These library calls have similar absolute costs (all other 
factors being equal), regardless of whether they are made inside a web or pop 
server. However, as POP requests appear to be more expensive than HTTP 
requests, the cost of adding the IDS/ A instrumentation to the pop server is 
a smaller fraction of the total-thus the smaller percentage. 
The results illustrate why it is not possible to provide a single percent-
age describing the performance impact of adding IDS / A instrumentation to 
applications in general. The relative performance impact is specific to a par-
ticular application, instrumentation strategy, configuration and workload. 
This means that care has to taken not to make overly general claims based 
on the above results. 
However, a number of mitigating factors were not considered in the above 
tests: Network latencies (the tests were conducted on the same host), cache 
misses (data and executables were preloaded) and user delays (clients were 
noninteractive) were excluded-these lengthen the overall execution time and 
thus reduce the relative impact of the IDS/ A instrumentation. 
It is thus not completely unjustified to suggest that under typical con-
ditions the impact of the IDS/ A instrumentation on the performance of the 
two applications is less than or equal to the percentages measured in the 
above tests. 
Stronger claims can be made about the effectiveness of optimising the 
IDS/A system by shifting operations from a separate process (idsad) into 
a library component executing in the process space of the application. As 
can be seen from Table 8.5, this reduction of the performance impact is 
substantial. 
In line with expectations the reduction for the simple cases is larger than 
for the expensive ones, as the interprocess communication overhead accounts 
for a smaller fraction of the total cost in the latter. However, even for the 
expensive configurations, the interprocess communication overhead is signif-
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the IDS! A instrumentation to the applications to a half in the worst case to 
a quarter in the best. 
The greater improvements for the HTTP server can be accounted for by 
noting that apache serves requests using multiple processes. These multiple 
processes would have competed with each other to be serviced by a single 
idsad instance-the transfer of the analysis tests to the applications paral-
lelises this task. However, as the test was performed on a single processor 
system, individual web server processes still had to compete for the same 
processor, thus reducing the magnitude of this gain. 
8.3.2 Synthetic Benchmark 
The previous section quantified the relative increase in execution time of 
adding the instrumentation to real applications. 
This section attempts to estimate the cost of making calls to the IDS! A 
API. This cost is measured using a simple synthetic benchmark program 
which makes as many calls as possible to the API. 
The test used four of the five configurations described previously (the 
first configuration of an unmodified application is not relevant to a synthetic 
benchmark). The configurations were exercised on a number of different 
platforms, ranging from an older Pentium system clocked at 75MHz with 
16Mb of main memory to an Athlon clocked at 1330MHz, with 256kb of 
primary cache and 256Mb of RAM. 
It is noted that the performance of a given platform depends on numerous 
other factors besides processor type and clock speed-however, the clock 
speed is an indicator of the ageS of a consumer system, and, given exponential 
advances in processing power over time, does summarise overall capabilities, 
albeit imprecisely. 
Test conditions were similar to the ones for the application benchmarks. 
All systems were running Linux and the tests were warm. 
The benchmark program was set up to issue 10,000 API calls and the 
elapsed times were recorded for 25 runs, resulting in a total of 1,000,000 API 
calls for each tested platform. 
Results 
The results for the trivial rule set are given in Table 8.6 and for a more ex-
pensive logging rule set in 8.7. Note that the timings are reported in seconds 
8CPU clockspeed has a significant influence on purchasing decisions, obliging vendors 
to maximise this value. Consequently clockspeed is reasonably easily mapped to the age 
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to service 10,000 calls and that the reduction field lists the performance gain 
achieved by transferring the rule evaluation to the application context. Also 
note that the X-axes of the accompanying graphs are logarithmic. 
Discussion 
The figures reported for the tested systems span slightly less than two orders 
of magnitude for all configurations: The values computed by the benchmark 
program per single API call range from 0.09ms to 3.9ms for an expensive, 
server resident rule set, while a trivial rule set running inside the application 
context costs between 0.004ms and 0.31ms per call. 
The cost reductions achieved by shifting the work from a separate server 
process into the application (here benchmark) process are even more sub-
stantial than those measured during the actual application performance tests 
described in the previous sections. For example, for the trivial rule set exe-
cuting in the application the time taken by the synthetic benchmark can be 
reduced by about 90%, compared to 75% and 65% for the HTTP and POP 
servers respectively. 
The reduction can in part be accounted for by the fact that the synthetic 
benchmark does not map (retrieve and possibly reformat) information from 
the application data structures to a representation which can be used in 
an IDS / A API calL These tasks may lengthen the overall execution time 
and thus reduce the relative significance of the interprocess communications 
overhead. Another, possibly even more substantial, contributing factor is 
that real applications are larger and thus likely to incur more processor cache 
misses compared to the synthetic benchmark which executes in a relatively 
compact loop. The absence of a load generating utility (httperf, fetchmail) 
in the synthetic benchmark is likely to have a similar effect. 
The above explanation can also account for the fact that calls to the 
IDS/ A API in the synthetic benchmark take less time than when used in 
real applications. For example, it takes 10.72s to service 10,000 requests in 
the benchmark program for the trivial case compared to 1.96s to handle 1,000 
requests in the web server. 9 
8.3.3 System Call Costs 
This section presents an alternative approach to describing the performance 
impact of adding the IDS / A instrumentation to applications. 
Instead of measuring elapsed execution times, this section enumerates 
the system calls that are made when an application invokes IDS/ A library 
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--(> 0.21 PentiumlIl398 
0 1.92 
f-.o 0.08 
0 Simple Server 
Celeronl845 
0.62 <> Simple Client 
~ 0.04 
Athlonll330 
to 15 20 25 30 
Time in seconds 
I Processor Clock RAM Simple Server Simple Client 
: (family.modeLstepping) MHz Mb seconds ± deviation seconds ± deviation (reduction) 
Intel Pentium (5.2.12) 75 0125.30 ± 0.035 3.10 ± 0.002 (87.7%) 
Cyrix 6x86L (5.4.2) 120 64 10.72 ± 0.073 1.02 ± 0.013 (90.5%) 
Intel PentiumMMX (5.4.3) 200 64 8.36 ± 0.127 t%84 ± 0.005 (90.0%) 
. Intel PentiumPro (6.1.9) 180 32 5.15 ± 0.045 .53 ± 0.005 (89.6%) 
Intel Pentiumll (6.5.3) 398 128 2.88 ± 0.007 0.22 ± 0.000 (92.4%) 
Intel Celeron (6.8.6) 845 256 1.92 ± 0.124 0.08 ± 0.000 (95.8%) • 
AMD Athlon (6.4.4) 1330 256 0.62 ± 0.0031 0.04 ± 0.000 (93.6%) :I[ 
Table 8.6: Time to process 10,000 events using a simple rule set measured 


























0 Logging Server 
Celeronl845 
0.91 <> Logging Oient 
~0,29 
Alhlonll33O 
10 15 20 25 30 35 «J 45 
Time in seconds 
Processor Clock RAM Logging Server Logging Client 
(family.model.stepping) MHz Mb seconds ± deviation seconds ± devia.tion (reduction) 
Intel Pentium (5.2.12) 75 16 39.26 ± 0.346 17.95 ± 0.486 (54.3%) 
Cyrix 6x86L (5.4.2) 120 64 19.49 ± 0.583 4.74 ± 0.113 (75.7%) • 
Intel PentiumMMX (5.4.3) 200 64 10.32 ± 0.162 2.79 ± 0.041 (73.0%) 
Intel PentiumPro (6.1.9) 180 32 6.67 ± 0.100 2.00 ± 0.016 (69.9%) 
Intel Pentiumll (6.5.3) 398 128 3.58 ± 0.005 1.01 ± 0.002 (71.8%) 
, Intel Celeron (6.8.6) 845 256 3.14 ± 0.159 0.74 ± 0.059 (76.4%) 
AMD Athlon (6.4.4) 1330 256 0.91 ± 0.008 0.29 ± 0.005 (68.2%) 
Table 8.7: Time to process 10,000 events using an expensive rule set mea-
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functions. System calls are expensive operations and constitute a significant 
part of the cost of an IDS / A function call. 
System calls are a common subject of performance tests and are easily 
measured for a particular operating system and hardware configuration. A 
list of system calls triggered by a given IDS/ A function can be used to esti-
mate a lower bound for the cost of invoking the function on systems where 
such system call benchmarks are available. 
Method 
System call traces were recorded for the benchmark program described previ-
ously. The same four configurations of Simple Server, Simple Client, Logging 
Server and Logging Client were used. The IDS/ A library function examined 
was idsa_set, an arbitrary choice as idsa_scan and idsa_log trigger the 
same system call sequence. Once-off initialisation and termination activity 
was not examined. 
Results 
The system calls issued inside idsa_set are listed in Table 8.8. 
Discussion 
The difference between a configuration which performs security related com-
putations in a separate server process and one which performs the same task 
inside the application process space is clearly visible. It adds six system calls 
and context switches between application and server process. 
The configurations that 'write log files can be identified by the additional 
wri te 0 system call. This system call is made within the logging module 
mOd_log, however it should be noted that not all modules issue system calls 
when processing an event. 
8.3.4 Consolidation 
This section has approached the problem of quantifying the performance 
impact of adding the IDS/ A instrumentation to applications from several 
angles. 
The first approach measured the impact of the instrumentation on real-
world applications. The application performance measurements showed that 
the instrumentation causes only a moderate lengthening of execution time 
under the particular test conditions. Unfortunately, as such performance fig-
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Simple Server timec(NULL); 
sendc(server, event, · .. ) ; 
selects ( ... ) ; 
times(NULL); 
reads (client , event, · .. ) ; 
writes (client , reply, ... ) ; 
recvc(server, reply, · .. ) ; 
i Simple Client timec(NULL); 
Logging Server timec(NULL); 
sendc(server, event, · .. ) ; 
selects(· .. ); 
! 
times(NULL); 
reads (client , event, ... ); 
writes(file, event, ... ) ; 
writes (client , reply, ... ); 
recvc(server, reply, · .. ) ; 
Logging Client timec(NULL); 
writec(file, event, ... ) ; 
Table 8.8: System calls for the IDS / A API call idsa_set O. Subscripts 
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them to make claims about the average cost of instrumenting applications in 
general. However, the results do support the assertion that there exist ap-
plications which can be instrumented using the IDS / A system at reasonable 
cost to performance. 
Two additional approaches were used to decouple the performance of the 
IDS/ A system from application-specific factors: Individual API call costs 
were both benchmarked and traced. The former provides an indication of 
the cost on a number of platforms, the latter a lower bound on the cost 
expressed as a sequence of system calls, a form reasonably independent of a 
particular platform. 
On recent hardware (of which the Athlon-based system in Tables 8.6 and 
8.7 is an example) the benchmark places the costs of making an IDS/A API 
call in the tens or hundreds of microseconds. For many types of applications 
such costs are acceptable: Applications where activity is initiated by a human 
and triggers only a limited number of IDS / A calls per action (eg most inter-
active applications) are unlikely to be noticeably affected by sub-millisecond 
increases in response time. Similar considerations apply to applications that 
communicate across the internet: Network latencies and variations in latency 
can introduce significantly larger delays than IDS / A calls. lD 
So although there is a measurable cost associated with making IDS/ A 
calls, an effort has been made to keep this cost low enough to permit inclusion 
in both interactive and networked applications. 
While the performance costs of adding the IDS / A instrumentation are 
reasonably small, there do remain some applications or usage scenarios where 
stringent throughput or latency requirements make the IDS/ A instrumenta-
tion cost prohibitively expensive. In order to reduce the number of such 
cases, the optimisation of shifting the computation from a separate server 
into the application context was introduced. The results presented in this 
section show conclusively that this optimisation can reduce the execution 
time of an IDS / A library call, typically by a factor of two or more. 
Finally it should be noted that there exist other run-time security mech-
anisms which, despite nontrivial performance costs, are in common use. For 
example, the costs associated with TCP wrappers[135] (a protection mecha-
nism for network server applications) include the creation of a new process, 
parsing a configuration file and two name lookups. The popularity of sys-
tems like TCP wrappers indicates a willingness to tolerate performance losses 
for the sake of improved security. As systems become faster and security a 
lOConsider the example of sending a packet from New York to London: Even under 
optimal conditions this takes 2*55~Okm r:::i 36ms, about two orders of magnitude more than 
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greater concern this willingness is unlikely to disappear. All these factors 
support the conclusion that the careful instrumentation of most nonrealtime 
applications with IDS/ A API calls should not lead to unacceptable perfor-
mance losses. 
8.4 Security Gains 
This section describes the security benefits which can be realised using the 
security component design proposed in this thesis. The section consists of a 
number of examples which are intended to provide concrete illustrations of 
how the proposed approach can be used to address some of the limitations 
identified in Section 3.3. The examples have been kept simple deliberately. 
This limits the amount of context needed to introduce them and makes it 
easier to isolate a particular issue. 
8.4.1 Resistance to Desynchronisation 
This example shows how the security analysis phase (used in an intrusion 
detection role) can be provided with more accurate information if it is coupled 
strongly to the applications it guards. Consider a simple reconnaissance 
attempt which aims to access the details of the unix administrative user 
via the finger protocol. snort, a representative of a conventional network 
intrusion detection system, provides the following signature to report this 
event: 11 
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 79 
(msg: "FINGER root query"; 
flow:to_server,established; content: "root"; 
reference: arachnids, 376; 
classtype:attempted-recon; sid:323; rev:4;) 
The third line is of particular interest: It causes the signature to trigger 
if the string "root" is matched in a packet sent to the finger server. An 
equivalent (ignoring references) rule for an application instrumented using 
the IDS / A system is given below: 
service elfingerd & name finger & 
.am-i.object:string root: 
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log file /var/log/alerts. custom "FINGER root query~J" 
While these rules perform the same analysis task, their input data is 
collected by different means. The snort rule is supplied with data by a low-
level infrastructure component, the IDS/ A rule by the guarded application 
itself. As argued previously, the latter has the advantage of being more 
difficult to desynchronise at the cost of relying on the application provider 
to supply this information. 
For example, although snort does attempt to track TCP connections, 
it was possible to discover (as part of the examination undertaken in this 
section) a means of desynchronising snort and similar systems from the 
applications they monitor.12 This desynchronisation opportunity involves a 
complication in the handling of the TCP Urgent Flag and Pointer, a protocol 
feature that allows communicating parties to mark high priority data. The 
salient issue is that applications usually have to enable the reception of this 
data explicitly, by setting the MSG_OOB flag in the recv () system call or 
equivalent. A number of network monitors disregard this, assuming that 
urgent data is processed by all applications. This allows an attacker to insert 
misleading data into a message that reaches the weakly coupled security 
analysis subcomponent but not necessarily the guarded application. In the 
above example, a request to finger root can be disguised as ro~ot which 
does not trigger the snort rule. Attack payloads can be masked in a similar 
way. 
It is not easy for a security component which only has access to low 
level network traffic to decode this disguised attack correctly, given that the 
MSG_OOB flag is not transmitted across the network but influences the decod-
ing logic of the local TCP stack. In addition, the interpretation of urgent data 
may vary across TCP implementations and even installations-for example, 
the Linux kernel can be configured to follow one of two approaches. 
Complications of this type provide empirical support for the claim that 
a weakly coupled security component is more likely to be bypassed. In this 
regard it is worth noting that the above example application is not even par-
ticularly complex, and that large traffic loads and encrypted communications 
channels provide further desynchronisation opportunities. 
12The maintainers of snort have been notified of this problem, as it is not described 
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8.4.2 Finer Grained Access Control 
Previously the thesis stated that application level access controls tend to 
be relatively unsophisticated and insular-unsophisticated in that only a 
limited number of coarse configurations are supported, and insular in that 
the application access control subsystem is not easily integrated with others. 
The teapop mail retrieval server can be used to illustrate this point. The 
uninstrumented version of the server does not provide facilities to block access 
on a per host basis itself13-instead it relies on other systems (tcpwrappers, 
firewall rules) to perform this task. While effective, this makes it difficult 
to enforce finer-grained policies, such as defining host access lists on a per 
mailbox basis. Once instrumented with calls to the IDS! A system, it is 
possible to enforce such restrictions. Consider the following four rules: 
service teapop & name login & success:flag true 
& ip4src:addr 137.158.0.0/16 
continue; 
keep user:string active-users, size 500, timeout 1209600 
service teapop & ip4src:addr 137.158.0.0/16 
allow; log file /var/log/teapop/internal-use 
service teapop & !name dele 
& (name connect I %keep user:string active-users) 
allow; log file /var/log/teapop/external-reads 
service teapop : 
deny; log file /var/log/teapop/disallowed 
Taking 137.158.0.0/16 as the network local to the organisation owning 
the pop server, this of rules allows all users full mail access from within 
the organisation (rule 2). In addition, those users who have made successful 
use of this service from within the organisation in the last two weeks (rule 
1) are also able to but not delete, mail from external hosts (rule 3). 
This configuration offers an intermediate between a draconian policy 
which disallows all remote mail retrieval and one which is overly permissive-
the former may cause users to circumvent controls (by installing private and 
13This is not a deficiency of teapop~most pop servers only provide simple access con-
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poorly maintained remote access hardware and software, or forwarding all 
mail to external accounts) while the latter has the potential to expose a 
large number of dormant accounts to attack. 
It is also possible to use the instrumentation to integrate policies across 
applications, in this example a SMTP server could be made to query the 
active-users state variable14 to enable selective mail relaying (POP before 
SMTP), a task which otherwise tends to be performed using ad hoc scripts 
to insert hosts extracted from POP server logs into relay lists and cron jobs 
to expire them. 
8.4.3 Reduction of Nonessential Trust Relationships 
This section provides an example of how a more sophisticated application 
analysis subsystem can make it possible to reduce application reliance on 
the parties interacting with it. This can be seen as an implementation of the 
suggestion made by Gong et al [27] that the efforts undertaken to secure large 
distributed systems be shifted from the global infrastructure to individual 
servers or objects. 
The example relates to the crawlers or robots which autonomously tra-
verse web sites. Site owners may wish to bar robots from retrieving certain 
web pages if they are automatically generated, short-lived or contain sen-
sitive information. The current procedure to achieve this, as described in 
[73], relies on crawlers to retrieve the list of paths not to be accessed from 
the file robots. txt stored in the document root of the web server. Such an 
approach is satisfactory from the perspective of the robot owner who may 
wish to prevent the crawler from ((getting lost" in a dynamically generated 
site. It is a attractive proposition for a web site owner as the approach 
depends on the ((honesty" of the robot. 
As part of the operation of the IDS / A system it was found that this trust 
is, at least in some instances, misplaced. By adding paths not referenced 
anywhere else to robots. txt it was found that some web crawlers retrieve 
(whether through incompetence or malice) the prohibited sections of a web 
site. This can be countered using the following two rules: 
service apache & file:file /var/www/robots.txt 
allow; keep ip4src:addr robots, size 1000 
service apache & file:file /var/www/private.html & 
%keep ip4src:addr robots : 
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deny; log file /var/log/bad-robots 
The above rules can be seen to enforce a simple Chinese Wall [25] access 
control policy,15 where the files robots. txt and private .html belong to the 
same conflict of interest class. To hinder those crawlers which do not retrieve 
the file robots. txt, the test of the first rule could be replaced with a file 
accessible through a link unlikely to be followed by a human, such as one 
embedded in a comment or displayed in a poorly visible form. 
A related example involving an obligation (an AND rather than an XOR 
constraint) relates to the management of web server bandwidth. An unde-
sired use may occur if a foreign server publishes a document which sources 
elements (typically backgrounds, icons, or other multimedia entities) hosted 
on the local server. Effectively this allows the foreign site to transfer a part 
of the bandwidth cost of hosting the document to the server under consider-
ation. A common response to this practice is to examine the Referer HTTP 
header for nonlocal references to image elements and block these requests. 
As in the previous example, this relies on the co-operation of the clients to 
supply the correct data. This co-operation cannot always be secured, given 
that a number of web clients or privacy enhancing proxies omit this field or 
always set it to the document root of the current site. 16 
In this situation a rule set similar to the previous one can be used to 
remove the dependence on the client-the first rule can be modified to in-
struct the %keep module to store the addresses of hosts that have recently 
accessed primary documents (all html documents instead of robots. txt), 
while the second rule can be changed to supply only those addresses with 
supporting elements (allowing access to images instead of blocking access to 
private .html). 
It should be noted that these defenses are imperfect. For example, a 
document author determined to include image elements from another site 
could perhaps embed a script that instructs browsers to load and discard a 
document from that site before accessing its images. In general, it is difficult 
to control how publicly accessible data is used by other parties. However, the 
above approach does increase the effort needed to circumvent policy-instead 
of trusting crawlers to honour the prohibitions contained in robots. txt or 
users to supply valid refer fields, the examples use a more complex analysis 
subsystem to check client behaviour. 
15 A Chinese Wall Security Policy is a stateful policy. It expresses Exclusive OR con-
straints-a subject may not access more than one object from the same conflict of interest 
class, but it is left to the subject to choose which one. 
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Figure 8.4: Policy Lifecycle 
8.5 Runtime Effort 
This section discusses the costs of operating and maintaining an IDS/ A in-
stallation, in particular the effort required to formulate policy-a task com-
parable to maintaining a firewall or IDS ruleset. The next section decomposes 
policy construction into several phases and examines the different ways of dis-
tributing the effort across them. This is followed by an example illustrating 
how the same constraint can be enforced by different policy statements. 
8.5.1 Policy Lifecycle 
The policy engineering process can be represented as a typical development 
lifecycle or spiral, consisting of four major phases: Specification, develop-
ment, testing and maintenance. This is illustrated in Figure 8.4. The next 
paragraphs enumerate the parties who may invest an effort at each of the 
phases and how these costs may be amortised. 
Specification : This stage of the policy formulation process identifies the 
constraints which need to be enforced. Conventional access control 
policies are generally formulated by the organisation owning the com-
puter infrastructure, although large-scale standardisation (for example, 
as part of an ERP implementation) or external legislative constraints 
may fix substantial parts of the policy. Where the IDS / A system is used 
to block the exploitation of software vulnerabilities, the equivalent of 
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CVE-2001-0473 notes that some versions of mutt should be prevented 
from processing IMAP server replies containing a format string. 
Implementation : The implementation phase maps a higher-level specifi-
cation to a form which can be processed by the IDSj A implementation. 
Arguably the most significant impact on the implementation cost is the 
size and computational complexity (as defined in Section 4.6) of the 
policy to be enforced. Implementation costs can be mitigated by shar-
ing or automating this task. Costs can be shared using an opensource 
approach where multiple users contribute policy profiles and misuse sig-
natures. Alternatively, or additionally, this task could be out sourced to 
security specialists, such as the vendors of anti-virus products (whose 
virus signature databases already encode a form of misuse) or managed 
security providers. The implementation of policy can also be automa-
ted by employing machine learning systems (anomaly detectors and 
related systems)-however, the next points will note that the latter 
strategy often transfers the bulk of the effort to a later stage, rather 
than removing it entirely. 
Testing and Tuning : This phase verifies that the policies generated in the 
previous phase provide the desired control. Apart from conventional 
testing, this phase also includes the customisation of vendor provided 
policies and the training of machine learning systems, the latter being 
a task which may sometimes be as expensive as developing policies 
manually. 
Maintenance : A set of policies enters this phase one it is used opera-
tionally. The effort needed to maintain a policy set is usually inversely 
related to the effort applied in the earlier stages-a poorly specified, 
implemented or tested set is likely to require more maintenance. Al-
though experiences from the discipline of software engineering suggest 
that it is generally more cost efficient to apply the greatest effort at the 
earlier stages, it is probable that some organisations may not follow 
this approach. In such cases the idsaguardgtk utility may be used by 
security administrators to override misconfigured17 policies manually. 
As noted in the above points, the costs of formulating policy can be 
reduced if they are shared between organisations or transferred to domain 
specialists. The concept of security abstractions articulated in Chapter 6 can 
be seen to extend this strategy further-security abstraction make it possible 










8.5 Runtime Effort 131 
to simplify the formulation of policy at the cost of a greater application 
development effort, as indicated in Figure 6.2 on page 70. 
8.5.2 Example Permutations 
Given that the policy engineering costs are dependent on a number of factors 
which are difficult to measure (such as the competence of those specifying the 
policies, the quality of the instrumented application and the degree of control 
desired) and that costs can be distributed and transferred as described above, 
it is difficult to quantify the associated costs in a meaningful way. Instead 
this section provides an example showing how several analysis approaches 
(involving different degrees of complexity, human involvement and levels of 
abstraction) can be applied to the same security issue. 
The example involves the apache web server which, in addition to im-
plementing well-known HTTP methods such as GET and POST, also supports 
the infrequently used, but standard [45], TRACE method. Grossman [53] has 
reported that this method makes it possible to attempt a variation of a cross 
site scripting attack. Because TRACE is rarely used, it is possible to disable 
it completely with the rule given below: 
service apache & method:string TRACE: 
deny ; log file /var/log/http-trace-attempts 
The above can be seen as a simple misuse prevention signature. Such a 
rule could be provided as part of the security alert describing the attack or 
by an IDS vendor. 
Alternatively, it is possible to block this activity using an anomaly-based 
approach, as illustrated with the following rule set: 
service apache & %counter learning : 
allow; keep method:string valid-methods; size 32, 
file /var/state/valid-http-methods 
service apache & %keep method:string valid-methods 
allow 
service apache : 
deny; log file /var/log/unusual-http-methods 
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counter learning set 1 
service idsalog & name exit-learning-phase & uid root 
counter learning set 0 
This list of rules can be used to gather actively used HTTP methods 
during a learning phase which is entered when the administrative user issues 
the command "idsalog -n enter-l earning-phase" ,18 with new methods 
encountered outside this phase being rejected. This rule set can not only be 
used to block the TRACE method but also other functionality not needed by 
a particular site, such as the MKCOL, COpy or MOVE methods provided by the 
WebDAV [50] extension or even the POST method if no scripts parsing HTTP 
bodies are in use. 
Rules of this form may be useful in a number of environments where appli-
cations provide unneeded or undesirable functionality. Early and well-known 
examples of such operations are the WIZ and DEBUG commands of sendmail, 
while over the last decade the EXPN and VRFY SMTP protocol operations 
have been disabled at a large number of sites, as they are deemed to yield 
too much information to potential attackers.19 Similar considerations apply 
to ftp, where a number of problems have been discovered in implementations 
of the SITE command. These include CVE-1999-0880, CVE-1999-0955 and 
CVE-2000-0040 and have contributed to the omission of this operation in a 
number of recent implementations. 
In cases where the set of operations (or the set of values for a particular 
operation parameter) is too large to be enumerated, it is possible to replace 
the %keep module with an alternative such as %constrain which examines 
a field for unusual characters at unusual positions. This may be useful to 
block a number of input validation flaws-attempts to take advantage of 
quoting deficiencies may be detected by the occurrence of escape and other 
magic characters, similarly buffer overflows may be made more difficult by 
requiring that machine instructions consist of characters only encountered 
during normal operation. Alternatively the sequence anomaly detector %sad 
may be used in situations where a small set of operations is in frequent use, 
since this module examines the order in which operations occur (inteT-, rather 
than intra-event structure) for unusual patterns. 
While the latter analysis modules are useful in some situations, their 
18 Alternatively unusual commands could be added to the whitelist interactively, as 
shown in Figure 7.3. 
19The senders of unsolicited commercial email can be regarded as mounting a low-grade 
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operation tends to be less transparent and thus more difficult to follow. In 
the case of a rule list involving the %keep module, it is relatively easy for 
an administrator to examine the content of a state variable to establish if a 
rejected event contains a field not on the whitelist. More effort is required to 
decode the character statistics or sequence trees maintained by %constrain 
and %sad respectively. 
As noted in Figure 6.2, the runtime effort (required during the specifi-
cation of signatures or the management of anomaly detection modules) can 
be transferred to the construction phase if the developer describes events in 
terms of higher level abstractions. For example, the various HTTP methods 
could be assigned functionality labels, with only GET and HEAD marked as 
essential. This would make it possible to configure the web server to offer 
only minimal functionality with the following rule: 
service apache & .fnl-1.1evel:integer > 0 
deny 
Given that this rule operates at a higher level of abstraction, some loss of 
detail is to be expected. Such a tradeoff may be acceptable if policy is to be 
set by individuals with limited knowledge of application detail. It can also be 
used to mount a general and entirely autonomous, if primitive20 response by, 
for example, coupling the currently available functionality level in multiple 
applications to a global threat counter. 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented selected results and experiences describing the 
effort, performance impact, security benefit and administrative effort of ex-
temalising the security analysis tasks of trusted applications. The informa-
tion was gathered over a period of three years during the construction and 
operation of a system exploring this concept. The implementation is non-
trivial and has been made available to the public, making the results more 
credible than ones which are derived from a simulation, skeletal prototype 
or unpublished system. However, a real-world implementation also intro-
duces a substantial number of external factors which are difficult to control. 
Thus the results should be seen as supporting an existence (3), rather than 
a universal (\1') claim. Summarised, the results show that there exist applica-
tions that can be modified with moderate effort (an increase of below 5% in 










134 Chapter 8 Results 
number of application decision points) and with an acceptable performance 
impact (typically millisecond to microsecond delays per analysis invocation) 
to produce an integrated security mechanism capable of fine-grained and pre-














This chapter examines the work described previously from a higher level 
perspective. It considers the limitations of the approach, the social factors 
relating to it and possible areas for future investigation. 
9.2 Context 
Constructing secure software is a hard problem: Over the last several decades 
numerous software failure modes have been discovered and described, but 
only limited progress has been made in eliminating them. Given the past 
lack of progress and the substantial investments in existing infrastructure 
(the latter one of several factors, according to Pike [100], which impede sys-
tems research in general), it appears overly optimistic to expect that these 
problems will be solved by the discovery of a revolutionary technique. 1 Hence 
Bellovin [15] and others argue that efforts should be directed towards improv-
ing existing systems incrementally and making provision for failures. The 
approach proposed in this thesis should be viewed in this context-in place 
of rejecting the prevailing penetrate-and-patch paradigm, it aims to refine 
the process by adding an interface which permits the runtime adjustment of 
applications for the purpose of discovering and blocking undesirable activity. 
This can be used to reduce the penetration possibilities by disabling un-
needed functionality or expedite the patching process. Instead of developing, 
testing and installing a new software release which repairs a flaw or provides 
more detailed restrictions, the equivalent of a signature can be disseminated 
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Figure 9.1: Alternate Views of the Proposed Mechanism 
which restricts application behaviour. 2 Even in cases where such restrictions 
are imperfect, they may be useful as interim measures while a full response 
is being formulated. 
Viewed from the perspective of the application user or owner (Figure 9.1A), 
the thesis proposal can be seen to add a dedicated, bidirectional security in-
terface to trusted applications, in addition to any existing user, 3 extension, 
debugging or management interfaces. 
To the application developer (Figure 9.1B), the approach appears as 
a mechanism that allows the delegation of intrusion detection and access 
control-related analysis tasks. Viewed from this perspective, the IDS/ A im-
plementation extends the scope of security related APIs, which are normally 
used to relieve application developers of tasks such as the implementation of 
cryptographic envelopes or authentication subsystems. In the same way that, 
for example, the introduction of the pluggable authentication module (PAM) 
client API has increased the flexibility and sophistication of the sign-on pro-
cedures, the IDS / A API is intended to enhance the response to undesirable 
activity. 
Related to existing security mechanisms (Figure 9.1C), the proposed ap-
proach can be viewed as an elaboration of one of three existing ones: It 
can be regarded as a more sophisticated and externalised application access 
control system, an application logging system which is more structured and 
includes a response pathway, or it could be seen as a closely coupled intru-
sion detection system which involves applications in the data collection and 
response phases. 
2 A more cost effective proposition, according to Fiebig [44] who is quoted as stating 
that system patching is significantly more expensive than a signature update. 
3In this context any channel by which the application renders its service, not only the 
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9.3 Limitations 
The proposed approach differs from conventional deployed security compo-
nents in that it relies on applications both to collect information and to en-
force a response. While the previous chapters have argued that this approach 
is attractive, it is not without limitations. In particular, it presupposes that 
application developers (or other parties, in the case of open-source software) 
are willing to apply the instrumentation, and depends on the integrity of the 
applications once instrumented. Some of the social factors influencing the 
decision to instrument a particular application are examined in the next sec-
tion. This section considers the disadvantages of relying on the application. 
The primary restriction of the approach is that the security analysis com-
ponent has to be invoked before an application can be exploited because the 
response mechanism consists of directing control flow away from the part of 
the application which would have yielded an advantage to the attacker.4 
The secondary concern is the supply of data to the analysis component. 
Although in some cases it is possible to block a failure given only an iden-
tifier naming the pending operation, it is usually preferable to receive more 
information to allow a more precise response. Consider the example of an 
ftp server implementing the infrequently used SITE command. If a flaw in 
the command implementation is discovered, it may be feasible to disable 
the command outright without needing any further information. This may 
not be the case if a weakness is found in an essential application function, 
such as the handling of the ftp file retrieve command RETR. Here additional 
information such the file name requested (does it, for example, contain the 
substring / .. / ?) or the username (has the user previously made use of the 
service?) would be useful to restrict access selectively to known users who 
do not exploit the vulnerability. 
The location and density of the points at which the external analysis sys-
tem is consulted, as well as the amount and type of information reported at 
each point, is largely dependent on the judgement of the developer adding 
the instrumentation, although the higher level security abstractions may of-
fer some guidance. For example, an access control model may assist in the 
task of identifying the points at which a subject acts on an object. How-
ever, imperfections are likely to remain, resulting either in failures not being 
blocked or coarser than necessary responses. 
Despite this limitation, the proposed approach is deemed attractive given 
4Exceptions to this restriction involve partial application failures or situations where 
the instrumentation is part of a system adjacent (using the definition of Figure 4.2) to the 
guarded application. In these cases the approach may also be used to contain an attack 
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that the applications under consideration are trusted systems. Thus their de-
velopers, while not infallible, are non-malicious with some interest in security. 
This makes it feasible to take advantage of developer knowledge instead of 
duplicating significant application logic and state at lower levels-the latter 
the strategy of conventional intrusion detection systems which is, as argued 
previously, expensive and vulnerable to desynchronisation. 
The above position should not be interpreted as an outright rejection of 
infrastructure security mechanisms, but rather as the contention that clas-
sical infrastructure access controls are necessary but not sufficient for the 
protection of trusted application, and that instead of increasing security in-
frastructure complexity to track application behaviour, it seems more appro-
priate to strengthen application level security mechanisms. 
9.4 Social Factors 
This section examines selected nontechnical issues which may influence the 
proposed approach in a real world environment. The main focus is on factors 
which may encourage or hinder its adoption, followed by a discussion of the 
privacy implications. 
9.4.1 Adoption 
In order to persuade developers to adopt the approach, it would be useful 
to find a means of describing the possible benefits succinctly. For this pur-
pose the security instrumentation process could be presented as a defensive 
programming technique where diligent developers, aware of the possibility 
that their applications may be imperfect, incorporate facilities to monitor 
and adjust their systems at runtime. Two analogies might be helpful in this 
regard: 
• A medical comparison could be invoked, which portrays the interface 
as a means for the application (developer) to solicit a "second opinion" 
from a security expert when about to perform a potentially dangerous 
operation . 
• The instrumentation could be described as a form of insurance which 
is used to mitigate the effects of flaws not discovered during testing. 
Particularly the latter may assist in presenting the mechanism as part of 
a strategy to address the issue of retrofitted security, a problem caused by 
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design prototype (as it is deployed in an environment which is not hostile) 
and the first release (since the latter is usually constructed under severe time 
pressure). Consequently security measures tend only to be considered after 
the release of several major revisions when the publication and exploitation 
of security weaknesses have made the security problems too significant to 
ignore. Here the likes of the IDS/ A API could be used by developers to flag 
potential security concerns during initial application development, but defer 
complete analysis to a later stage or transfer it to other parties entirely. 
A result [134] from the field of Prospect Theory [66] indicating that hu-
mans tend to prefer a future, larger but uncertain loss over an initial, smaller 
but certain expense (even ifthe latter is statistically somewhat cheaper) may 
have a bearing on the discussion. Under a pessimistic interpretation this 
result suggests that developers are unlikely to apply the instrumentation be-
cause it constitutes an upfront cost, even if smaller than the one associated 
with a potential security failure. However, it is also possible to interpret the 
result as an argument favouring the approach, if the instrumentation cost 
is compared to that associated with the elimination of security flaws before 
deployment. 5 
If implementation effort remains a concern, it is possible to present the 
system as an augmented logging interface. For new applications requiring 
logging facilities, the augmented interface not only provides a message format 
more amenable to automated analysis than unstructured text, but it also 
includes an immediate response pathway at little additional cost. 
Although these arguments may be useful in the promotion of the ap-
proach, a number of outstanding issues may have to be addressed if the mech-
anism described in this thesis is to be adopted on a larger scale. Amongst 
others, it is likely that the above work, conducted as an independent research 
effort, would have to be transformed into a more inclusive process leading 
toward ratification as a standard or other specification permitting multiple, 
independent implementations. The value of a champion of the approach, 
in the form of a well-funded or respected organisation should also not be 
underestimated. 
9.4.2 Privacy Concerns 
The proposed instrumentation can be used to collect extensive and detailed 
information. This provides a means to violate the privacy of an individual. 
To address this problem in conventional audit systems, Biskup et al [22] 
5The observation that the majority of flaws remain latent over the lifecycle of a system 
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suggest replacing sensitive event fields (user identifiers or network addresses) 
with pseudonyms that are sufficient to perform the analysis but do not iden-
tify the user. The mapping from pseudonym to real identity is only revealed 
if the analysis discovers a transgression. Such a facility could also be added 
to the IDS/ A implementation. However, under certain circumstances it may 
be possible to achieve a similar result with a simpler mechanism: Given that 
the collection and analysis phases of the IDS / A system are closely integrated 
(in particular events are not written to permanent storage before analysis), 
the system could be configured to record only events which the analysis flags 
as suspicious. 
In general, it is the process of recording user activity over a period of 
time, rather than the analysis of current actions, which poses the primary 
threat to privacy. Under utopian conditions the proposed design could be 
used to reduce the need for extensive records and so enhance privacy, since 
it is intended to enforce policy by means of disallowing undesired actions, 
rather than by the threat of repercussions if evidence of undesired activity is 
discovered in the trail of security events. Unfortunately, like most other sys-
tems aiming to detect undesirable behaviour, the closely coupled analysis is 
imperfect. Thus it usually remains necessary to record substantial informa-
tion for human review. In these situations the publication and enforcement 
of reasonable data retention policies playa substantial role in the prevention 
of privacy violations. 
9.5 Future Work 
Several aspects of the work performed as part of this thesis could be elabo-
rated. Opportunities exist to extend the implementation, to investigate the 
security-related analysis abstraction concept further and to develop business 
models around outsourced application security analysis. 
9.5.1 Implementation 
A substantial effort was made to create an operationally useful implemen-
tation. Thus the resulting system could be employed as an experimental 
platform in other investigations. For example, the system could be used to 
exercise an alternative anomaly detection strategy-the detection logic could 
be implemented as an IDS/ A analysis module, allowing it to utilise existing 
application level data collection points. Alternatively the instrumentation 
could be used to alter the control flow of an application, either to test and 
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postulated during a failure mode and effects analysis. 
Apart from using the system in a support role, it may also be possible to 
expand its scope along the two lines described below. 
Infrastructure Extension 
The implementation is primarily an application level security mechanism, but 
it may be feasible to extend it towards lower levels by intercepting and mod-
ifying kernel security decisions. The userspace ptracel strace mechanism, 
but also kernel modules or direct kernel modifications, have been used for 
this purpose by systems such as Janus [51]6 and Medusa DS9 [143]. A similar 
approach could be used by the IDS I A system to handle security analysis for 
both a kernel and the applications it hosts.7 
The unification of infrastructure and application security subsystems may 
be interesting in, for example, exploring the possibilities of combining volun-
tary (or internal) and mandatory (or external) application controls. However, 
it is also not without risk, as the merger of two previously distinct layers may 
reduce defensive depth. 
Distributed Extension 
The current implementation is designed to operate within a single host. Ap-
plications and idsad communicate using a channel where message authentic-
ity, integrity and confidentiality are guaranteed by the host operating system. 
Distributing the system over multiple hosts would require the replace-
ment of the local communications subsystem (unix domain sockets) with one 
spanning hosts (most likely TCP lIP sockets). 
A naive replacement of this form is trivial. However, as network channels 
tend to be less secure and reliable than those internal to a host, it would be 
necessary to add the following mechanisms: 
• A cryptographic envelope to make the interception or injection of mes-
sages more difficult. This facility could be provided by an SSL ITLS 
wrapper or extension but also by the likes of IPSEC at lower levels. 
• A system to deal with issues of reliability and latency. The already im-
plemented performance enhancement of transferring of rules into local 
applications could be adapted for this purpose. 
6While the original Solaris implementation uses the Solads Iproc tracing interface, the 
Linux version uses its own kernel module. 
7 An interposition wrapper in the form of a preloaded shared library to report and 
possibly block the exec 0 family of calls (similar to one proposed by [11]) has already 
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The introduction of such an extension should not be particularly disrup-
tive, since the interface to applications is defined by an API, not a trans-
port protocol. This higher-level interface shields application developers from 
such changes and because the API is contained in a shared library, differ-
ent implementations can be substituted without modifying the application 
executables. 
As in the case of the infrastructure extension, it is not so much the tech-
nical feasibility of implementing the addition, but rather the mitigation of 
increased security risk which would require the most attention. In particular, 
the properties of a distributed system (unreliable inter-host communication 
and larger size) are likely to make such a system more accessible and more 
attractive to potential attackers, the above measures notwithstanding. 
9.5.2 Security Abstractions 
The thesis considered the distribution of the security effort over the devel-
opment and deployment phases of an application lifecyc1e. It suggested re-
porting events in terms of higher level security abstractions in cases where 
it is desirable to transfer the bulk of the effort to the developer. Opportuni-
ties exist to investigate further abstractions and consider the utility of this 
approach in general. 
Alternative Abstractions 
It may be interesting to develop additional abstractions which can be used 
to capture a particular application security aspect. Other fields of endeavour 
could serve as inspiration and be examined for interesting analogies. An 
example of this approach has been taken by Moskowitz et al [94] who consider 
a computer system to provide a set of barriers checking the flow of insecurity 
across domains. The barriers can be encoded as nodes and the domains as 
edges of a graph. Given the reliability of each barrier and its connectivity, it 
is possible to borrow an analysis technique used to calculate the current flow 
through an electrical circut to compute the robustness of a system, based on 
the observation that barriers arranged in parallel offer less protection than 
those arranged in series. 
An illustration of how this abstraction can be applied to inter-application 
security relationships is shown in Figure 9.2, and it is possible that further 
analogies await discovery or use in the effort to describe security features in 
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Remote 
Figure 9.2: Insecurity Flow Across Trusted Applications 
Elaborated Abstractions 
It would be interesting to continue the investigation into how security-related 
information can be encoded in a form independent of the originating appli-
cation. If it were feasible for application developers to describe all security 
implications in such a way, the need for expensive domain knowledge during 
analysis (either directly for the formulation of application-specific logic, or 
indirectly in the supervision of thus far imperfect machine learning systems) 
could be eliminated completely. 
However, it seems unclear if such an approach is currently viable, as it 
is likely to require that the application be mapped to a security model of 
substantial complexity if all the features are to be captured. The mapping to 
such an elaborate abstraction may itself contain flaws hindering fully automa-
ted analysis. In addition its cost may be comparable to a formal verification 
process, making it unaffordable in the majority of cases. 
Hence it seems more productive to develop smaller abstractions of the 
form described in this thesis which, while capturing the security concerns 
only incompletely, are easier to comprehend and thus more likely to find 
widespread use. If successful, these could then be combined gradually to 
generate more sophisticated systems, instead of introducing a complex and 
unproven abstraction immediately. 
9.5.3 Managed Security 
The introduction of a distinct application security interface may offer oppor-
tunities to the providers of security services. Apart from contractors who 
may be involved in adding the instrumentation as part of a security audit 
or review, the interface should be of greatest interest to managed security 
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sation can be accessed. Managed security providers could use this interface 
to: 
1. acquire more detailed and accurate information for analysis, 
2. sell hardened configurations which limit application functionality to a 
subset appropriate for a hostile environment, and 
3. provide security updates which resemble virus8 or misuse detection sig-
natures but which are able to prevent applications from processing 
attack payloads designed to trigger known flaws. 
In general, such a dedicated interface would allow external security spe-
cialists to focus on the security analysis, rather than the data acquisition 
phase (with the associated costs of constructing and maintaining custom 
data collection devices) or even the overall management of an organisation's 
computing resources. In other words, the proposed interface may help de-
lineate the role of a security specialist when compensating for application 
provider oversights, whether involving overly trusting or featureful applica-
tions (Point 2 in the above list) or vendors slow to repair flawed releases 
(Point 3). In a larger context, this could facilitate the transition of security 
specialists from the sale of a product to the provision of a service. 
8Here the observation of Swimmer [132] that the intrusion detection industry resem-
bles a less mature anti-virus industry may be of relevance. In particular, the dominant 
virus defense model (rapid dissemination of new virus signatures) can be interpreted as 
suggesting that misuse, rather than anomaly detection, is likely to remain the primary 












The thesis has examined the problem of securing trusted applications. It 
has reviewed and classified major security measures and investigated their 
limitations. Amongst others, it has noted that orthodox infrastructure ac-
cess controls lack the facilities to guard trusted applications and argued that 
conventional intrusion detection systems tend to be vulnerable to desynchro-
nisation. Viewed in terms of the distribution of effort, most contemporary 
approaches used to secure trusted applications can be seen to demand that 
application developers eliminate all flaws during construction or alternatively 
require that the producers of runtime security systems duplicate application 
logic and state faithfully. In the case of nontrivial applications these are 
substantial, arguably even unattainable, demands. 
These issues motivate the thesis proposal for an interface between ap-
plication and runtime security component, designed to allow the latter to 
monitor and adjust the former. The approach can be presented as a prag-
matic compromise which makes it possible to share the security costs between 
application development and runtime security measures. 
Viewed in terms of the problem of concentrating the security concerns of 
a computer system (described in Chapter 2), the contribution of the work 
consists of two primary parts: 
• An analysis which argues that it currently does not appear feasible to 
transfer completely the security duties of some (ie trusted) applications 
to infrastructure components . 
• A synthesis which proposes an interface designed to abstract and trans-
fer a subset of the application security functions, namely the analysis 
phase, to an external component. While this strategy remains reliant 
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and act on the analysis, it appears to be an attractive method of modu-
lating application activity, whether to enforce classical policies or block 
suspected intrusions. 
The work performed towards both the above parts can be presented as a 
sequence of interlocking tasks-the thesis: 
• identified the challenge of extracting and managing the security func-
tions of applications, 
• formulated a model to describe this process, 
• examined the limitations of several existing approaches with the aid of 
the model. The examination included both theoretical and practical 
aspects, the former presenting formalisms to describe the constraints, 
the latter contributing a NIDS desynchronisation attack involving vari-
ations in the handling of TCP urgent data, 
• defined a class of applications, referred to as "trusted" whose security 
responsibilities are difficult to transfer to infrastructure systems, 
• generated a taxonomy of security measures from the above model, 
• used the taxonomy as a framework to position existing approaches and 
describe development trends, 
• proposed a design which explores an approach involving a dedicated se-
curity interface between application developer and specialised security 
component, 
• investigated several abstractions which can be used to structure the 
exchanges across the interface, 
• constructed and released an operational implementation based on the 
design, 
• exercised, optimised and evaluated the implementation 
• and reflected on the utility of the approach. 
The above are deemed to constitute an incremental, as opposed to a 
revolutionary, advance-the thesis has articulated an approach which assists 
in the control of security flaws, it has not discovered a means of eliminating 











the compelling arguments of Brooks [26) that there are IIno silver bullets" 
awaiting discovery which will solve the problem of constructing reliable and 
thus also secure software. Under these circumstances a system which can be 





















[1] J. Abela, T. Debeaupuis, and E. Guttman. Universal format for logger 
messages. http://www.hsc.fr/gulp/, 1997. 
[2] Serge AbitebouL Querying semi-structured data. In International Con-
ference on Database Theory, pages 1-18, January 1997. 
[3] A. Acharya, Edjlali G., and Chaudhary V. History-based access control 
for mobile code. In 5th ACM Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security, 1998. 
[4] J. P. Anderson. Computer security technology planning study. Tech-
nical report, USAF Electronic Systems Division, October 1972. 
[5} J. P. Anderson. Computer security threat monitoring and surveillance. 
Technical report, James P. Anderson Co., April 1980. 
[6] R. Anderson. Why information security is hard - an economic per-
spective. In 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 
December 2001. 
[7] C. J. Antonelli, M. Undy, and P. Honeyman. The packet vault: Secure 
storage of network data. In USENIX Workshop on Intrusion Detection 
and Network Monitoring, pages 103-110, April 1999. 
[8] Apache Consortium. Apache HTTP server project. 
http://httpd.apache.org/, 1995. 
[9] S. Axelsson. The base-rate fallacy and its implications for the diffi-
culty of intrusion detection. In 6th A CM Conference on Computer and 
Communications security, pages 1-7, November 1999. 
[10] S. Axelsson. Research in intrusion-detection systems: A survey. Tech-












[11] S. Axelsson, U. Lindqvist, U. Gustafson, and E. Jonsson. An approach 
to unix security logging. In 21st National Information Systems Security 
Conference, pages 62-75, October 1998. 
[12] B. Bakker et al. log4cpp log library for C++. 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/log4cpp, December 2000. 
[13] A. Bali. IDS/ A debian package. http://packages.debian.org/idsa/, 
June 2002. 
[14] C. Beermann. Calamaris. http://calamaris.cord.de/, 1997. 
[15] S. M. Bellovin. Computer security - an end state? Communications 
of the ACM, 44(3):131-132, March 2001. 
[16] T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, and H. Frystyk. RFC 1945: hypertext 
transfer protocol HTTP/1.0, May 1996. 
[17] T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, and 1. Masinter. RFC 2396: uniform 
resource identifiers (URI): Generic syntax, August 1998. 
[18] M. Bishop. How to write a setuid program. ;login:, 12(1):5-11, January 
1987. 
[19] M. Bishop. A model of security monitoring. In 5th Annual Computer 
Security Applications Conference, pages 46-52, 1989. 
[20] M. Bishop. A standard audit trail format. In 18th National Information 
Systems Security Conference, pages 136-145, October 1995. 
[21] M. Bishop and M. Dilger. Checking for race conditions in file accesses. 
Computing Systems, 9(2):131-152, May 1996. 
[22] J. Biskup and U. Flegel. Transaction-based pseudonyms in audit data 
for privacy respecting intrusion detection. In 3rd International Sympo-
sium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 28-48, October 
2000. 
[23] B. Blakley. The emperor's old armor. In ACM New Security Paradigms 
Workshop, pages 2-16, September 1996. 
[24] E. Boebert. Some thoughts on the occasion of the NSA linux release. 











[25] D. F. C. Brewer and M. J. Nash. The chinese wall security policy. In 
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 
206-214, May 1989. 
[26] F. P. Brooks. No silver bullet: Essence and accidents of software engi-
neering. Computer, 20(4):10-19, April 1987. 
[27] J. Bull, L. Gong, and K. Sollins. Towards security in an open systems 
federation. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 
pages 3-20, November 1992. 
[28] C. A. Carver and U. \lV. Pooch. An intrusion response taxonomy and 
its role in automatic intrusion response. In IEEE Workshop on Infor-
mation Assurance and Security, pages 129-135, June 2000. 
[29] J. Case, M. Fedor, M. Schoffstall, and J. Davin. RFC 1157: a simple 
network management protocol, May 1990. 
[30] S. Castano, G. Martella, and P. Samarati. A new approach to secu-
rity system development. In ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop, 
pages 82-88, August 1994. 
[31] National Computer Security Center. US department of defense trusted 
computer system evaluation criteria, December 1985. 
[32] W. R. Cheswick and S. M. Bellovin. Firewalls and Internet Security: 
Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison-Wesley, 1994. 
[33] T. Chiueh and F. Hsu. RAD: A compile-time solution to buffer over-
flow attacks. In International Conference on Distributed Computing 
Systems, April 2001. 
[34] C. Chung, M. Gertz, and K. Levitt. DEMIDS: A misuse detection 
system for database systems. In 3rd Annual IFIP TC-ll we 11.5 
Working Conference on Integrity and Control in Information Systems, 
1999. 
[35] The MITRE Corporation. Common vulnerabilities and exposures 
20010918. http://cve.mitre.org/, September 2001. 
[36] C. Cowan, C. Pu, and H. Hinton. Death, taxes and imperfect software: 
Surviving the inevitable. In ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop, 











[37] C. Cowan, C. Pu, D. Maier, J. Walpole, P. Bakke, S. Beattie, A. Grier, 
P. Wagle, Q. Zhang, and H. Hinton. Stackguard: Automatic adaptive 
detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks. In 7th USENIX 
Security Symposium, pages 63-78, January 1998. 
[38] T. de Raadt et al. Openbsd. http://www.openbsd.org/, 1997. 
[39] G. Della-Libera, P. Hallam-Baker, M. Hondo, T. Janczuk, C. Kaler, 
H. Maruyama, A. Nadalin, N. Nagaratnam, A. Nash, R. Philpott, 
H. Prafullchandra, J. Shewchuk, E. Waingold, and R. Zolfonoon. Web 
services security policy language (WS-SecurityPolicy), December 2002. 
[40] D. Denning. An intrusion-detection model. IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, 13(2):222-232, February 1987. 
[41] Computer Economics. E flash. http://www.computereconomics.com/. 
January 2002. 
[42] S. Elbaum and J. C. Munson. Intrusion detection through dynamic 
software measurement. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on 
Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring, pages 41-50, April 1999. 
(43] M. Erlinger, S. Staniford-Chen, et al. IETF intrusion detection working 
group. http://www,ietf.org/html.charters/idwg-charter.html, 1999. 
(44] C. Fiebig. Patching is the problem, says Microsoft: Interview with Ian 
Thompson, May 2003. 
[45] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, 1. Masinter, P. Leach, and 
T. Berners-Lee. RFC 2616: hypertext transfer protocol - HTTP/1.1, 
June 1999. 
(46] S. Forrest, S. A. Hofmeyr, A. Somayaji, and T. A. Longstaff. A sense of 
self for unix processes. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
pages 120-128, May 1996. 
[47] T. Fraser, L. Badger, and M. Feldman. Hardening COTS software with 
generic software wrappers. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, pages 2-16, May 1999. 
(48] S. M. Purnell, G. B. Magklaras, M. Papadaki, and P. S. Dowload. A 
generic taxonomy for intrusion specification and response. In Eurome-












[49] A. K. Ghosh, A. Schwartzbard, and M. Schatz. Learning program 
behavior profiles for intrusion detection. In Proceedings of the USENIX 
Workshop on Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring, pages 51-
62, April 1999. 
[50] Y. Goland, E. vVhitehead, A. Faizi, S. Carter, and D. Jensen. RFC 
2518: HTTP extensions for distributed authoring - WEBDAV, Febru-
ary 1999. 
[51] 1. Goldberg, D. vVagner, R. Thomas, and E. Brewer. A secure envi-
ronment for untrusted helper applications. In 6th USENIX Security 
Symposium, pages 1-13, July 1996. 
[52] G. S. Goldszmidt. Distributed Management by Delegation. PhD thesis, 
Columbia University, 1996. 
[53] J. Grossman. TRACE used to increase the dangerous of XSS. Bugtraq 
Thread, http://www.securityfocus.com/. January 2003. 
[54] P. Hallam-Baker, E. Maler, et al. Security assertion markup language 
(SAML), November 2002. 
[55] L. R. Halme and R. K. Bauer. AINT misbehaving: A taxonomy of anti-
intrusion techniques. In 18th National Information Systems Security 
Conference, pages 163-172, October 1995. 
[56] S. E. Hansen and E. T. Atkins. Centralized system monitoring with 
swatch. In 3rd USENIX Security Symposium, pages 105-117, Septem-
ber 1992. 
[57] S. E. Hansen and E. T Atkins. Automated system monitoring and no-
tification with swatch. In 7th USENIX Systems Administration Con-
ference, November 1993. 
[58] D. Hardeman. Ample. http://ample.sf.net/, July 2001. 
[59] H. Hazewinkel, C. Kalbfleisch, and J. Schoenwaelder. RFC 2594: defi-
nitions of managed objects for www services, May 1999. 
[60] L. T. Heberlein, G. Dias, K. Levitt, B. Mukherjee, J. Wood, and 
D. Wolber. A network security monitor. In IEEE Symposium on Re-











[61] S. A. Hofmeyr. An Immunological Model of Distributed Detection and 
Its Application to Computer Security. PhD thesis, University of New 
Mexico, May 1999. 
[62] J. D. Howard. An Analysis Of Security Incidents On The Internet. 
PhD thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, April 1997. 
[63] K. Ilgun. USTAT: A real-time intrusion detection system for unix. 
Master's thesis, University of California, July 1992. 
[64] C. E. Irvine and D. Volpano. A practical tool for developing trusted ap-
plications. In 11th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 
pages 190-195, December 1995. 
[65] A. K. Jones and Y. Lin. Application intrusion detection using lan-
guage library calls. In 17th Annual Computer Security Applications 
Conference, December 2001. 
[66] D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, editors. Judgment under 
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
[67] I. Khalifa and M. Stahre. Teapop - a POP3 server daemon. 
http://www.toontown.org/teapop/, 1999. 
[68] S. Kille and N. Freed. RFC 2789: mail monitoring MIB, March 2000. 
[69] G. H. Kim and E. H. Spafford. Experiences with tripwire: Using in-
tegrity checkers for intrusion detection. In 3rd Annual System Adminis-
tration, Networking and Security Conference, pages 89-101, April 1994. 
[70] V. Kiriansky, D. Bruening, and S. Amarasinghe. Secure execution via 
program shepherding. In 11th USENIX Security Symposium, August 
2002. 
[71] M. Kirkwood and I. Lynagh. Firewall kit. http://hairy.beasts.org/fk/, 
2000. 
[72] C. Ko, G. Fink, and K. Levitt. Automated detection of vulnerabili-
ties in privileged programs by execution monitoring. In 10th Annual 
Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 134-144, 1994. 













[74] I. V. Krsul. Software Vtdnerability Analysis. PhD thesis, Purdue Uni-
versity, May 1998. 
[75] S. Kumar. Classification and Detection of Computer Intrusions. PhD 
thesis, Purdue University, August 1995. 
[76] B. VV. Lampson. Protection. In 5th Princeton Conference on Informa-
tion Sciences and Systems, pages 437-443, March 1971. 
[77] B. W. Lampson. A note on the confinement problem. Communications 
of the ACM, 16(10):613~615, 1973. 
[78] C. E. Landwehr, A. R. Bull, J. P. McDermott, and W. S. Choi. A tax-
onomy of computer program security flaws. A CM Computing Surveys, 
26(3):211 ~254, September 1994. 
[79] W. Lee, S. J. Stolfo, and K. Mok. Mining audit data to build intrusion 
detection models. In International Conference on Knowledge Discovery 
and Data Mining, September 1998. 
[80] T. Lindholm and F. Yellin. The Java Virtual Machine Specification. 
Addison-Wesley, April 1999. 
[81] U. Lindqvist and E. Jonsson. How to systematically classify computer 
security intrusions. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 
1997. 
[82] U. Lindqvist and E. Jonsson. A map of security risks associated with 
using cots. Computer, 31(6):60-66, June 1998. 
[83] H. F. Lipson and D. A. Fisher. Survivability a new technical and 
business perspective on security. In ACM New Security Paradigms 
Workshop, pages 33-39, September 1999. 
[84] B. Long et al. The common gateway interface 1.1. 
http://hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.edu/cgi/overview.html, November 1995. 
[85] C. Lonvick. RFC 3164: the BSD syslog protocol, August 2001. 
[86] P. A. Loscocco, S. D. Smalley, P. A. Muckelbauer, R. C. Taylor, S. J. 
Turner, and J. F. Farrell. The inevitability of failure: The flawed 
assumption of security in modern computing environments. In 21st 












[87] C. Lott. csize - measure the size of c source files. http://www.chris-
lott.org/resources/software/, September 1994. 
[88] T. F. Lunt. Automated audit trail analysis and intrusion detection: A 
survey. In 11th National Computer Security Conference, October 1988. 
[89) A. Luotonen. The common log file format. 
http:// www.w3.org/pub/WWW/Daemon/User/Config/Logging.html, 
1995. 
(90) T. J. Mc Cabe. A complexity measure. IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, 2(4):308-320, December 1976. 
[91) C. Meadows. An outline of a taxonomy of computer security research 
and development. In ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop, pages 
33-35, August 1993. 
[92) C. C. Michael and A. Ghosh. Two state-based approaches to program-
based anomaly detection. In 16th Annual Computer Security Applica-
tions Conference, December 2000. 
[93) D. Mosberger and T. Jin. httperf a tool for measuring web server 
performance. Performance Evaluation Review, 26(3):31-37, December 
1998. 
[94) I. S. Moskowitz and M. H. Kang. An insecurity flow model. In A CM 
New Security Paradigms Workshop, pages 61--74, September 1997. 
[95) A. Mounji. Languages and Tools for Rule-Based Distributed Intrusion 
Detection. PhD thesis, Universite de Namur, September 1997. 
[96] J. Myers and M. Rose. RFC 1939: post office protocol - version 3, May 
1996. 
[97] T. Olovsson. A structured approach to computer security. Technical 
report, Chalmers University of Technology, 1992. 
[98) V. Paxson. Bro: A system for detecting network intruders in real-time. 
In 7th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 31-50, January 1998. 
(99) M. Petkac and L. Badger. Security agility in response to intrusion 












[100J R. Pike. System software research is irrelevant. Talk Slides, February 
2000. 
[101J P. Porras, D. Schnackenberg, S. Staniford-Chen, M. Stillman, and 
F. Wu. The common intrusion detection framework architecture. 
http://www.gidos.org/, 2000. 
[102J J. Postel. RFC 791: darpa internet program protocol specification, 
September 1981. 
[103J T. E. Potok, M. Vouk, and A. Rindos. Productivity analysis of object-
oriented software development in a commercial environment. Software 
- Practice and Experience, 29(10):833-847, 1999. 
[104] H. Ptacek and T. N. Newsham. Insertion, evasion and denial of 
service: Eluding network intrusion detection. Technical report, Secure 
Networks, 1998. 
[105J C. Pu, A. Black, C. Cowan, and J. Walpole. A specialization toolkit to 
increase the diversity in operating systems. In lCMAS Workshop on 
Immunity-Based System, 1996. 
[106J X. Qie, R. Pang, and L. Peterson. Defensive programming: Using 
an annotation toolkit to build dos-resistant software. In 5th USENlX 
Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation, Decem-
ber 2002. 
[107J Rain Forrest Puppy. vVhisker. http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/. 1999. 
[108J M. J. Ranum and P. D. Robertson. Logging data attribute 
map. http://www.ranum.com/logging/logging-data-map.html. August 
2002. 
[109] M. K. Ranum and F. M. Avolio. A toolkit and methods for internet 
firewalls. In Proceedings of the USENIX Conference, pages 37-44,1994. 
[110] S. Raymond. Fetchmail - a remote-mail retrieval and forwarding 
utility. http://www.tuxedo.org/ 
[111] J. Riordan and D. Alessandri. Target naming and service apoptosis. 
In 3rd International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion De-
tection, pages 217-225, October 2000. 
[112J M. Roesch. Snort - lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In 











[113] T. Rooker. Application level security using an object-oriented graphical 
user interface. In ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop, pages 105-
108, August 1993. 
[114] J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder. The protection of information in 
computer systems. Procedings of the IEEE, 63(9):1278-1308, Septem-
ber 1975. 
[115] V. Samar and R. Schemers. Unified login with pluggable authentication 
modules (PAM), October 1995. 
[116] R. S. Sandhu. The typed access matrix model. In IEEE Symposium 
on Security and Privacy, pages 122-136, May 1992. 
[117] M. Schaefer. The new security paradigms workshop - boom or bust? 
panel position statement. In ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop, 
pages 119-123, September 2001. 
[118] E. A. Schneider. Security architecture-based system design. In ACM 
New Security Paradigms Workshop, pages 25-31, September 1999. 
[119] F. B. Schneider, G. Morrisett, and R. Harper. A language-based ap-
proach to security. In Dagstuhl 10th Anniversary Symposium, August 
2000. 
[120] B. Schneier. Managed security monitoring: Closing the window of 
exposure. Technical report, Counterpane Internet Security, 2000. 
[121] R. Sekar, T. Bowen, and Segal. M. On preventing intrusions by pro-
cess behavior monitoring. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on 
Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring, pages 29-40, April 1999. 
[122] R. S. Sielken. Application intrusion detection. Master's thesis, Univer-
sity of Virginia, May 1999. 
[123] Secure Software. RATS: Rough auditing tool for security. 
http://www.securesoftware.com/rats/. May 2001. 
[124] European Community Advisory Group SOG-IS. Information technol-
ogy evaluation security criteria, June 1991. 












[126] A. Somayaji and S. Forrest. Automated response using system-call 
delays. In 9th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2000. 
[127] D. Song. Fragrouter. http://www.anzen.com/research/nidsbench/. 
1999. 
[128] S. Staniford-Chen, B. Tung, and D. Schnackenberg. The common intru-
sion detection framework (CIDF). In Information Survivability Work-
shop, October 1998. 
[129] G. Stocksdale. NSA glossary of terms used in security and intrusion de-
tection. http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/glossarY.htm. April 
1998. 
[130] T. Sullivan. All things web. http://www.pantos.org/atw /, 1999. 
[131] Sun Microsystems. SunSHIELD Basic Security Module Guide, Novem-
ber 1995. 
[132] M. Swimmer. Review and outlook of the detection of viruses using in-
trusion detection systems. http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid2000/, 
October 2000. 
[133] The Open Group. Distributed audit service (XDAS) base. 
http://www.opengroup.org/pubs/, 1997. 
[134J A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. The framing of decisions and the psy-
chology of choice. Science, 211(4481):453-458, January 1981. 
[135] W. Venema. TCP wrapper, network monitoring, access control and 
booby traps. In 3rd USENIX Security Symposium, pages 85-92, 
September 1992. 
[136] 1. Welch and R. Stroud. Reflection as a mechanism for enforcing secu-
rity policies in mobile code. In 6th European Symposium on Research 
in Computer Security, October 2000. 
[137] M. Welz and A. Hutchison. Incremental security in open, untrusted 
networks. In Future Trends in Distributed Computer Systems, pages 
151-154, November 1999. 
[138] M. Welz and A. Hutchison. Interfacing trusted applications with in-
trusion detection systems. In 4th International Symposium on Recent 











[139] D. Wheeler. Flawfinder. http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/. May 
2001. 
[140] C. Wright, C. Cowan, J. Morris, S. Smalley, and G. Kroah-Hartman. 
Linux security module framework. In Ottawa Linux Symposium, 2002. 
[141] T. Wu, M. Malkin, and D. Boneh. Building intrusion tolerant applica-
tions. In 8th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 79-91, 1999. 
[142] D. ZambonL Using Internal Sensors for Computer Intrusion Detection. 
PhD thesis, Purdue University, August 2001. 
[143] M. Zelem, M. Pikula, and M. Ockajak. Medusa DS9 security system. 
http://medusa.fornax.sk/, 1999. 
[144] D. Zerkle and K. Levitt. Netkuang - a multi-host configuration vul-













The appendix contains the manual pages referenced in the previous chapters. 
Included are the pages describing the server idsad, parts of the C API, a 
number of predefined abstractions as well as the documentation index. 
The manual pages describing the configuration file format, the different 
types, the various support utilities, analysis and response modules, wrappers 
and replacements have been omitted. However, they can be found in source 
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IDSA(l) IDSA(l) 
NAME 
idsa idsa system overview 
SYNOPSIS 
idsa is a combined intrusion detection, access control and logging system for applications. Its doc-
umentation is distributed over several manual pages. 
ADMINISTRATION 










Master configuration file 
Utility to run commands from idsad(8) 
Utility to relay events from idsad(8) 
Interface to guile(l) 
RC support for master daemon 
GTK utility for interactive control 
TTY utility for interactive control 
Documentation for selected modules loaded by idsad(8) to perform analysis and response tasks: 
mod_chain(8) 
mod constrain(8) 














Identify a rule chain 
String anomaly detector 
Set and test counters 
Test if a field exists 
Interface to idsaguardgtk(8) or idsaguardtty(8) 
Retain state 
Measure field sizes 
Write to file or subprocess 
Match regular expression 
Return extra data to application 
Match a given time 
Match a given period 
Always match 
Test for incomplete fields 
Determine field type 
The following pages document the API used to add idsa support to applications: 
Higher Level C API: 
idsa_open(3) 
idsa _ close(3) 




i IDS/ A System 
Initialise interface 
Terminate interface 
Report an event 
Type information 
Report and request permission to perform an action 
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IDSA(l) 
ABSTRACTIONS 









Access control abstraction 
HTTP common logging format 
Error reporting abstraction 
Functionality labelling 
Logging data map 
Resource control 
State management 









Kernel logger replacement 
Remote syslog replacement 
Local syslog replacement 
TCP wrapper replacement 
TCP connection logger 
IDSA(l) 
idsa may only be distributed and modified in accordance with the terms of the GPL (GNU 
General Public License) as published by the FSF(Free Software Foundation). 
SEE ALSO 
idsad(3), idsad.conf(5). 
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IDSAD(8) IDSAD(8) 
NAME 
idsad - master daemon of the idsa system 
SYNOPSIS 
idsad [-hknuv] [-f file] [-i username 1 [-M integer] [-p socket ... 1 [-r directory 1 
DESCRlPTION 
idsad accepts connections from one or more unix domain sockets. Security events are read from 




-f file Read configuration from file instead of default /etc/idsad.conf 
-h Print a terse help message 
-i username 
Run as specified user instead of root. Group is determined from password file entry 
-k Kill and replace an already running idsad instance. Note that this replacement is atomic, 
at no point in time will the listening sockets be unbound. This option should be used to 
reconfigure idsad in place of sending it a SIGHUP. Reconfiguring or restarting idsad 
via a signal is not feasible as the running idsad instance has no way of recovering the 
privileges it relinquished on entering chrooted environment and changing its user identifier 
-M integer 
Preallocate memory resources to support the given number of clients. In this configura-
tion idsad will allocate no memory after initialization this should prevent memory 
exhaustion failures. Using a value exceeding the number of available file descriptors is 
inadvisable, as this will disable the mechanism which enforces connection quotas on non-
root users 
-n Do not fork into background 
-p socket ... 
Listen on one or more unix domain sockets. Multiple sockets should be separated by 
unquoted whitespaces. If this option is omitted, idsad will default to listening on 
/var /run/idsa 
-r directory 
Chroot to directory after initialisation 
-u Honour umask when creating sockets. Allows the system administrator to restrict access 
to the socket to a given group or user. Note that few systems other than Linux honour 
permission bits for unix domain sockets 
-v Print version number 
/etc/idsad.conf 
Default idsad configuration file. 
/var /run/idsa 




idsa may only be distributed and modified in accordance with the terms of the GPL (GNU 
General Public License) as published by the FSF(Free Software Foundation). 
SEE ALSO 
idsad.conf(5), syslogd(8). 
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NAME 
idsa_open - create an idsa handle 
SYNOPSIS 
#include <idsa.h> 
IDSA_CONNECTION *idsa_open(char *name, char * credential , int flags); 
DESCRIPTION 
idsa_open allocates a handle which is used in subsequent calls to idea_set, idsa_scan and oth-
ers. name is the name used to identify the client application, credential a token used for authenti-
cation (currently unused, should be NULL). flags can be used to set zero or more of the follow-
ing options, bitwise or'd: 
IDSA F FAIL OPEN 
Change the behaviour of idsaJog, idsa yet and idsa _scan to return 
IDSA L ALLOW instead of IDSA L DENY in case of failures internal to idsa. - - - -
IDSA F ENV 
allow a user to override the location of the idsa socket using IDS A_SOCKET. The use 
of this is inadvisable for setuid programs. 
IDSA] _SIGPIPE 
Do not trap SIG _PIPE. This only applies to older platforms, newer ones do require that 
that any signals be trapped. 
IDSA _ F _UPLOAD 
Enable the uploading of rules (and thus shared objects) into t.he process space. The use of 
this option is inadvisable for applications which are more trusted than idsad(8). 
IDSA] _NOBACKOFF 
Disable the linear backoff strategy in case of a failure of idsad(8). 
IDSA F TIMEOUT 
- S-;;t a timeout for I/O to idsad(8). Using this flag in conjunction with 
IDSA_F _UPLOAD is not advised. 
IDSA F KEEP 
Disable automatic deallocation of events inside idea_log. 
RETURN VALUE 
FILES 
A pointer to an IDSA_CONNECTION structure on success, NULL otherwise. 
/etc/idsad.conf 
Default idsad(8) configuration file. 
/var /run/idsa 




idsa may only be distributed and modified in accordance with the terms of the GPL (GNU 
General Public License) as published by the FSF (Free Software Foundation). 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_close(3). 
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NAME 
idsa_close destroy an idsa handle 
SYNOPSIS 
#include <idsa.h> 
int idsa_close(IDSA_CONNECTION "'e); 
DESCRIPTION 
idsa _close deallocates the resources associated with the given idsa connection handle. 
RETURN VALUE 
FILES 
Zero on success, nonzero otherwise. 
/etc/idsad.rAJnj 
Default idsad(8) configuration file. 
/var/run/idsa 




idsa may only be distributed and modified in accordance with the terms of the GPL (GNU 
Genera] Public License) as published by the FSF (Free Software Foundation). 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_open(3). 











idsa _set, idsa _scan report an event to the idsa system 
SYNOPSIS 
#include <idsa.h> 
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int idsa_set(IDSA_CONNECTION *c, char *n, char *8, int f, unsigned ar, unsigned 
cr, unsigned ir, ... ); 
int idsa_scan(IDSA_CONNECTION *c, char *n, char *s, int f, unsigned ar, unsigned 
cr, unsigned ir, •.. ); 
DESCRIPTION 
idsa_set and idsa_scan create an event from their parameters. This event is then reported to the 
idsa system via the connection handle c. 
The event name is given in n and its scheme or namespace in s. The combination of n and 8 
should identify an event uniquely. 
f is a flag which indicates whether the application can and will honour a request to deny this 
event. If fis zero the application won't honour an IDSA_L_DENY, otherwise it will. 
ar, cr and ir contain the risks to availability, confidentiality and integrity associated with permit-
ting the event. Risks are local to an application namespace. Risks can be specified as pair of cost, 
confidence values using idsa _ risk _make or the following predefined risks can be used: 
IDSA R TOTAL 1.000 0.990 Complete failure 
IDSA - R-PARTIAL 0.500 0.750 Partial failure 
IDSA=R~INOR 0.250 0.875 Minor failure 
IDSA R NONE 0.000 0.990 No Significant risk 
IDSA=R=UNKNOWN 0.000 0.000 Unknown risk 
idsa_set and idsa_scan only differ in the way optional arguments are handled. Optional argu-
ments are given as a triple of name, type and value where name is a character string, type an 
unsigned integer from the set of available types. For idsa _set the value is a pointer to the in-
memory representation of the value while for idsa_scan the value is a character string. The last 
argument passed to both functions has to be NULL. 
EXAMPLES 
pid_ t target; 
char *name; 
idsa _set( c, "kill", "audited-shell", 1, 
IDSA R PARTIAL, IDSA R NONE, IDSA R UNKNOWN, 
"victi~-pid", IDSA T PIO, &target, - -
"victim-name", IDSA T STRING, name, 
NULL); - -
Request permission ( f set to 1) to terminate the process identified by target. The event poses an 
elevated risk to availability, little risk to confidentiality and an unknown threat to integrity. 
char *target; 
char *namej 
idsa_scan(c, "kill", "audited-shell", 1, 
IDSA_R_PARTIAL, idsaJisk_make(O.O, 0.99), IDSA_R_UNKNOWN, 
"victim-pid", IDSA_T_PID, target, 
"victim-name", IDSA T STRING, name, 
NULL); - -
This example has the same effect as the previous one, but involves idsa scan, not idsa _set. 
Consequently the process id in the variable target is represented as a string to be parsed by 
idsa_set. Also note that the risk to confidentiality is specified directly using idsaJisk_make. 
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struct sockaddr in sa; 
char *method, *urlj 
idsa_set(c, "http-request", "sampJehttpd", 1, 
mSA R UNKNOWN, mSA R PARTIAL, mSA R UNKNOWN, 
"client-iP.', mSA_T_SADDR~ &Sa, - -
"http-method", IDSA_T_STRlNG, method, 
"uri", IDSA_T_STRING, uri, 
NULL); 
This example shows a client request as reported by the web server. The optional fields report the 
IP address of the client, the method and the requested urI. The event poses a partial threat to 
confidentiality, while the risks to availability and integrity are not rated. 
RETURN VALUE 
FILES 
IDSA_L_ALLOW if the event is permitted, IDSA_L_DENY if it is to be denied. By default 
an internal failure will generate an IDSA _ L _DENY return value, but this can be changed with 
the IDSA_F _FAIL OPEN flag to idsa_open. 
/etc/idsad.conf 
Default idsad(8) configuration file. 
/var /run/idsa 




idsa may only be distributed and modified in accordance with the terms of the GPL (GNU 
General Public License) as published by the FSF (Free Software Foundation). 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_open(3), idsa_close(3), idsa_types(3). 










A.4 Abstractions 169 
IDSA-SCHEME-AM(7) IDSA-SCHEME-AM(7) 
NAME 
IDS! A Access Control Abstraction 
DESCRIPTION 
This page lists the event field names which should be passed to idsa_set(3) or idsa_scan(3) to 
describe security events in terms of an access control model. The primary fields are 
mSA AM SUBJECT, IDSA AM OBJECT, and IDSA AM ACTION, with several 
types Of accE;s actions or modes d-;;fined-:- Additional fields are used to r-;;port compartments, levels 
and roles. 
FIELDS 
IDSA _ AM_SUBJECT 
Active entity which attempts the action 
IDSA_AM_OBJECT 
Passive entity on which the action is pf'normed 
IDSA AM ACTION 
- TYPe of action performed. The following string values are defined: 
IDSA _AM _ AREAD 
Transfer information to the subject 
IDSA _AM _ AWRITE 
Transfer information from the subject 
IDSA AM ACREATE 
Generate object 
mSA AM ADESTROY 
Render object inaccessible 
IDSA AM AFLOW 
Untrusted transfer: Subject gains sufficient control of object so that subsequent 
actions performed by object could have been performed at the request of this sub-
ject. Used to measure insecurity flow. Appropriate for invoking nonsetuid ex€-
cutables, changing uid, remote logins, etc 
IDSA_AM_AREQUEST 
Trusted transfer: Subject requests a trusted object to perform an action. Appro-
priate for execution of setuid executables, protocol commands 
IDSA_AM_AOTHER 
Fallback if none of the above are appropriate 
mSA AM CLEARANCE 
Security level of subject 
mSA _AM_CLASSIFICATION 
Security level of object 
IDSA_AM_DOMAIN 
Compartment of subject 
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IDSA-SCHEME-AM(7) 
IDSA_AM_TYPE 
Compartment of object 
IDSA AM ROLE 
EXAMPLE 
Role assumed by subject 
struct sockaddr In sa; 
char *urI; 
idsa set(c, "reply", "sarnplehttpd", 1, 
iDSA R UNKNOWN, IDSA R PARTIAL, IDSA R MINOR, 
IDSA - Ah1 SUBJECT, IDSA - T - SADDR, &sa, --
IDSA-AM-OBJECT, IDSA -T-STRING, urI, 
IDSA=AM=ACTION, IDSA=T)TRING, IDSA_AM_READ, 
NULL); 
Request permission to allow a client access retrieve an urI. 
SEE ALSO 
idsa _set(3), idsa _scan(3), idsad(8). 
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IDSA-SCHEME-CLF(7) IDSA-SCHEME-CLF(7) 
NAME 
IDS/A Common Logfile Format Mapping 
DESCRIPTION 
This page lists the event field names which should be passed to idsa set(3) or idsa scan(3) to 
describe security events using the Common Logfile Format (eLF) as dOcumented by Luotonen et 
III in http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/Daemon/User/Config/Logging.html. 
FIELDS 
IDSA CLF REMOTEHOST 
- Re;:;;ote hostname (or IP number if no DNS hostname is available or name resolution has 
been disabled) 
IDSA CLF RFC931 
- The remote logname of the user 
IDSA _ CLF _ AUTHUSER 
The usemame as which the user has authenticated himself 
IDSA CLF DATE 
- Date and time of the request. Note that idsa events also provide a timestamp 
IDSA_CLF _REQUEST 
The request line exactly as it came from the client 
IDSA CLF STATUS 
- The HTTP status code returned to the client 
IDSA CLF BYTES 
EXAMPLE 
The content-length of the document transferred 
struct sockaddr In sa; 
int bytes, code; 
char *req; 
code = 404; 
idsa_set(c, "reply", "samplehttpd", 0, 
IDSA_R_MINOR, IDSA_R_NONE, IDSA_R_NONE, 
IDSA CLF REMOTEHOST, IDSA T SADDR, &sa, 
IDSA - CLF -STATUS, IDSA TINT, &code, 
IDSA - CLF -BYTES, IDSA -T -INT, &bytes, 
IDSA=CLF=REQUEST, IDS"Aj'_STRING, req, 
NULL); 
Report a web page access. 
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IDSA-SCHEME-CLF(7) IDSA-SCHEME-CLF(7) 
SEE ALSO 
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IDSA-SCHEME-ERR(7) IDSA-SCHEME-ERR(7) 
NAME 
IDS! A Error Reporting Scheme 
DESCRIPTION 
This page documents an abstraction which describes errors and their location. The abstraction 
considers the entity reporting the errors to be part of a layered design, where errors may occur 
above, inside, adjacent and below the reporting system. 
USAGE 
I rnTE~~AL!UNHANDLED ~---;~ PROTOCOL 
SYSTEM 
Supplementary fields IDSA _ ES _ SYS _ ERRNO, IDSA _ ES _ SYS _EXIT and 
IDSA _ ES _PRO _HTTP provide more detailed information for particular subsystems. 
FIELDS 
IDSA_ES 
The type of error reported. It should have one of the following value strings: 
IDSA ES USAGE 
- Failure at user interface (layer above reporting system) 
mSA _ ES _SYSTEM 
Failure at infrastructure (layer below reporting system) 
IDSA _ ES ]ROTOCOL 
Failure at logical peer (system at same layer, external to reporting system) 
IDSA ES UNHAND LED 
Anticipated but unhandled condition internal to reporting system 
mSA ES rnTERNAL 
Unanticipated failure internal to reporting system 
IDSA _ ES _OTHER 
Other or unknown type of error 
IDSA ES SYS ERRNO 
- U'[;ix e;;'or number associated with error, listed in /usr/include/errno.h 
mSA ES SYS EXIT 
- U'[;ix erit code associated with error, listed in /usr/include/s1Jsexists.h 
IDSA_ES_PRO_HTTP 
RFC2068 HTTP error status codes 
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IDSA-SCHEME-ERR(7) 
EXAMPLE 
struct sockaddr _in saj 
int statusj 
status 40l; 1* not authorised * / 
idsa_set(c, "not-found", "samplehttpd", 0, 
IDSA_R_MINOR, IDSA_R_NONE, IDSA_R_NONE, 
"client-ip", IDSA_T_SADDR, &sa, 
IDSA_ES, IDSA_T_STRING, IDSA_ES_PROTOCOL, 
IDSA_ES]RO_HTTP, IDSA_T_INT, &status, 
NULL); 
Report a request for an entity which the peer is not permitted to access. 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_set(3), idsa_scan(3), idsad(8). 
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IDSA-SCHEME-FNL(7) IDSA-SCHEME-FNL(7) 
NAME 
IDS / A Functionality Scheme 
DESCRIPTION 
This page describes a simple, discrete functionality labelling abstraction. A similar, continuous 
approximation can be implemented using the required adak field, with important functions hav-
ing a high cost to availabilty if denied. 
FIELDS 
IDSA _FNL _LEVEL 
The functionality level of the current event, with essential operations starting at 0 
IDSA]NL _MAX 
EXAMPLES 
The highest functionality level 
struct sockaddr In sa; 
idsa_set(c, "http-request", "samplehttpd", 1, 
"client-ip", IDSA T SADDR, &sa, 
"http-method", IDSA_T_STRlNG, "GET", 
IDSA FNL, IDSA TINT, 0, 
NULL); - -
idsa_set(c, "http-request", "samplehttpd", 1, 
"client-ip",IDSA T SADDR, &8a, 
"http-method", IDSA_T_STRlNG, "MKCOL", 
IDSA FNL, IDSA T INT, 3, 
NULL)j - -
Report a basic function as well as a less frequently used extension. 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_set(3), idsa_scan(3), idsad(8). 
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IDSA-SCHEME-LDM(7) IDSA-SCHEME-LDM(7) 
NAME 
IDS/A Logging Data Map Mapping 
DESCRIPTION 
This page lists the event field names which should be passed to idsa_set(3) or idsa_scan(3) to 
describe security events UBing the Logging Data :M;ap (LDM) proposed by Ranum and Robertson 
in http://www.mnum.com/loggingjlogging-data-map.html. The explanations are reproduced 
largely verbatim. 
FIELDS 
IDSA LDM NDATE 
- Nor~al Date/Time Normalized (IS08601) Date/Time format. Note that idsa also pro-
vides a timestamp 
IDSA_1OM_SOURCEID 
Source host identifier 
IDSA _10M _ TRANSID 
Transaction or message identifier 
IDSA_1OM]RIO 
Snort priority rating in the range 0-11: 
o Not suspicious traffic 
1 Unknown traffic 
2 Potentially bad traffic 
3 Attempted information leak 
4 Information leak 
5 Large scale information leak 
6 Attempted denial of service 
7 Denial of service attack 
8 Attempted user privilege gain 
9 User privilege gain 
10 Attempted administrator privilege gain 
11 Administrator privilege gain 
IDSA LDM REFS 
Event-IDs of related records, comma separated in form of message-ID@Source-ID 
IDSA_LDM_GEOLOC 
Geographic location if known or relevant (arbitrary format) 
IDSA 10M GROUP 
- Gro-;;:ping for administrative purposes (Arbitrary site private) (e.g.: "sales", "west coast", 
... ) 
IDSA_LDM_RAWMSG 
Original message text, raw evidence form 
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IDSA-SCHEME-LDM(7) IDSA-SCHEME-LDM(7) 
IDSA_LDM_DESCRlPT 
Short description of event (human readable) ("failed login attempt" "message delivery 
notification" ... ) 
IDSA _ LDM _OPERATION 
Description of operation performed (arbitrary string: "get file", POST, stat=sent, exec) 
IDSA LDM PROTO 
- Pro"Gcol in use for event (IPV6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, ... ) 
IDSA_ LDM _ ALERTMSG 
Short description of alert (human readable) if appropriate (" Denial of service attack 
deflected .. ") 
IDSA _ LDM_ ERRMSG 
Error message associated with the event, if any 
IDSA LDM SRCPID 
- Sotice process ID (if appropriate) of related process 
IDSA LDM SRCIDENT 
- Sotice of record (kernel, application, device, app name, or proc name) 
IDSA_LDM_SRCUSER 
User-ID or name of attributed user 
IDSA LDM TARGUSER 
- Use;--ID or name of target/victim/destination user if applicable 
IDSA LDM SRCDEV 
- Sotice device or host platform (hostname, ip, mac address) identifier 
IDSA LDM TARGDEV 
- Target device or host platform (hostname, ip, mac address) identifier 
IDSA _ LDM _ SRCCRED 
Credential presented by source user if any (password, password text, crypto key, cookie) 
IDSA LDM TARGCRED 
- Credential presented for use at destination if any (password, password text, crypto key, 
cookie) 
IDSA_LDM_SRCPATH 
Source Pathname (URI, filename, executable to run, ... ) (Windows pathnames should 
include Device: specifier if available) 
IDSA LDM TARGPATH 
- Target Pathname (URI, filename, executable to run, ... ) 
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IDSA-SCHEME-LDM(7) 
EXAMPLE 
struct sockaddr in sa; 
char *url; -
idsa_set(c, "reply", "samplehttpd", 0, 
IDSA R MINOR, IDSA R NONE, IDSA R NONE, 
IDSA-LDM SOURCEID, rOSA T SADDR,&sa, 
IDSA-LDM-PROTO, IDSA T STRING, "HTTP", 
IDSA=Lm(TARGPATH, IDSAJ_STRING, urI, 
NULL); 
Report a web page access. 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_set(3), idsa_scan(3), idsad(8) . 
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mSA-SCHEME-RQ(7) mSA-SCHEME-RQ(7) 
NAME 
IDS / A Resource Accounting Abstraction 
DESCRlPTION 
This page lists the event field names which should be passed to idsa_set(3) or idsa_scan(3) to 
describe the resources held by a monitored application. Each resource is considered to consist of a 
number of discrete elements which are either allocated/consumed or available for allocation/con-
sumption. An application in its simplest form would report the resources a..~ a count, using either 
IDSA RQ REQUEST, IDSA RQ RELEASE or IDSA RQ USED as well the field 
IDSA=RQ=UNITS to describe -the entities counted. More elaborate systems may also list 
totals, report unallocated elements and categorise resources. 
FIELDS 
mSA _ RQ_ REQUEST 
The resources which are requested by the application emitting the security event 
mSA _ RQ_ RELEASE 
The resources released by the application. This field differs from the inverse of the previ-
ous one in that the release of resources is not blocked 
mSA RQ USED 
- The number of resource items already held by the monitored entity, not counting the ones 
currently being requested or about to be released 
mSA_RQ]REE 
The number of resource elements which could potentially still be allocated to the request-
ing system 
mSA RQ TOTAL 
- The overall number of resource elements 
mSA_ RQ_ UNITS 
The units in which the reported resource elements are measured. Loads can be expressed 
as a number of units per time interval. 
mSA RQ CLASS 
- The resource type held or consumed. The abstraction proposes three major categories 




Resources related to transfers or communications, such as bytes of network traffic 
or blocks of disk 10 
mSA RQ CPROCESSOR 
- R;'ources devoted to manipulation or transformation, such as CPU time 
mSA _ RQ_ CSTORAGE 
Resources required for storage, such as disk blocks or bytes or RAM 
int size; 
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IDSA-SCHEME-RQ (7) 
idsa_set(c, "multimediarreply", "samplehttpd", 1, 
"content-type, IDSA_T_STRING, "video/mpeg", 
IDSA_RQ_REQUEST, IDSA_T_INT, &size, 
IDSA RQ UNITS, IDSA T STRING, "bytes-sent", 
IDSA=RQ=CLASS, IDSA=T=STRING, IDSA_RQ_CTRAFFIC, 
NULL); 
IDSA-SCHEl\ilE-RQ(7) 
Request permission to transfer a video to a client of a given number of bytes. 
SEE ALSO 
idsa _set(3), idsa _scan(3), idsad(8). 
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IDSA-SCHEME-SSM(7) IDSA-SCHEME-SSM(7) 
NAME 
IDS/A Service State Model 
DESCRIPTION 
This page presents a simple state model which represents the monitored system as a set of transi-
tions. These are shown in the state diagram given below. Note that the depicted finite state 
automaton can be extended to a pushdown automaton where wstart pushes a symbol and both 
wstop and wfail consume it in order to encode the constraint that a unit of work has to be initi-
ated before it can complete or fail. 




This field contains the transitions made by the application. It should have of the follow-
ing value strings: 
IDSA _SSM_SSTART 
Service ready to do work 






IDSA _SSM _ SSTOP 
Service completed successfully 
IDSA_SSM_SFAIL 
Service terminated abnormally 
IDSA _SSM _ WSTART 
Started a unit of work 
IDSA SSM WSTOP 
Completed a unit of work successfully 
IDSA_SSM_ WFAIL 
Failed to complete a unit of work 
struct sockaddr In sa; 
int fd, status, SZj 
. IDS/A System 
I 
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IDSA-SCHEME-SSM(7) 
sz = sizeof( sa) j 
fd accept(lfd, &sa, &sz)j 
idsa_set(c, "new-request", "sa.mplehttpd", 1, 
"ciient-ip", IDSA T SADDR, &sa, 
IDSA SSM, IDSAf STRING, IDSA SSM WSTART, 
NULL)j - - --
status = 404j 
idsa_set(c, "new-request", "samplehttpd", 0, 
"http-status", IDSA TINT, &status, 
IDSA SSM, IDSA T STRING, IDSA SSM WFAIL, 
NULL)j - - --
Report an HTTP request on arrival, as well as the failure to service it. 
SEE ALSO 
idsa_set(3) , idsa_scan(3), idsad(8). 
i IDS/ A System APRIL 2003 
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